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PREFACE 
 
 
This document is a compilation of technical policies for human spacecraft as 
released through the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) Design and 
Procedural Standards activity.  
 
The Design and Procedural Standards are located in Section 2 of this manual 
and are identified according to the applicable discipline or category, with letter 
codes as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Letter Codes for Standards 
 
G General 
E Electrical 
F Fluids 
M/P Materials and Processes 
M/S Mechanical and Structural 
P Pyrotechnics 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments and questions regarding this document should be directed to the JSC 
Technical Standards Control Board (JTS) Executive Secretary or the JTS Chair, 
mail code EA4, Houston, Texas 77058. 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Danny Punch for 
_________________________________ 
 
Director, Engineering   
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   PURPOSE 
This document provides design and procedural requirements appropriate for inclusion in specifications for 
any human spaceflight program, project, spacecraft, system, or end item. The term “spacecraft” as used 
in the standards includes launch vehicles, orbital vehicles, non-terrestrial surface vehicles, and modules. 
The standards are developed and maintained as directed by Johnson Space Center (JSC) Policy 
Directive JPD 8080.2, JSC Design and Procedural Standards for Human Space Flight Equipment.  
1.2   SCOPE 
The Design and Procedural Standards contained in this manual represent human spacecraft design and 
operational knowledge applicable to a wide range of spaceflight activities. These standards are imposed 
on JSC human spaceflight  equipment through JPD 8080.2.  Designers shall comply with all design 
standards applicable to their design effort.  
1.3   BACKGROUND   
The Design and Procedural Standards activity was established to develop technical and procedural policies for 
human spaceflight programs. Originally published in 1964, the Standards manual has been revised 
periodically. Because of agency document management changes over the years, the letters in front of 8080.5 
have changed many times over the years without affecting the standards contained within the document.  
1.4   JSC TECHNICAL STANDARDS CHANGE BOARD 
 
The JSC Technical Standards (JTS) Change Board was established by JPD 8080.2 and charters by EPC 
2104.00, Charter of the JSC Technical Standards Control Board,  EA-07-028 to perform and administer the 
technical standards activity at the Johnson Space Center.  
The JTS membership represents the various technical and operations disciplines involved in past and 
present human spaceflight activities at JSC.  Each standard is assigned to the most knowledgeable and 
appropriate organization and the organization assigns a Lead Engineer for ownership.   
1.5   DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS   
Any JSC employee may propose a new JSC standard or a revision to an existing standard. Proposed 
new standards and revisions to existing standards will be submitted to the JTS. A Lead Engineer and 
Lead Organization will be identified for each new standard. 
Standards will be submitted on the appropriate JTS change form.   The change form identifies a revision, 
a proposed cancellation, or the inclusion of a new standard.     
Supporting or background information should be enclosed with the change. 
1.6   CANCELLED STANDARDS 
Standards may be cancelled following the same process for new and revised standards. Cancelled 
standards are not deleted from this document so that the standard can be returned to active status. All 
cancelled standards are removed from the main body of this document and placed in Appendix B. The 
rationale for canceling the standard is documented on the standard itself, as well as in the JTS 
configuration management records.  
1.7   WAIVERS  
Standards may be waived by obtaining approval of the NASA Technical Authority and the 
Program/Customer Control Board (CCB) that controls the requirements specification for the project or 
program.  The waiver process is defined in other agency documentation.  Waivers are not required for 
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standards that are determined to be "not applicable."  This applicability is coordinated with the Safety and 
Mission Assurance Directorate. 
1.8   JSC DESIGN AND PROCEDURAL STANDARDS NUMBERING 
JSC Design and Procedural Standards are categorized into logical groupings and numbered consecutively, 
within their respective categories, as they are released, revised, or cancelled. The standards are listed in 
this manual in numerical order within their respective categories (see paragraph 1.11 below as well as the 
sections comprising Section 2). Standards appear in only one category and are not repeated, even if 
appropriate for another category. As an example, some electrical standards are found in the general 
section. The user should be familiar with all standards.  
1.9   ISSUE DATES AND REVISION HISTORY 
For updated standards, the information block at the top of each standard reads: “Effective as of”.  For 
cancelled standards, the information block reads: “Cancelled”.   
To trace the revision history of each standard, please refer to Appendix A where original effective dates 
and revision dates are located for each standard. 
1.10  LISTING IN KEY WORD INDEX 
Key words selected to aid in searching for relevant standards are presented in alphabetical order as a 
Key Word Index (see Section 3) with a listing of the standards applicable to each word. For each 
standard, the Statement of Standard provides the requirements.  The fact that a standard may not be 
listed under a specific word or category does not relieve JSC organizational elements of the responsibility 
for applying the requirement. 
1.11  LIST OF STANDARDS 
 
JSC Design and Procedural Standards are listed below in numerical order within their respective 
categories.  The categories are General (G), Electrical (E), Fluids (F), Materials and Processes (M/P), 
Mechanical and Structural (M/S), and Pyrotechnics (P).  Active standards are located in the Section 2.  
Cancelled standards are located in Appendix B Cancelled Standards. 
  
 JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
 
 
 
 1-4 
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2.2. ELECTRICAL ..................................................................................................................... 2.2-1 
 
E-1 MATING PROVISIONS FOR ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS ............................................... 2.2-3 
E-2 PROTECTION OF SEVERED ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS ...................................................... 2.2-4 
E-3 ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES PROTECTION FROM REVERSE POLARITY 
AND/OR OTHER IMPROPER ELECTRICAL INPUTS ....................................................... 2.2-5 
E-4 ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS - MOISTURE PROTECTION ............................................... 2.2-6 
E-5 ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS - PIN ASSIGNMENT ............................................................ 2.2-7 
E-6 CORONA SUPPRESSION .................................................................................................... 2.2-8 
E-7 PROBLEM ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS - RESTRICTIONS ON USE ............................ 2.2-10 
E-8 ELECTRICAL / ELECTRONIC SUPPLIES AND LOADS –  
VERIFICATION TESTS .................................................................................................... 2.2-14 
E-9 ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS – DE-ENERGIZING REQUIREMENT ........................................ 2.2-15 
E-10 CLEANING OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT .................................... 2.2-16 
E-11 PROTECTIVE COVERS OR CAPS FOR ELECTRICAL  
RECEPTACLES AND PLUG ............................................................................................ 2.2-17 
E-12 ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS - DISCONNECTION FOR  
TROUBLE-SHOOTING AND BENCH TESTING .............................................................. 2.2-18 
E-13 BIOINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS - CREW ELECTRICAL SHOCK  
PROTECTION STANDARD .............................................................................................. 2.2-19 
E-14 ELECTRICAL WIRE HARNESSES - ACCEPTANCE TESTING ...................................... 2.2-20 
E-15 ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION –  
VERLOAD PROTECTION & FAULT PROPAGATION ..................................................... 2.2-21 
E-16 TESTING PROTECTIVE DEVICES FOR ELECTRICAL AND  
ELECTRONIC CIRCUITS ................................................................................................. 2.2-23 
E-17 ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC PIECE PARTS –  
HERMETIC CONSTRUCTION ......................................................................................... 2.2-24 
E-18  RECLASSIFIED AS G-54 ................................................................................................. 2.2-25 
E-19 EQUIPMENT DESIGN – POWER TRANSIENTS ............................................................. 2.2-26 
E-20 ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE PROTECTION  
OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT ...................................................................................... 2.2-27 
E-21 - CANCELLED – SEE APPENDIX B ................................................................................. 2.2-28 
E-22 IONIZING RADIATION EFFECTS ON ELECTRONICS .................................................... 2.2-29 
E-23 - CANCELLED – SEE APPENDIX B ................................................................................. 2.2-32 
E-24 ELECTRICAL WIRE AND CABLE ACCEPTANCE TESTS .............................................. 2.2-33 
E-25 PROTECTING ELECTRICAL WIRES, CABLES, BUNDLES,  
AND HARNESSES ..................................................................................................................... 2.2-36 
 
2.3. FLUIDS ............................................................................................................................... 2.3-1 
 
F-1    RESTRICTION REQUIREMENTS -PRESSURIZED  COMPONENTS .............................. 2.3-3 
F-2    WATER SEPARATORS IN A ZERO-GRAVITY ENVIRONMENT ..................................... 2.3-4 
F-3    SERVICE POINTS - POSITIVE PROTECTION FROM INTERCHANGE-ABILITY OF  
FLUID SERVICE LINES...................................................................................................... 2.3-6 
F-4    GROUND SERVICE POINTS -FLUID SYSTEMS .............................................................. 2.3-7 
F-5    FLUID LINES - SEPARATION PROVISION ....................................................................... 2.3-8 
F-6    TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE MONITORING REQUIREMENTS FOR  
POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS REACTIVE FLUIDS ........................................................... 2.3-9 
F-7    CAPPING OF FLUID SERVICING AND TEST PORTS NOT REQUIRED TO  
FUNCTION IN FLIGHT ..................................................................................................... 2.3-10 
F-8    FLUID SYSTEMS COMPONENTS WHOSE FUNCTION IS DEPENDENT ON  
DIRECTION OF FLOW - PROTECTION AGAINST INCORRECT INSTALLATION ........ 2.3-11 
F-9    SPACECRAFT VENTING-INDUCED PERTURBING FORCES ...................................... 2.3-12 
F-10  NOZZLES AND VENTS - PROTECTION PRIOR TO LAUNCH ...................................... 2.3-13 
F-11  FLUID SUPPLIES - VERIFICATION TEST PROVISIONS ............................................... 2.3-14 
F-12  PROTECTION OF PRESSURIZED SYSTEMS FROM DAMAGE DUE TO  
PRESSURANT DEPLETION - SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ................................................. 2.3-15 
F-13  HABITABLE MODULE PRESSURE - VENTING RESTRICTION .................................... 2.3-16 
F-14  CANCELLED – SEE APPENDIX B ................................................................................... 2.3-17 
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F-15  SEPARATION OF HYPERGOLIC REACTANTS ............................................................. 2.3-18 
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Systems, subsystems, equipment, and components shall be designed with features that 
contribute to the ease and rapidity of maintenance. 
 
Equipment expected to require servicing, replacement, or maintenance shall be designed to be 
accessible without removal of other equipment, wire bundles, and fluid lines.  This should 
include accessibility during ground operations (horizontal and vertical) as well as on orbit. 
 
Electrical connections and cable installations shall be designed with sufficient flexibility, length, 
and protection to permit disconnection and reconnection without damage to wiring or 
connectors. 
 
Panel-mounted displays and controls that are inside the habitable areas shall be capable of 
being totally maintained from the habitable area.  Each display and control installation shall be 
designed to permit removal and replacement without disturbing the validity and integrity of 
other components or subsystems. 
 
 
The version updated in October 2004 modifies the text to align better with longer-term 
maintenance activities encountered on longer duration space missions such as the 
International Space Station or exploration missions 
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Redundant systems, redundant subsystems, and redundant major elements of subsystems 
(such as assemblies, panels, power supplies, tanks, controls, and associated interconnecting 
wiring and fluid lines) shall be separated or protected to ensure that an unexpected event 
which damages one is not likely to prevent the other from performing the functions. 
 
Electrical wiring of redundant systems, redundant subsystems, or redundant major elements of 
subsystems shall not be routed in the same wire bundle or through the same connector with 
wiring of the other redundant system, subsystem, or subsystem element. 
 
This standard is not applicable to redundant components or piece parts mounted in common 
housings within redundant systems, subsystems, or subsystem elements. 
 
This standard does not apply to redundant explosive charges that are located adjacent to each 
other in order to sever structural members at a given point or along a given line.  However, the 
electrical wiring of redundant systems and routing shall apply. 
 
 
 
For purposes of this standard, "redundancy" is defined as the ability to perform a function by 
more than one means. 
 
 
This recommended separation for electrical wiring also applies to fluid lines. 
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Electrical and fluid systems and subsystems shall be designed to permit checkout tests and 
shall include provisions (e.g., test points) that permit these checkout tests to be conducted 
without disconnecting any tubing, mated flight couplings, or any other mated flight connectors.  
 
Test points shall allow checkout of the system without loss of integrity (e.g., loss of pressure, 
leakage, loss of continuity, etc.). 
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Electrical and mechanical systems shall be shielded in such a way that encounters with debris 
or foreign material do not cause a malfunction.  Acceptable methods include, but are not 
limited to, the following: 
1. Design and fabricate electrical circuitry to prevent the establishment of unwanted current 
paths from such debris. 
2. Provide critical electrical items with debris-proof covers, suitable containers, housings, 
potting, or conformal coatings. 
3. Provide critical mechanical systems with debris-proof covers, shrouds, or containers that 
protect the entire system prior to use, or that prevent debris from entering into critical 
areas of the mechanism where the debris could cause binding, jamming, or seizing. 
4. Incorporate filters, strainers, traps, screens, or other devices in moving-fluid components 
of electrical or mechanical systems to trap debris in a manner that will eliminate it as a 
threat to critical mechanical or electrical components.  In systems where flow reversal 
may occur, install such devices on both sides of critical components.  Make sure all such 
devices are able to be cleaned in-flight and/or are able to be replaced as part of the 
maintenance program. 
 
 
Refer to G-5 for prevention of debris. 
 
Crew cabin module ventilation fans are low pressure-drop devices with small clearances 
between blades and duct to maximize efficiency and minimize power consumption.  Under 
microgravity conditions ventilation systems are particularly prone to blockage due to 
particulates.  International Space Station ventilation systems suffered up to 80% reduction in 
flow due to the entrainment of clusters of particulate or fibrous debris in the ventilation 
systems.  This debris penetrated through a protective screen with .02-inch diameter hole size, 
but then combined to block internal flow paths with .125-inch diameter.  Because simple 
screens have been shown to be ineffective in long duration protection of ventilation systems in 
microgravity, depth filters should be used to protect ventilation systems from particulate fouling 
for long-duration missions.  A similar phenomenon can occur in liquid media systems where 
particulates chemically combine downstream of the filter to produce larger than screen-size 
debris clumps.  These systems should be assessed for the use of depth filters or more 
effective chemical filters.  
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A Foreign Object Debris (FOD) prevention program shall be established for all ground 
operations of mechanical and electrical systems of flight hardware including the design, 
development, manufacturing, assembly, repair, processing, testing, maintenance, operation, 
and check out of the equipment to ensure the highest practical level of cleanliness. 
 
The FOD prevention program shall conform to NAS 412 "Foreign Object Damage/ Foreign 
Object Debris (FOD) Prevention". 
 
 
 
 
 
Refer to G-4 for protection from FOD.   
 
NAS 412 is available through NASA Technical Standards Program at Marshall Space Flight 
Center. 
 
Refer to JSC 49774 "Standard Manned Spacecraft Requirements for Materials and 
Processes", paragraph 4.2.9 for selection of materials to prevent growth of biological 
contaminants. 
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G-6 – G-7 have been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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Spacecraft systems, subsystems, and equipment shall be designed to permit verification 
of redundant functions or operational modes any time the system, subsystem, or 
equipment requires testing prior to launch or during the mission.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This standard is not to be interpreted to require verification of redundancy every time the 
system, subsystem, or equipment is tested but merely to require that the 
systems/subsystems/equipment be designed in a manner to allow redundancy verification 
if it is deemed necessary. Verification of redundancy may occur at any time from 
acceptance testing through launch processing, mission operations, and post flight.  
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Shatterable materials shall not be used in the habitable compartment unless positive 
protection is provided to prevent fragments from entering the cabin environment. 
 
Photographic, optoelectronic, and television lenses are exempt from this standard when 
in use, but they shall be protected by suitable covers when not in use. 
 
This standard is also applicable to nonflight hardware or ground support equipment 
(GSE), including wiring and tubing that is carried on or used in the habitable compartment 
subsequent to start of equipment installation, at the contractor's facility or in a 
Government facility. 
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Spacecraft components which are time-critical and/or cycle-critical or which have limited 
storage life shall be subject to the following controls: 
 
1. Each time-critical or limited-life assembly, subassembly, component, and spare shall 
be clearly and indelibly marked with a serial number. 
2.  Appropriate documentation shall accompany all time-critical and limited-life items and 
shall include the date of manufacture of the item and of its most time-critical 
component. Realistic life limits shall be assigned and documented for each item and 
shall be suitably altered as new data and new evidence are obtained. 
3.  Status records shall be maintained on all such items after installation in the spacecraft. 
Operating-time logs shall be maintained for all items having limited operating lives. 
Components shall have sufficient life remaining to adequately support mission 
requirements. 
4. Special storage requirements shall be carefully defined and strictly observed. 
A time-age-life cycle database shall be maintained for verification (and notification) of 
time-age-life component status. 
 
 
This requirement may be satisfied by the inventory management subsystem of the 
onboard data management system. 
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Purchase requests (PRs), requests for proposal (RFPs), purchase orders (POs), credit 
card purchases, contracts, and subcontracts for items procured for use in human 
spaceflight shall be submitted with the statement shown below. 
 
The information shall be printed, stamped, or added in boldface type. 
 
FOR USE IN HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT, MATERIALS, 
MANUFACTURING, AND WORKMANSHIP OF HIGHEST 
QUALITY STANDARDS ARE ESSENTIAL TO ASTRONAUT 
SAFETY. 
 
IF YOU ARE ABLE TO SUPPLY THE DESIRED ITEMS WITH 
A QUALITY WHICH IS HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE ITEMS 
SPECIFIED OR PROPOSED, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO 
BRING THIS FACT TO THE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION OF 
THE PURCHASER. 
 
Procedures shall assure that new PRs, RFPs, POs, contracts, and subcontracts issued 
by prime contractors and their subcontractors down to the lowest tier include this 
information. Present contracts and subcontracts involving such hardware shall be 
amended at the earliest possible date to require the prime contractor or subcontractor to 
establish such procedures in all actions covering new procurement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued next page 
 
  
STATEMENT OF STANDARD 
G-11 Procurement Document 
Identification For Human 
Spaceflight Items 
Document No. 
 JSC-STD-
8080.5 
Standard No.  
 G-11 
Page  
1 of 2 
Previous 
Revision  
04/01/1991 
 
Current as of 08 March 2005 
JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
2.1-13 
 
Verify correct revision before use 
 
 
Continued from previous page 
 
 
For referral, here is the content of NASA FAR Supplement clause 1852.246-73, Human 
Space Flight Item. 
 
1852.246-73 Human Space Flight Item. 
  As prescribed in 1846.370(b), insert the following clause: 
HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT ITEM 
(MARCH 1997) 
  The Contractor shall include the following statement in all 
subcontracts and purchase orders placed by it in support of 
this contract, without exception as to amount or subcontract 
level: 
  
  "FOR USE IN HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT; MATERIALS, 
MANUFACTURING, AND WORKMANSHIP OF HIGHEST 
QUALITY STANDARDS ARE ESSENTIAL TO ASTRONAUT 
SAFETY. 
  
  IF YOU ARE ABLE TO SUPPLY THE DESIRED ITEM WITH 
A HIGHER QUALITY THAN THAT OF THE ITEMS 
SPECIFIED OR PROPOSED, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO 
BRING THIS FACT TO THE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION OF 
THE PURCHASER." 
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When certifying an item for a new application, use of qualification test data obtained 
during a previous certification shall meet the following conditions prior to use: 
 
1. There is no change in design and specifications from the original item certified 
including operating limits, weight, dimensions, materials, performance and tolerance, 
reliability, and quality. 
 
2. The configuration (part number and dash number) previously tested is identical to the 
configuration proposed for the new application. 
 
3. Manufacturing/Fabrication methods and process have not changed and are certified 
 
4. Previous environmental test conditions are greater than or equal to the environmental 
extremities and exposure durations required for the new application. 
 
5. Previous functional/performance test results are greater than or equal to the accuracy, 
input-output, sensitivity, and other performance/operational characteristics required for 
the new application. 
 
6. The previous test configuration is documented and is considered an adequate 
methodology/technology to provide test results for the new application. 
 
7. Previous test equipment tolerances and data resolution are documented. 
 
8. Inspection methods, inspection points, and acceptance test procedures are greater 
than or equal to the rigor of previous methodologies.  
 
9. Previous operating environments, exposure duration, cycling, and usage are greater 
than or equal to the operations concept required for the new application.  
 
10. Previous failures have been evaluated for impact to the validity of test and analysis 
data 
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Flight Certification of any item involves evaluation of verification data to determine if 
customer requirements have been met. When some of that data is already available from 
a prior flight certification program, and the appropriate technical evaluation determines 
that the data can be used to support a new certification program, it is cost effective to use 
existing data instead of performing additional testing. Previous failures and waivers must 
be reconsidered or resubmitted for approval by the authorizing organization. 
Environmental testing typically refers to vibration, thermal, thermal vacuum, radiation, 
loads, and electromagnetics.   
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G-13 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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The status of flight equipment and nonflight equipment (equipment which is not suitable 
for use in flight but which could be accidentally substituted for flight articles) shall be 
identified and classified as follows: 
 
CLASS I  Equipment acceptable for flight use. Identification shall be in 
accordance with drawings and specifications.   
CLASS II  Equipment acceptable for use in ground tests or training in a 
hazardous environment. The nameplate or a label adjacent to the nameplate shall be 
conspicuously marked "CLASS II, CONTROLLED EQUIPMENT" with flight compatible 
material. 
CLASS III  Equipment acceptable for nonhazardous training or display 
purposes. This equipment shall be conspicuously identified by red (or orange) stripes 
alternating with a contrasting base color or painted solid red. Red paint no. 28913 as 
specified by Federal standard 595A is the preferred color. An alternative to the paint 
method of identification is a red (or orange) striped nameplate or label marked "CLASS 
III, NOT FOR FLIGHT" applied to the equipment. The identification shall be visible 
when the equipment is installed. 
 
In addition, equipment not readily identifiable as nonflight equipment, as well as nonflight 
equipment hidden from view in a major module, shall have a red (or orange) serialized 
streamer attached to, or in the immediate vicinity of the installation.  The streamer shall 
be of a size and material compatible with the environment under which it will be used. 
Streamers are to be traceable to the major module which identifies and controls the item. 
A record of nonflight equipment and, if appropriate, associated streamer serial numbers 
shall accompany each major module upon formal transfer (i.e., DD250/1149) from one 
organization to another. 
 
Appropriate instructions shall be printed on each streamer. Streamers shall be numbered 
and accounted for prior to launch. 
 
The color coding requirements of this standard do not apply to explosive devices. 
REMARKS 
 
Nonflight equipment or hardware must be identified to preclude possible use during a 
flight mission. 
 
Hazardous environment is defined as a chamber environment (such as vacuum, high 
temperature, low temperature, and oxygen-rich atmosphere) or any other environmental 
condition that could subject the user of the equipment to a hazard of any kind.  
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Where flight or flight-like equipment has failed or otherwise exhibited anomalous 
performance or intermittent operation, launch-to-orbit of identical or like equipment, either 
as part of the flight vehicle or as a replacement, shall not be permitted unless one of the 
following occurs: 
 
1. It is verified that the basic deficiency which caused the failure or anomalous 
performance is not present in the flight equipment or its replacement. 
2. The basic deficiency has been counteracted by changes in operational procedures to a 
degree that eliminates it as an unacceptable risk to the success of the mission or the 
safety of the crew. 
3. The basic deficiency does not present an unacceptable risk to the success of the 
mission and safety of the crew. 
 
Do not use equipment that exhibits or has exhibited intermittent malfunctions, failures, or 
anomalies for flight until the malfunction, failure, or anomaly has been corrected or 
resolved to the satisfaction of the Flight Readiness Review Board. 
 
 
 
This standard supports the current philosophy that all failures or anomalous performance 
must be resolved before launch. 
 
Where the cause of an inconsistency remains unresolved, equipment is unreliable. 
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For spacecraft equipment where the operating temperature is normally controlled by 
heating or cooling equipment and the temperature is monitored in ground test and flight, 
the test program and/or appropriate analyses shall define the following: 
 
1. The maximum and minimum temperatures expected in normal operations 
 
2. The maximum and minimum temperatures (including duration and temperature rate of 
change, as appropriate) at which equipment may be expected to: 
 
a. Fail to meet specified performance until temperature is restored to normal range. 
 
b. Be permanently rendered inoperative. 
 
For critical components, automatic safing with manual override only shall be used. 
 
Information used to satisfy requirements 1 and 2 above shall be provided in operational 
constraints documentation. 
 
 
Knowing the maximum and minimum operating limits of spacecraft equipment is essential 
for flight and mission management.  This information needs to be readily available for real 
time decision-making. 
 
Item #1: 
This information is needed for equipment characterization and could be used for 
recognizing a thermal malfunction within the spacecraft equipment. 
 
 
Continued on next page 
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Item #2 
This information provides guidance to NASA in an unlikely, off-nominal mission scenario 
that normal operating temperatures may need to be exceeded due to malfunction(s) 
either external or internal to the equipment.  In such a scenario it may become necessary 
to operate equipment beyond the qualification limits and mission manager's need to know 
how far the equipment can be pushed and reasonably expect that the equipment can be 
turned off and subsequently reactivated to support the safe return of the crew.  The 
ultimate purpose of this information is to enable flight and mission management to make 
the best decisions possible in an off-nominal situation to maximize the probability of 
safely returning the crew. 
 
Relevant information used to form the guidelines may include data or analysis from other 
program or manufacturer  development (from DoD to COTS), data from operational 
programs due to unplanned thermal conditions, similar hardware data (document 
similarities and contrasts, e.g. non-screened parts data), sub-part data, bench testing that 
was not previously documented in reports, inadvertent test conditions, etc. 
 
The desired outcome is a set of useful temperature and duration guidelines for the 
deliverable units at the lowest cost.  Therefore, deriving the guidelines from the best 
available information is preferred and supplemental high-cost testing must be approved 
by the Program.  Engineering judgment should also be applied and documented as 
appropriate in meeting this requirement. 
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Assemblies, parts, and materials procured or designated specifically for use in space 
shall be:  
• positively identified  
• stored in controlled access areas 
• physically separated from nonflight parts and materials to avoid mixing. 
 
 
 
 
This standard is to prevent nonstandard, nonspaceflight, nonsegregated stock from being 
unintentionally used in space or in the fabrication of spaceflight equipment. 
 
For purposes of this standard, the term "controlled access area" is defined as: stock 
areas or areas of rooms which are separated from nonflight stock areas or rooms by 
fences, walls, or other physical separations and which have access control to ensure the 
following: 
 
1. Access by authorized personnel only 
 
2. Proper parts and materials storage, maintenance, and withdrawal 
 
3. Compliance with applicable quality assurance directives 
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Procedures developed for testing and operating spaceflight equipment or ground support 
equipment shall clearly indicate any step which, if not correctly followed, would result in 
injury to personnel, damage to a system or equipment, or an environmental impact. 
 
The cover sheet of the procedure shall indicate if the test or operation is hazardous. 
 
 
 
A warning statement, preceded by the word WARNING in upper use letters, is commonly 
used to emphasize any instructions which, if not correctly followed, would result in injury 
to personnel, damage to a system or equipment, or an environmental impact. The 
statement usually indicates the reason for the warning. 
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Manufacturing, assembly, or installation drawings for spacecraft, space flight equipment, 
experiments, and ground support equipment shall identify all special processes required 
to manufacture, assemble, and install the equipment.   
 
Process specifications shall be referenced, or the processes shall be specified in detail on 
the respective drawings. 
 
All referenced specifications not normally available shall be submitted upon request. 
 
 
 
The requirements of this standard are in addition to other requirements of the drawing 
system used.  The preferred method of documenting the special processes is to release 
separate process specifications and to make reference to the specifications on the 
drawings.   
 
Examples of special processes are cleaning, potting, etching, wire splicing, soldering, 
welding, brazing, and bonding.   
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Equipment sensitive to moisture and located where it is subject to liquid leaks during 
ground operations shall be identified in the design documentation.  This documentation 
shall also include:   
 
• The rationale for positioning the equipment in that location.  
 
• A plan for implementing protection of this equipment. 
 
 
 
Major damage to spacecraft and serious delay of programs can result from small, easily 
correctable leaks that would be of minor significance except for the effect of the leakage 
on exposed equipment. Experience has shown that fluid system leaks are particularly 
prevalent during initial ground testing of new spacecraft. 
 
Sources of moisture and liquid leaks may include systems fluids, water condensation, 
fluid from GSE or facilities, and natural phenomena. 
 
Protection from damage by leakage may include one or more of these methods: 
 
1. Designing the equipment to be insensitive to the liquid leakage 
2. Designing the plumbing or equipment containing the liquid to locate couplings, vents, 
service points, and other items where leakage from them could not reach the sensitive 
equipment 
3. Providing ground support equipment or devices to protect the sensitive equipment from 
leakage during ground operation 
4. Providing proper insulation to prevent condensate from forming and subsequently 
falling on the equipment 
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Spacecraft equipment within a pressurized compartment shall be designed so that 
performance of the equipment will not be degraded by humidity or moisture droplets in 
the spacecraft atmosphere or by condensation of moisture from the spacecraft 
atmosphere. 
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1. Product shall be identified by suitable means throughout its lifecycle in accordance 
with customer and/or regulatory requirements.  
2.  Where traceability is a customer and/or regulatory requirement, the  organization 
controls and records for the unique identification of the product shall be documented in 
accordance with JPR 1440.3. 
3.  For all JSC GFE for which JSC is the design authority, serial and/or lot numbers shall 
be provided by the Engineering Document Control Center (EDCC) per JPR 8500.3H.  
EDCC-controlled serial and lot numbers may be assigned to engineering drawings with 
non-JSC numbers only if the design authority and the configuration management of the 
design has been transferred to JSC.  
4. Records shall be maintained to preclude duplication of serial or lot numbers. 
Reference JPR 8500.4 for policies defining allowable values for serial and lot number 
assignment for JSC GFE. 
5.  Requirements on GFE products for a serial and/or lot number shall be established per 
NASA-STD-0005.  
6.  The engineering drawing shall document the method of marking and desired location 
for part identification on GFE parts, if applicable, per JPR 8500.4.  
7.  The organization initiating the manufacturing or purchase request shall obtain serial 
and/or lot numbers from the EDCC and specify specific serial and/or lot numbers on 
manufacturing or purchase requests, but not on drawings. 
8.  For critical and complex GFE hardware, the following additional requirements shall be 
met:  
a) The design authority/hardware owner maintains the identification of the 
configuration of the product in order to identify any differences between the actual 
configuration and the agreed configuration.  
b) According to the level of traceability required, the design authority/ hardware owner 
provides for: 
(1) Identification to be maintained throughout the product life;   
(2) All of the products manufactured from the same batch of raw material or 
from the same manufacturing batch to be traced, as well as the destination 
(delivery and scrap) of all products of the same batch;  
(3) An assembly, the identity of its components, and those of the next higher 
assembly to be traced;  
(4) For a given product, a sequential record of its production (manufacture, 
assembly, inspection) to be retrievable.   
Continued next page
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9. Parts used in flight hardware shall be identified by physical part marking or container 
marking per requirements defined on the applicable drawing. 
 
10. Hardware drawings shall include identification processes necessary to control 
parts until installed in an assembly. 
 
 
 
These requirements are intended to meet system engineering configuration management 
practices, the JSC quality system requirements (including ISO and AS9100), and FAR 
requirements. 
 
 
 
G-22 Parts Identification  
Document No. 
 JSC-STD-
8080.5 
Standard No.  
  G-22 
Page  
2 of 2 
Previous 
Revision  
2011_10 
 
Current as of 2012_06 
REMARKS 
JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
2.1-27 
 
Verify correct revision before use 
 
 
 
Electrical current entering a crew member's pressure garment shall be limited to a level 
that will not ignite or damage materials that would contact damaged wiring within the 
garment under the worst combination of short-circuit current and environment.  
 
Energy storage or conversion devices capable of producing short-circuit current of a 
magnitude and discharge rate sufficient to ignite materials shall not be located inside 
pressure garments, unless:  
1. adequate current limiting is provided, or  
2. there is no contact between potentially damaged wires and the material in question 
 
 
 
In this standard, "no contact" is defined as no electrically conductive path. 
 
The fire hazard associated with inclusion of communications and bioinstrumentation 
wiring in the oxygen-rich environment of pressure garments necessitates the analysis and 
selection of suitable materials to minimize the potential flammability hazard.  It is 
necessary to confirm the compatibility of the materials and electrical currents under failure 
conditions in the planned oxygen environment.   
 
Current limiting may be required to assure values below the threshold level for ignition of 
materials caused by arcing or heating from high-resistance heat sources.  An alternative 
to current limiting is strategic materials placement to ensure that flammable materials, 
that are demonstrated to ignite at the use conditions, are prevented from contacting 
potentially damaged electrical wiring or componentry. 
 
Selection of materials with suitable flammability characteristics is constrained by other 
requirements, such as flexibility, bulk, weight, and comfort of the crew. 
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Ground support equipment (GSE), airborne support equipment (ASE), facility equipment, 
or test equipment used in ground or flight operations shall be equipped with protective 
devices to preserve safe operation margins of the flight equipment. 
 
 
 
 
GSE or ASE, as a result of misuse or malfunction, has the potential for causing 
irreparable damage to spacecraft flight systems if the GSE or ASE does not incorporate 
design features for protecting against such eventualities.  
 
All GSE and ASE designs should be evaluated from the standpoints of inadvertent 
operator error and hardware (component) malfunction to ensure that protective features 
are adequate to safeguard spacecraft subsystems. Consideration should be given to the 
need for not only static overload protection (such as pressure relief, electrical fuses, etc.) 
but also protection from such elements as dynamic or transient conditions (e.g., electronic 
filters, accumulators) or contaminants (e.g., contaminant filters). 
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Hardware shall be designed to function in the full range of the thermal environment to 
which it will be exposed. 
 
Thermal analyses shall be performed for nominal and worst-case conditions for all 
temperature-sensitive components and structures.   
 
Worst hot and cold cases shall be analyzed using realistic combinations of thermal 
parameters which produce the worst-case conditions. 
 
 
 
 
Example: A solar constant with 3 percent seasonal variation will be used. Other heat flux 
impacts, solar absorptances, emittances, conductances, etc. will be varied to include 
measurement uncertainties, variations in application of coatings, and degradation. 
Boundary temperatures and heater voltages will be varied over the ranges expected. 
 
Thermal analysis includes both transient and steady state. 
 
This standard incorporates SSP 30213 no. G-25. 
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Laser sources sufficiently powerful to be a hazard shall be positioned to preclude the 
possibility of looking directly at the source.  
 
Sources emitting electromagnetic wavelengths between x-ray and visible light, sufficiently 
strong to pose a hazard, shall be positioned to preclude crew exposure or touch.  
 
Hazard distance shall be marked. 
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The primary means of fire control shall be the selection of materials that are 
nonflammable or nonpropagating in their use configuration.  Materials flammability control 
is addressed in Standard M/P-1. 
 
The capability for fire detection and suppression shall be provided.  
 
The material used to extinguish fires shall be nontoxic to humans and shall be capable of 
being easily cleaned up after it is used. 
 
 
 
Fire, particularly in a space vehicle, can be catastrophic. Special precautions are 
necessary, more so than on earth, because countermeasures must be self-contained 
within the space vehicle. 
 
In microgravity conditions, fires that are not actively fed with oxygen will self-extinguish.  
One fire control strategy is to eliminate ventilation, remove electrical power, evacuate 
personnel, and allow the fire to self-extinguish. 
 
Fire-resistant storage should be provided for hardware that is controlled for flammability 
by stowage when not in use. 
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On completion of final inspection following manufacture, each solid propellant rocket 
motor shall be sealed and pressurized to prevent damage due to entry of moisture or 
foreign material.  
 
The pressurant shall be dry N2 gas.  
 
The pressure applied shall be sufficient to ensure against entry of contaminants under 
any anticipated storage conditions.  
 
The seal shall be designed to withstand internal pressure corresponding to the maximum 
anticipated storage temperature with an adequate safety factor or shall include a relief 
device. 
 
The seal shall be installed such that it can be expelled during normal rocket ignition 
without damage to the nozzle. If no other provisions can be made to inspect the grain, 
access shall be provided through the seal. 
 
 
 
 
 
The seal may contain provisions for relief of pressure, pressurizing, and pressure gauge 
installation as necessary. 
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Crewed spacecraft which use a separate propulsion subsystem for reentry attitude control 
shall include means for testing this subsystem before jettisoning the last of any other 
attitude control systems which could be used to position the spacecraft in a reentry 
attitude. 
 
Control circuitry and attitude cues should be developed to enable the crew to test the 
reentry propulsion subsystem of the reentry module before abandoning an operating 
attitude control subsystem. 
 
This standard is not applicable for spacecraft without a separate propulsion subsystem for 
reentry attitude control.  For such cases, refer to the following document and sections: 
 
 
NPR 8705.2 Human-Rating Requirements and Guidelines for Space Flight Systems 
w/Change 2 (6/25/04) [Effective Date: June 19, 2003, Expiration Date: June 19, 2008]: 
1. Preface, Applicability, p.2. 
2. Section 2.5.3 Failure Tolerance and Reliability: 
a. Subsections 2.5.3.1 
b. Subsection 2.5.4.4 
 
 
This standard does not preclude the need for redundant reentry attitude control systems. 
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G-30 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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Where possible, actuating devices shall be made an integral part of the equipment to be 
operated. 
 
Detachable actuating tools, such as handles, pins, and ratchets, shall not be permitted in 
applications where tool nonavailability could compromise crew safety or primary mission 
objectives. 
 
Where tools are allowed for system controls, provisions shall be made whereby the 
position of the control is readily apparent to the responsible crew member without the tool 
in place. 
 
 
 
Detachable tools are generally undesirable for all applications in the crew compartment 
under zero-gravity conditions, but such devices may be used if a significant advantage in 
operation, weight reduction, or volume reduction is assured and if their application does 
not conflict with the constraints outlined above. 
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Standards G-32 – G-36 have been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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Visibility verification for crewed spacecraft shall include tests, simulations, or analyses to 
verify visibility during all anticipated phases and environmental conditions of the planned 
mission and contingencies. 
 
Simulations shall include mockups or high-fidelity computer simulation to ensure the view 
(picture) seen by the crew during each phase of the simulated mission will be comparable 
to that which will be seen in flight. 
 
 
Whenever possible, visibility verification tests should incorporate actual flight hardware. 
 
The external visibility may be provided using windows, external cameras, or alternative 
capability.   
 
During previous crewed spaceflight missions, visibility problems have occurred. Deposits 
have covered windows. Visibility has been restricted by parts of the spacecraft during 
certain mission phases. Light gathering properties of some optical instruments have not 
been satisfactory. Reflections and parallax have caused difficulty. Moisture has 
condensed between inner and outer panes of windows. Fingerprints and smear marks 
have compromised optical surfaces. 
 
Factors affecting satisfactory visibility include but are not limited to: 
 
1. Visibility and field-of-view requirements during each phase of the intended mission and 
for all anticipated contingencies. 
 
2. Protection or preventive measures to avoid unsatisfactory degradation of visibility due 
to buildup of solid or liquid deposits on all window surfaces, viewing ports, or other 
optical devices. 
 
Conitued on next page 
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3. Scene displays that will be required for simulators and training to ensure satisfactory 
crew training. 
 
4. Internal and external lighting conditions during the mission. 
 
5. Parallax. 
 
6. Possible angular reflections, particularly from rays of the sun. 
 
7. Optical surface coatings and treatments used to control optical properties and the 
sensitivity of the treated surfaces to human contact and environmental exposure. 
 
8. Thermal and vacuum conditions to which the viewing device will be subjected. 
 
9. Obstruction of critical view by parts of the spacecraft itself. 
 
NASA-STD-3000, Volume 1 "Man-systems Integration Standards", contains a discussion 
of design considerations on the following subjects: vision (i.e., space travel effects on), 
window integration (i.e., placement and location), and windows. 
 
High fidelity computer simulation capabilities may enable alternative methods for verifying 
visibility rather than using mockups.  The computer simulations are flexible for trying out 
multiple window/camera configurations, whereas mockups are less flexible.  
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In the design of pressurization, repressurization, and ventilation systems for habitable 
areas, provisions shall be made to prevent ingress of undesirable elements.  
 
This standard applies to spacecraft which have habitable areas pressurized at less than 
atmospheric pressure during normal mission and which must enter the earth's 
atmosphere or other atmospheres with pressures different from the spacecraft's normal 
operational pressure for habitable areas. 
 
 
 
During atmospheric entry and landing, undesirable elements such as vented propellants, 
heat shield fumes, and water may be ingested into habitable areas unless design or 
procedural precautions are taken. 
 
This standard in not intended to apply to airlock ingress and egress pressurization and 
depressurization procedures. 
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Lightning protection shall be designed into spacecraft which will operate in Earth's 
atmosphere such that, in the event of a lightning strike, flight hardware will not be 
damaged or affected to the extent that mission success, crew, or ground personnel safety 
is compromised. 
 
Verification of adequate protection shall be accomplished using both test and analysis 
based on technical detail contained in: 
 
• SAE ARP 5412 (Rev baseline, 11/01/99) ARP5412 : Aircraft Lightning Environment 
and Related Test Waveforms  
• SAE ARP 5413 (Rev baseline, 11/01/99)  ARP5413 : Certification of Aircraft 
Electrical/Electronic Systems for the Indirect Effects of Lightning  
• SAE ARP 5414 (Rev baseline, 12/01/99) ARP5414 : Aircraft Lightning Zoning  
• SAE ARP 5415 (Rev A, 05/01/02) ARP5415 : Users Manual for Certification of Aircraft 
Electrical/Electronic Systems for the Indirect Effects of Lighting  
• SAE ARP 5577 (Rev baseline, 09/01/02) ARP5577 : Aircraft Lightning Direct Effects 
Certification 
 
 
 
This standard has not been evaluated for its applicability to other atmospheres. 
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When radioactive material is to be used, such as radioactive luminescent devices, the 
following requirements shall be met: 
 
1. Each proposed use of radioactive material shall be approved by the JSC Radiation 
Safety Committee. 
 
2. A minimum amount of radioactive material shall be used consistent with the 
requirements. 
 
3. Radioactive materials shall be completely sealed or encapsulated in substances 
having low damage potential from the inherent radiation. 
 
4. Installation within or on the vehicle shall be such that it is unlikely that the seal of the 
radioactive material will be damaged because of ground or space environment, 
accidents, or mishandling. Installation in the habitable volume of a manned vehicle 
and/or in a location for potential contact with any crew member during extravehicular 
activity (EVA), intravehicular activity (IVA), ingress, or egress shall be protected 
against damage to eliminate the possibility of particle ingestion, inhalation, and/or skin 
contact by the crew. 
 
5. The component bearing the radioactive substance shall be designed for replacement 
with no damage to the seal of the radioactive substance. 
 
6. Each item containing radioactive material shall be permanently marked in a manner 
approved by the JSC Radiation Safety Committee. 
 
 
A byproduct material license issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
authorizes JSC to use radioactive components on spacecraft. This license, issued 
pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, requires that each use of radioactive 
material be reviewed and approved by the JSC Radiation Safety Committee for 
compliance with NASA and JSC health and safety issuances, the Code of Federal 
Regulations, and other applicable statutes. 
 
The type and degree of protection referred to in paragraph 4 will be dependent upon the 
amount of luminescent material and the design and location of the device 
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Standards G-41 – G-43 have been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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Spacecraft automatic attitude control circuitry shall be designed so that the crew can 
assume manual attitude control at all times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This revision increases the scope of the standard to require capability for manual 
takeover of the automatic attitude control circuitry during all phases of the mission. 
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Solid propellant rocket motors shall be designed with the capability to ignite without a 
seal, or with a nozzle seal failure, up to the highest altitude and maximum elapsed time at 
which ignition is required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nozzle covers (seals) are required to protect the grain from the environments but the 
motor should be capable of being lit when necessary even in the event of a seal failure. 
 
 
REFERENCES: 
 
JSC Design and Procedural Standard G-28, Sealing - Solid Propellant Rocket Motors. 
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Separation sensing systems designed to detect separation of stages or modules of space 
vehicles shall not inadvertently actuate separation sensors due to structural deformations 
or vibrations less severe than those associated with the structural failure of the vehicle. 
 
Separation sensing systems that are designed to initiate subsequent steps in a sequence 
of events shall be designed so that the failure or actuation of a single sensor will not 
initiate the sequence of events. 
 
Separation sensing systems shall be designed not to initiate a sequence of events 
unrelated to space vehicle separation. 
 
 
 
Separation sensors have erroneously given signals of spacecraft module separation 
because of structural deformation. On an uncrewed flight, high aerodynamic and 
vibrational loads caused structural deformation that resulted in an inadvertent firing of the 
launch escape tower. 
 
Structural deformation must be considered during the installation design to locate 
separation sensors where relative motion of the structural elements is not excessive and 
where inspection of the sensor can be accomplished. The sensors should be selected to 
require actuation travel substantially greater than the maximum deformation anticipated 
between the structural elements at the point of installation. 
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Guidance, Navigation and Control subsystems utilizing gyroscopes shall provide 
continuous outputs during operation to verify that gyroscopes are operating within 
specified limits.  
 
Gyroscopes shall be capable of providing operational readiness status prior to use. 
 
Failures shall be detected within a timeframe that allows for corrective action prior to 
negative consequences resulting from the failure. 
 
 
Optimum spacecraft operation and safety are dependent upon properly functioning 
gyroscopes. Failure detection and redundancy is desirable to mitigate the effects of 
gyroscope failures or off nominal operation. 
 
 
  
G-47  Gyroscopes - Verification Of 
Operational Status 
Document No. 
 JSC-STD-
8080.5 
Standard No.  
G-47  
Page  
1  of  1 
Previous 
Revision  
04/01/1991 
 
Current as of 08 March 2005 
STATEMENT OF STANDARD 
REMARKS 
JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
2.1-47 
 
Verify correct revision before use 
 
 
 
Furnish analytical proof or conduct tests to demonstrate that proposed onboard experiments shall not 
impair the safety or effectiveness of the astronaut or jeopardize the functioning of spacecraft equipment 
under worst case conditions.   
Examples include: 
Releasing solids, liquids, or gases. 
Producing temperature extremes or releasing thermal or ionizing radiation. 
Emitting electromagnetic radiation. 
Degrading external and internal visibility.  
Degrading internal auditory environment. 
Impeding crew ingress and egress.  
Jeopardizing the integrity of the spacesuit. 
Interfering with the operation of EVA or IVA controls. 
Jeopardizing the integrity of the spacecraft power system by transients or short circuits. 
Producing damage as a result of cabin decompression or recompression at maximum possible rate. 
Producing damage through loss of structural integrity during any spacecraft operation including land or 
water landings at maximum design conditions. 
Producing damage as a result of stored energy release. 
 
 
Instances have occurred where materials that were prohibited from use in the spacecraft 
environment were planned for experimental use. 
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G-49 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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The initiator of purchase requests and other applicable procurement documents for parts 
used in a spacecraft, space flight equipment, experiments, and ground support equipment 
shall specify on the procurement document that procurement must be made directly from 
the manufacturer or from distributors who can furnish certification of the following 
conditions:  
 
1. The item was actually produced or assembled by the designated manufacturer. 
2. The item conforms to the manufacturer’s current standards of performance and quality 
for items of the specified designation. 
3. The distributor can furnish any traceability records or documentation required by the 
PR for materials control, process control, and limited life tracking.  Traceability requires 
a configuration control system that includes drawing version control, fabrication 
records, and hardware serialization or lot tracking.   
 
 
 
There have been cases of procurement of obsolete, out of tolerance, and improperly 
stored parts when lot control and serialization were not specified. 
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Hardware and equipment that is scheduled as primary or spare equipment for flight shall 
not be used for training, unless all of the following conditions are met: 
 
1. Training use is strictly limited to the prime and backup flight crews or a designated 
delegate. 
 
2. Adequate crew familiarity with the characteristics of the actual flight equipment cannot 
be obtained from fabrication and use of flight-like training hardware or training models. 
 
3. A record of all training use is documented per controlled hardware documentation 
requirements. 
 
4. The equipment will subsequently be subjected to inspection and preinstallation 
acceptance tests prior to flight. 
 
5. After such training use, the life remaining on all limited-life items will be adequate for 
completion of the mission. 
 
 
 
October 2004 text modified to address crew availability during long-duration missions 
such as the International Space Station or exploration missions and hardware obtained 
specifically for training purposes. 
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Flight equipment that has been previously used in flight may be reused in crewed flight if 
the following minimum conditions have been met: 
 
1. Appropriate refurbishment, inspection, and testing have been accomplished between 
flights. 
 
2. Any elements not replaced will be within all shelf-life limits, operational time or cycle life 
limits, and environmental (e.g., vibration) life limits at the end of the mission. 
 
3. No evidence exists that the unit has been stressed beyond specification limits during 
previous use.    
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STATEMENT OF STANDARD 
 
After successful completion of some or all of the verification program, changes may occur 
that dictate the need for reverification assessment. Such changes may include changes in 
design configuration, material, manufacturing or procurement sources, operating 
environments, etc.  Baseline characterization data such as chemical and physical 
properties of materials including fluids as well as impurity composition and levels shall be 
collected during initial qualification such that any follow-on changes may be assessed 
relative to possible or anticipated impacts to equipment performance.  When such 
changes as those identified below occur, a reverification assessment shall be performed 
to determine the need to repeat previously completed verification activities. 
 
Qualification Reverification: If changes occur in any of the following, an assessment to 
determine the need to repeat any or all of previously completed qualification activities 
shall be performed and documented: 
 
1. Design configuration or manufacturing process changes (e.g., bonding, soldering, 
welding, installation torques of fasteners, etc.) 
2. Changes in fluids or lubricants; either in their specifications; procurement source, 
processing; transportation, or storage, or handling conditions.   
3. Changes in materials or parts; either in their specifications; procurement source; 
manufacturer; or processing. 
4. Changes to equipment, part, fluid, or lubricant manufacturer or manufacturing facility.  
5. Inspection, test, mission change, or other data indicates that a more severe 
environment or operating condition exists than that to which the equipment was 
originally qualified. 
6. Changes to flight software coding or capability.  
 
When repeat of some or all of previously completed qualification activities is conducted 
due to such changes, a reverification report shall be written to formally document the 
reason for the reverification, justification for the degree of reverification performed, and 
the results of the reverification activity. 
 
Continued next page 
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Acceptance reverification: If changes occur in any of the following, an assessment to 
determine the need to repeat any or all of previously completed acceptance activities 
shall be performed and documented: 
 
1. Any change consistent with the above changes identified for qualification reverification. 
2. A previously mated and verified interface has been demated. 
3. Any modification, repair, replacement, or rework occurs on the equipment. 
4. The equipment is subject to drift or degradation during transportation, storage, or 
handling. 
 
REMARKS 
 
This standard replaces information previously covered for qualification fluids in F-23 
(1991). 
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Automatic shutdown of launch vehicle engine(s) procedures/design shall maximize crew 
survival probability as part of the overall system.   
 
The integrated system design shall incorporate: 
 
• Shutdown commands initiated by engine controller(s). 
• Shutdown commands initiated by the crew. 
• Shutdown commands initiated by ground personnel.  
• Crew escape capability from the vehicle on the pad. 
• Launch abort/escape system capability while on the pad. 
• Launch abort/escape system capability while in flight. 
• Specific plans for non-catastrophic, imminently-catastrophic, and other engine 
failure mode categories. 
• Early engine-out capability of the launch vehicle. 
• Handling of multiple engine shutdown requests. 
• Avoidance of catastrophic impact with ground or tower for loss of an engine(s). 
 
 
Prior to structural separation from the pad (or free-standing liftoff), it is never too late to 
shut the engine(s) down and abort the mission.  Once structural separation has occurred, 
the vehicle is essentially in flight, and a pad abort is generally considered unavailable.   
 
Unless it can be demonstrated that shutting an engine down prior to T-0 umbilical 
separation, but after structural separation, will cause a trajectory transient that will result 
in the loss of vehicle, the engine should be allowed to shut down.  If an engine is violating 
a redline shutdown limit, there are risks associated with running that engine.  If it wants to 
shut down to avoid a catastrophic failure we should allow it to do so. 
 
An example failure that drives an integrated system design solution is if an engine 
exhibits an imminently-catastrophic failure mode just after liftoff, but shutting down the 
engine will result in earth or tower impact. In such an instance vehicle destruction cannot 
be avoided.  However, the option (shutdown or not) that provides the crew more time for 
launch escape than the alternative option is the preferred choice.   
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1. Electrical connectors, plugs, and receptacles which otherwise could be incorrectly 
mated shall be designed to prevent incorrect connection with other accessible 
connectors, plugs, or receptacles.  
 
 The selection of the technique used shall be at the highest level of precedence in 
the following order: 
 
a. Use of constraints built into a cable or harness that locate similar 
connectors so they cannot be interchanged. 
b. Selection of different sizes or types of connectors to be located 
adjacent to each other. 
c. Selection of alternative polarization (alternative keying) of adjacent, 
similar connectors only if this requirement cannot be met with either method 
a or b above. 
 
2. Permanent identification of mating connectors shall be provided on each side of 
each connector pair. 
 
3. Ground connectors shall comply when they mate with flight connectors. 
 
 
NASA-STD-3000 addresses mating provisions and use of constraints built into a cable or 
harness that locate similar connectors so they cannot be interchanged (paragraph 
11.10.3.5, "Connector Identification / Alignment Design Requirements"). 
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Electrical circuits which are to be severed in the normal course of mission events (e.g., 
vehicle separation) shall be protected against short circuiting or compromising other 
circuits during the remaining phases of the mission by deadfacing to remove all voltages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For purposes of this standard, the term severed is defined as permanently separated by 
cutting conductors using guillotine devices.  This standard does not address connector 
mate/demate using spring- or pyro-assisted mechanisms.  Even small voltages could 
short and inadvertently power or ground the logic or control wiring resulting in adverse 
effects. 
 
Spring-loaded separators may be used to physically separate bare ends of the individual 
wires in the cable after severing.  
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Electrical and electronic devices shall incorporate protection against improper electrical 
inputs during qualification, acceptance, and checkout tests if such inputs could damage 
the devices. 
 
If it is impractical to incorporate adequate protection as a part of the device, protection 
shall be provided externally by the test equipment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Damage of an incipient nature may remain undetected and later cause equipment failure 
in flight. 
 
Examples of protective devices covered by this standard are diodes, capacitors, resistors, 
chokes, filters, etc., or combinations of devices included to protect electronic elements 
from such occurrences as unwanted transients, current reversals, short circuits, signal 
couplings, or wide deviations from desired operating conditions. 
 
For verification and testing of protective devices, refer to standard E-16.  
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Electrical connectors and wiring junctions to connectors shall be protected from moisture 
by methods which are demonstrated by test or analysis to provide adequate protection to 
prevent open and short circuits or a harmful unintended conductive current path.  Shrink 
boots are not acceptable as moisture barriers. 
 
Both external to and within the crew compartment, electronic and electrical equipment 
which is not hermetically sealed or otherwise positively protected against moisture shall 
not be cooled below the dew point of the surrounding atmosphere.  
 
This requirement shall include test conditions (except for environmental qualification test 
articles) and all operating conditions, including flight, wherein condensation of moisture 
can occur either during equipment operation before equipment is brought up to operating 
temperature or after equipment is shut down. 
 
 
 
The required composition and quality of the seal are dependent upon the environments to 
which the seal will be subjected. Examples include but are not limited to: 
 
1. Rain, condensation, and other fluid environments on the launch pad 
2. Condensation of cabin moisture during flight 
3. Electrolytic corrosion 
4. Manufacturing and storage environment 
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Electrical circuits shall not be routed through adjacent pins of an electrical connector if a 
short circuit between them would constitute a single failure that would: 
 
• • cause injury to the crew or  
• • cause loss or degradation of a critical system. 
 
 
 
 
In this standard, "adjacent" includes pins within reach of a bent pin. 
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Electrical and electronic systems and components susceptible to corona as dictated by 
the Paschen Curve shall be designed such that detrimental corona discharge will not 
occur under any operating conditions. 
 
Where adverse corona effects are avoided by pressurizing or evacuating a component, 
the seals shall be capable of maintaining the required internal pressure throughout the 
intended mission.  Pressure maintenance may be considered in lieu of seal 
demonstration. 
 
Where corona effects are avoided by conformal coating and/or encapsulate, methods 
shall be provided to verify that conformal coating / encapsulate is free from trapped 
gases, voids, or fractures. 
 
Where adverse corona effects are avoided in unsealed components by restricting 
operation to space vacuum conditions the ability of the equipment to reach the required 
vacuum in the planned time shall be demonstrated by test or analysis. 
 
Components protected by potting, conformal coating, or by corona prevention design 
shall be tested to demonstrate no detrimental effects from corona or partial discharge.  
Tests shall be conducted under service conditions of worst-case voltage, over the full 
operational range of pressure and environment. Testing shall be done on energized sub-
assemblies, lowest replaceable units, as well as cable runs, bus bars, and enclosures.  
 
Corona testing shall be part of the component selection and component qualification 
process.   
 
Test(s) or analysis shall be performed to demonstrate that the systems and components 
will remain protected for the intended length of the mission. 
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"Corona" is defined as an electrical discharge caused by ionization of gas in the vicinity of 
a conductor. 
 
Ionization can occur on the surface of an insulated or uninsulated conductor as well as in 
voids and cracks within insulation. 
 
Corona may be generally avoided or eliminated by lowering potential differences, 
increasing the gap or length of the current path between points of difference potential, 
increasing or decreasing the ambient gas pressure, or lowering the voltage stresses in 
gas spaces by selecting insulations with low dielectric constants. 
 
Outgassing or inadequate venting can cause internal pressures to remain unsafe for 
some time after ambient pressures have reached safe values. 
 
The possibility for corona near exposed conductors at voltage will be increased if local 
pressures are enhanced by nearby thruster operations, dumps, etc., particularly when 
extensive (e.g., reboost). 
 
Corona prevention design techniques, such as the avoidance of sharp points and bends 
or the use of corona balls, should be employed. 
 
Information on the Paschen Curve can be found in MSFC-STD-531.   
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In the construction of spaceflight hardware, the following parts shall not be used in the 
applications specified.  These part types and applications have known failure 
mechanisms which make them a reliability risk: 
 
1. Silver cased wet slug Tantalum capacitors (CLR65).  
2. Any non hermetically-sealed part that contains a fluid, such as an Aluminum 
electrolytic capacitor, used in a vacuum environment. 
3. Solid Tantalum capacitors used in a low impedance application of less than 1 
Ohm/Volt unless each part has been surge current tested to the test procedure defined in 
MIL-PRF-39003/10B.   
4. Sealed parts with internal voltages greater than 200 Volts that are used in a 
vacuum environment and have a maximum leak rate which will allow the internal cavity 
pressure to reach 50 Torr over the part’s mission life.  
5. Parts with internal or external plating of greater than 97% Tin, unless a Program-
approved mitigation plan is implemented. 
6. Use of cartridge style fuses (example is FM08 & FM09) in a vacuum environment 
with greater than 50 Volts DC applied.   
7. Switches, relays, bimetallic thermostats and other mechanical contact devices:  
a. Used in a voltage application for which they were not specifically qualified and 
proven.   
 
b. With higher rated contacts used in a low voltage or current application unless 
specifically recommended by the device manufacturer. 
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REMARKS 
 
Remarks section below corresponds to each numbered part of this standard. 
 
1. Silver-cased Tantalum capacitors are susceptible to internal dendrite growth 
between the Silver case and the tantalum anode when the capacitor is subjected to any 
negative voltage.  This potential problem is eliminated by using a hermetic Tantalum 
cased (MIL-PRF-39006) capacitor instead.  
2. Environmentally sealed parts that contain a gas, fluid, or gel should not be used in 
a vacuum environment.  In the case of a non-hermetic wet capacitor the parts will begin 
to outgas and eventually begin overheating leading to accelerated outgassing and 
eventual failure.  
3. Solid Tantalum capacitors have self-healing capability when they short if their 
circuit application provides 1 Ohm/Volt series impedance.   
4. All hermetic devices have a definitive leak rate.  Given enough exposure time in a 
vacuum environment a small cavity device will leak down below the critical pressure level 
of 50 Torr.  If a part has 190 Volts or greater applied internally then a destructive corona 
event is very probable.  (See MSFC-STD-531 for more detail) 
5. High purity Tin plating propagates the growth of conductive Tin (Sn) whiskers that 
can lead to shorting and generation of conductive foreign object debris.  (See JSC 49894, 
paragraph 2.12).  Legislation passed by a number of countries in the world restricts the 
use of Lead (Pb) in electronic manufacturing processes.  To comply with these laws 
electronic component manufacturers are removing Lead from the plating of their 
components.  Although space, military, and certain industrial applications have been 
granted exceptions to compliance with these directives, the small market presence of 
these industries does not allow for much influence on component manufacturers.  As a 
result, the vast majority of components will soon be available with only pure Tin plating.  
Soldering processes used with Tin/Lead solder do not fully mitigate the Tin plating issue 
because the entire termination is not covered during those soldering processes.  The very 
small termination spacing on many current components further increases risk. Conformal 
coating reduces the risk of Tin whiskers migrating to other areas, but these whiskers can 
grow under or through it - possibly to adjacent terminations on the components. Replating 
terminations with Tin/Lead solder is a viable option if done by a qualified vendor who 
controls the thermal shock to the component.  
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REMARKS 
 
Additional caveats associated with Lead-free manufacturing processes:  
a. Lead-free solder compounds generally require higher reflow process 
temperature profiles than standard Tin/Lead solder.  This adds additional stress 
to components, which may be damaged by these reflow temperatures.   
b.  Alternative solders are also more brittle than Tin/Lead alloys.  This may 
adversely affect product shock, vibration, or temperature cycle endurance. 
 
(1) In a vacuum environment, a cartridge style fuse will leak because of its 
poor hermetic seal.  If the internal fuse pressure falls between 50 Torr 
and 10-3 Torr during the same period that a circuit overload requires the 
fuse to open, testing has shown that 50 Volts or greater across the fuse 
element can initiate a plasma arc between the poles of the fuse.  The arc 
may propagate, consuming the fuse and attached conductors, until the 
arc’s working distance is exceeded or the upstream circuit protection is 
enabled. (See JSC 49894, paragraph 2.5) 
(2)  Explanation: (See JSC 49894, paragraph 2.3) 
 
(a) High voltage DC switches require a special design to assure reliability 
that includes a very fast snap-action contact movement and an arc 
suppression mechanism to immediately quench the contact-to-contact 
current flow. (An example of misapplication occurs when a 250 volt AC 
switch is used in a 120 Volt DC application.)  
 
(b) Switch manufacturers often give maximum contact ratings but are silent 
on minimum ratings.  It is often mistakenly thought that if a switch is 
rated for 5 amps it will work for a low current application (the bigger is 
better; mentally).  Manufacturers use special contact materials for 
various current and voltage configurations.  Gold plated contacts are 
typically used in low current (dry) and/or voltage applications 
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6. In a vacuum environment a cartridge style fuse will leak because of its poor 
hermetic seal.  If the internal fuse pressure falls between 50 torr and 10-3 torr during the 
same period that a circuit overload requires the fuse to open, testing has shown that 50 
volts or greater across the fuse element can initiate a plasma arc between the poles of 
the fuse.  The arc may propagate, consuming the fuse and attached conductors, until the 
arc’s distance is exceeded or the upstream circuit protection is enabled.  
 
7.  Explanation for mechanical contact devices:  
 
a. High voltage DC switches require a special design to assure reliability that includes 
a very fast snap-action contact movement and an arc suppression mechanism to 
immediately quench the contact-to-contact current flow.  Qualification can be by the 
manufacturer or NASA. (An example of an inappropriate selection: 250 volt AC switch 
used in a 120 volt DC application) 
1.  
b. Switch manufacturers often give maximum contact ratings but are silent on 
minimum ratings.  It is often mistakenly thought that if a switch is rated for 5 amps it 
will work for a low current application (the bigger is better mentality).  Manufacturers 
use special contact materials for various current and voltage configurations.  Gold 
plated contacts are typically used in low current and/or voltage applications. 
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Ground support equipment, facilities, and other equipment to be connected to a 
spacecraft system for operation, testing, checkout, or maintenance shall be designed so 
that routine verification tests can be conducted before each connection is made to ensure 
that each electrical and electronic input to the spacecraft is compatible with the spacecraft 
system.  
 
Verifications test procedures shall be provided with the equipment. 
 
 
 
Instances have occurred where spacecraft has sustained damage by inputs from 
equipment that was not checked and verified to be within acceptable limits before it was 
connected to spacecraft systems.  
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Spacecraft electrical systems shall be designed so that all necessary mating and 
demating of connectors can be accomplished without producing electrical arcs that will 
damage connector pins or ignite surrounding materials or vapors.  
 
Unless connectors are specifically designed and approved for mating or demating in the 
existing environment under the loads being carried, they shall not be mated or demated 
until voltages have been removed from the powered side(s) of the connector.  
 
If the circuit breakers and switches normally provided in the power distribution system of 
the spacecraft do not provide a satisfactory means of complying with the intent of this 
standard in all planned flight and ground test operations, additional circuit interruption 
capability shall be provided as required. 
 
Consideration in the design must be given to address the proper controls/inhibits in 
design features to avoid critical (two inhibits) and catastrophic (three inhibits) hazards 
(i.e., crew mate/demate of connectors for shock, molten metal & explosive environment 
hazards).  Reference: Space Shuttle Program Memorandum, MA2-99-170 - Crew 
mating/demating of powered connectors. 
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No method of cleaning electrical or electronic equipment shall be used unless it has been 
established that the method will not cause damage to, reduce the reliability of, or degrade 
the performance of any component or assembly being cleaned.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Typical cleaning processes include, but are not limited to, ultrasonic, chemical, 
electrochemical, aqueous-, and solvent-based cleaning systems. 
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Electrical plugs and receptacles of flight equipment and ground equipment that connects 
with flight equipment shall be protected at all times. 
 
Protective covers or caps shall be placed over electrical plugs and receptacles whenever 
they are not connected to the mating part. The protective covers or caps shall have the 
following characteristics: 
 
1. Provide protection from moisture for the plugs and receptacles 
2.  Provide protection against damage to sealing surfaces, threads, and pins 
3. Be made of conductive or dissipative materials that provide electrostatic discharge 
protection of components  
4.  Be resistant to abrasion, chipping, or flaking 
5.  Be positively marked by bright colors or streamers if they are to be removed prior 
to launch 
6.  Be maintained at a level of cleanliness equivalent to the plugs or receptacles on 
which they are used 
7.  Be made of material that is compatible with the connector material 
8.  Be provided with restraining devices or suitable storage areas if required for on-
orbit activities. Pressure-sensitive tape shall not be used to satisfy this requirement.  
 
 
Receptacles and plugs require restraining protection from mechanical damage, dust, dirt, 
and foreign objects. Incorrect practice has been to allow the disconnected parts to go 
unprotected. 
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Test equipment shall not be connected to spacecraft or spaceflight equipment circuits by 
insertion of meter probes directly into electrical connector sockets, by holding meter 
probes against connector pins, or by attachment of alligator clips to connector pins.  
 
The appropriate mating connectors shall be used to minimize wear on spaceflight 
equipment connectors.  
 
Connector savers and jumper cables with mating connectors may be installed and remain 
on the spaceflight equipment for bench tests up to the time of installation in the 
spacecraft.  
 
Approved breakout boxes may also be used. 
 
Shorting springs or shorting clips shall not be used in electrical or electronic connectors. 
 
Insertion of meter probes in connector sockets and connection of alligator clips to 
connector pins can cause damage to these components. 
 
Shorting springs or shorting clips are jumper wires that can be snapped or sprung into 
place to short connector pins to other connector pins. When installed, they do not form a 
reliable low impedance bond.  Since spring tension or compression is all that holds them 
in place, mating and demating of connectors can result in breakage of the spring or clip, 
intermittent contact points, and resistance buildup in the circuit due to contaminants. 
 
Test equipment with nonconducting probes (e.g., hall probes or proximity probes) may be 
used. 
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To limit electrical current that could flow through an instrumented crew member as a 
result of contact with available voltage sources to a safe level, bioinstrumentation 
systems shall be designed with sufficient resistance in series with each body electrode or 
conductive surface. 
 
Examples of voltage sources include, but are not limited to, sources in crew bays, power 
cords, batteries, and extravehicular activity umbilicals.   
 
This standard is in accordance with the international standard set forth by the IEC 60601, 
Second Edition. 
 
Serious electrical shock currents can accidentally flow through a crew member 
instrumented with electrodes that are connected through a low impedance to power 
ground / power return. If contact is made with a voltage source having the same ground 
as the bioinstrumentation system, electrical shock may occur. The shock currents include 
those caused by unequal ground potentials in multiple-instrument systems. 
 
Safety considerations must therefore be given a high priority in the design of 
bioinstrumentation systems.  Adequate protection from electrical shock hazards to the 
instrumented person involves consideration of the total environment. Bioinstrumentation 
may be reliable and safe when used alone but may electrocute the person when used in 
combination with other instruments or equipment that is defective or marginal. The 
serious electrical shock hazard can be eliminated by adequately isolating the 
bioinstrumentation system from ground. 
 
The maximum safe shock current levels for direct current (dc) and alternating current (ac) 
currents up to 1000 Hz are defined as 1.0 uA applied internally and 100 uA applied 
externally to the body. 
 
Bioinstrumentation may be isolated from other power sources by the use of a photo-
optical system or other suitable isolation method. 
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As a minimum, testing shall be performed on flight electrical wire harnesses prior to flight 
as defined in NASA-STD-8739.4, "Crimping, Interconnecting Cables Harness, and 
Wiring", paragraph 18.2 Testing: 
 
1. Following fabrication and prior to installation 
2. Post installation but prior to connection or reconnection to spacecraft components 
or devices 
3. Prior to each flight for nonpermanently installed cables 
 
Prior to performing dielectric withstanding testing, the dielectric strength of all connectors, 
wire, components, or devices attached to the harness shall be verified to be greater than 
the applied test voltage.  The test voltage level shall be adjusted to prevent damage to 
the lowest rated item in the cable.  
 
The individual leakage current readings shall be read and recorded for each test 
performed.  Measurement shall have resolution to the nano (10-9) range.  The data shall 
be maintained and available for comparison as long as the subject cable is in service.  
 
Initial and periodic testing for shorting and dielectric failures shall be performed on ground 
support cables that interface with flight hardware using the test criteria described above.    
 
Any trend in dielectric strength degradation / fluctuation greater than one order of 
magnitude shall be evaluated to determine the cause and worst case effect. 
 
Knowledge of an "out of family" reading that could indicate an impending dielectric 
problem can often be found in the documentation of all test measurements. Retention of 
the test data enables long-term trending that can provide insight into a potential insulation 
breakdown.   
 
The use of subminiature connectors has lead to dielectric breakdown failures during 
dielectric withstanding testing because the dielectric strength of the smaller connectors is 
often less than the required dielectric withstanding test voltages. 
 
Values derived from dielectric withstanding voltage testing may be used to calculate the 
insulation resistance threshold.  See JSC 49774 for further details. 
E-14 Electrical Wire Harnesses - 
Acceptance Testing  
Document No. 
 JSC-STD-
8080.5 
Standard No.  
E-14  
Page  
1 of 1 
Previous 
Revision  
04/01/1991 
 
Current as of 08 March 2005: 
STATEMENT OF STANDARD 
REMARKS 
 JSC-STD-8080  
October 2011 
 
 
Verify correct revision before use  
2.2-21 
 
 
 
Maximum operating temperatures for electrical power distribution circuit elements shall be 
established.  Overload protection devices shall be designed, selected, and calibrated to 
protect all elements of the circuit. The protection provided shall include consideration of 
wire material properties/ratings and wire bundle derating factors that are necessary due 
to area environmental conditions.  
 
Any circuit protection device shall be sized to support the maximum sustained load and to 
protect the smallest gauge wire to which it supplies power.   
 
Protection device trip characteristics for branch circuits shall be designed so that 
combination of current and time required to isolate/remove an overloaded branch circuit 
will not be sufficient to cause upstream protection devices to act and remove power from 
other branches of the power system inadvertently.  
 
Where circuit changes (such as the addition of splices or wiring) are made or where the 
environmental conditions surrounding the electrical system are changed in a manner that 
could adversely affect the power distribution system elements, the overload protection 
requirements shall be reevaluated to determine the adequacy of the protection provided.   
 
Failure in an individual phase of a multiphase alternating current circuit shall not cause an 
unbalanced overload in the other phases of that circuit.  Adequate protection shall be 
provided in each phase of the circuit supplying an item of equipment to prevent failure in 
other phases of that circuit or other branches upstream of the faulty equipment. 
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The requirements of this standard are directed toward the protection of circuit elements 
which, if overloaded, could be damaged or could cause damage to other elements 
through the generation of high temperature, flame, smoke, or noxious gases. For 
purposes of this standard, power distribution system elements are circuit elements such 
as wiring, wiring accessories, connectors, terminals, wire splices, and branch power 
distribution circuits.  
 
Circuit protection devices have varied trip characteristic curves and the maximum 
values/times should be used in assessing downstream wire size/insulation (i.e., maximum 
blow/trip values in fuses range from 135% to 235% in some cases).  Smart short current 
levels should be considered in selecting the wire gauge.  Insulation temperatures should 
not exceed their maximum rating during a max short event. 
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Protective devices for electrical and electronic circuits shall be verified as functional after 
the environmental acceptance test of the circuit assembly and after any event, such as 
maintenance or handling mishaps, that could physically damage the circuit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This test requirement is an important consideration during electronic circuit design where 
the verification should be performed without disassembly.  Verification of the protective 
device should be accomplished by selecting test methods that do not require 
incorporation of special testing circuits. 
 
Examples of protective devices covered by this standard are diodes, capacitors, resistors, 
chokes, filters, etc., or combinations of devices included to protect electronic elements 
from such occurrences as unwanted transients, current reversals, short circuits, signal 
couplings, or wide deviations from desired operating conditions. 
 
For design requirements for protective circuits, refer to standard E-3. 
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Hermetic packaging shall be used for parts exposed to any pressure environment (high or 
low/vacuum) if such exposure would adversely affect the function of those parts or 
mission reliability. 
 
Hermetic packaging shall be used for parts exposed to pressure changes during any 
phase of space flight if such changes would adversely affect the function of those parts or 
mission reliability. 
 
 
Some examples are piece parts that can be affected by injections of debris and moisture 
during vehicle descent.  Another example of the need for hermetic parts is the quenching 
effect (arc suppression) of the nominal atmospheric air mixture for contacts in relays and 
switches. 
 
Long-term storage of electronic parts is usually most successful if the part has a hermetic 
case or, as a minimum, is stored in a vapor proof container. 
 
Environmentally (non-hermetic) sealed parts such as an aluminum electrolytic capacitor 
can begin to leak around its seals when subjected to a vacuum, leading to the loss of 
electrolyte.  This loss accelerates over heating that increases internal pressure which 
increases the outgassing of electrolyte.  It is a vicious cycle which eventually will lead to 
part failure.  
 
If procedures for powering down those parts or other procedures will provide the 
necessary protection from damage such as corona, the parts need not be hermetically 
sealed. 
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E-18 has been reclassified as G-54.   
 
See General Section for standard text. 
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Electrical and electronic equipment and circuits shall be designed and tested to ensure a 
compatible power bus transient environment. 
 
Design factors shall include the following: 
 
1. Specifying the bus transient environment 
2. Limiting the transient generation characteristics of equipment to specified levels in both 
amplitude and time duration 
3. Ensuring that the equipment is not susceptible to transients of the specified amplitude 
and time duration with a specified margin of safety and functionality. 
 
System tests shall be performed using flight configuration hardware or electrically 
equivalent to flight equipment to demonstrate that power bus transients are within 
specified amplitude and time duration constraints during the worst cases of loading, 
switching, and power source impedance.  Flight electrically equivalent equipment shall 
have identical steady-state and transient electrical response and characteristics as the 
actual flight hardware. 
 
Ground equipment connected to a spacecraft power bus shall also comply with the 
requirements of this standard. 
 
 
A bus environment is the baseline voltage and frequency of the bus plus the aggregate 
electrical feedback of equipment powered from the bus or coupled with it electrically. 
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Electronic equipment including subassemblies and assemblies shall be designed to 
provide ESD protection from damage or fault for Electrostatic Discharge Sensitive 
(ESDS) parts used in the design. The minimum requirement for subassemblies and 
assemblies is 2,000 volts, and the minimum requirement for equipment is 4,000 volts. 
These requirements specifically relate to the direct contact during non-operating 
conditions to input, output, and interface connections to subassembly/assembly.  These 
requirements shall be satisfied either by test or analysis. 
 
Any hardware in its normal flight configuration, operating or non-operating, shall be 
immune to upset or damage to a human body model discharge of 16,000 volts from direct 
contact to operator accessible points and exposed surface areas of the equipment.  This 
requirement shall be satisfied by test or analysis. 
 
This standard does not apply to electrically-initiated explosive devices. 
A subassembly or assembly is a configuration that cannot be normally operated 
independently of other, companion subassemblies or assemblies (e.g. a circuit card).  
 
Equipment is a configuration of subassemblies or assemblies (e.g., an avionics box).   
 
Either the body/finger or hand/metal Human Body Model (HBM) test methods may be 
utilized at the subassembly or assembly levels. The hand/metal HBM test method shall 
be utilized at the equipment level. Guidance for the selection of test methods at the 
subassembly and assembly levels can be located in IEEE STD C62.38, IEEE Guide on 
ESD: ESD Withstand Capability Evaluation Methods (for Electronic Equipment 
Subassemblies)".  "Acceptable test methods may be located in IEEE C62.38, ANSI 
C63.16, "American National Standard Guide for Electrostatic Discharge Test 
Methodologies and Criteria for Electronic Equipment" or IEC 61000-4-2, "Electromagnetic 
Compatibility (EMC) Testing and Measurement Techniques-Electrostatic Discharge 
Immunity Test".  
 
Two documents recommended for use when establishing an ESD control program are:  
 
• MIL-STD-1686, Electrostatic Discharge Control Program for Protection of Electrical 
and Electronic Parts, Assemblies and Equipment and  
• ANSI/ESD S20.20, ESD Association Standard For the Development of an ESD 
control Program for Protection of Electrical and Electronic Parts, Assemblies and 
Equipment. 
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E-21 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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Spacecraft electronics shall meet performance and operability requirements while in the 
natural ionizing radiation environment of the mission.  Proof of the ability to meet the 
performance and operability requirements shall be established by mean time between 
failure (MTBF) estimations at the box or system level.  These MTBF estimations shall be 
based on actual test data.  Proper test data acquired from other tests, including vendor 
data that shows radiation tolerance, may be used where appropriate.  All radiation effects, 
such as Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Single Event Effects (SEE) including upsets, latch 
ups and burn outs, shall be considered. 
 
Radiation testing may be done at the part, board, or box level.  The minimum radiation 
testing level required to establish performance and reliable operation capability shall be 
by exposure of the test article to either: 
 
1. 200 MeV (+/- 10 MeV) protons to a fluence of 1e10 protons/cm2 or  
2. Heavy ions producing Linear Energy Transfer (LETs) of from 1 MeV/ (mg/cm2) to 
14 MeV/ (mg/cm2) in appropriate steps of LET to a fluence of 1e6 ions/cm2. 
 
Testing past the minimum shall be with heavy ions to extend the maximum test LET 
beyond 14 MeV/ (mg/cm2). 
 
Because the minimum test is not as complete as advanced testing with heavy ions past 
14 MeV/ (mg/cm2), an MTBF of 10 years shall be assigned for errors such as destructive 
latchups NOT seen in the minimum test.  The compatibility of the 10-year MTBF with the 
mission needs shall be proven for all systems using the “minimum testing” criteria. 
Additional testing with heavy ions to achieve LETs greater than 14 MeV/(mg/cm2) may be 
required if a 10 year MTBF is not sufficient for the mission or the application is such a 
critical nature that additional assurance is deemed necessary. 
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If similarity is to be used to establish the radiation susceptibility of a microelectronic part 
by comparison to a "similar" microelectronic part that has known radiation susceptibility 
characteristics, all of the following criteria shall be satisfied: 
 
1. Both microelectronic parts must be the product of the same Qualified Parts List, 
Qualified Manufacturers List, and/or ISO 9000 manufacturer. 
2. Both parts must have been manufactured on the same line. 
3. The processing of both parts must have been identical, especially the critical 
parameters of rate of oxide growth, temperature of the oxide growing process and final 
oxide thickness. 
4. The two parts must be similar in function and identical in technology including the 
same mask design, identical feature size, deposition, and doping. 
5. The same foundry must have produced both wafers. 
 
 
Modern microelectronic components are continuously being improved with faster 
operating speeds, smaller feature sizes, increased density, and reduced power 
requirements. These improvements, while providing superior performance in ordinary 
terrestrial environments, tend to increase the component’s susceptibility to the effects of 
ionizing radiation.  There are also limited offerings of parts designed specifically for use in 
the space environment and the performance of these parts tends to lag technology 
capability by some 5 to 10 years.  The overall result is that the vast population of modern 
microelectronic components is comprised of “commercial off the shelf” (COTS) parts 
designed for use on Earth.  The use of these COTS parts in the radiation environment of 
space involves risks, both from tolerance to total ionizing dose (TID) and from 
susceptibility to single event effects (SEE).  These risks must be quantified as part of a 
system design. 
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Rationale for testing: Essentially all microelectronics flown today has a probability of 
failing in some fashion due to ionizing radiation.  For the case of total ionizing dose (TID), 
this failure is characterized by a system that degrades over time or totally ceases to 
function. Exposing the hardware to a TID that represents the expected mission exposure 
multiplied by a safety factor will demonstrate via test that the hardware functions after 
such an exposure.  This total dose exposure can be accomplished during the testing for 
SEE with high-energy protons. 
 
Rationale for the assigned 10 year MTBF: The minimum radiation test with protons or 
with heavy ions to 14 MeV/ (mg/cm2) does not cover the on orbit deposited energy 
spectrum completely.  The portion of the spectrum not covered is that of the higher LETs. 
Fortunately this high-LET region has considerably less population (particles per unit area 
per unit time), which lowers the chance for errors to be generated.  However, this portion 
of the spectrum still offers the opportunity for failure modes to occur that won’t be seen in 
the basic test.  NASA/JSC modeling work indicates that a 10-year MTBF must be used to 
account for this somewhat truncated energy deposition (LET) region in the minimum test 
regimen. 
 
Rationale for similarity restrictions: The “market life” of an electronic part today ranges 
from 6 months to three years and then a replacement part, generally with better 
performance, is offered in the market place.  Even during the lifetime of a part, process 
changes can be made that might have catastrophic effects on the performance in the 
radiation environment.  Even consecutive lot numbers or date codes will not guarantee 
similar radiation performance.  
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2.2-32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E-23 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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Spacecraft electrical wire and cable, including wiring used within containerized 
electrical/electronic assemblies ("black boxes") shall be procured and acceptance tested 
to the appropriate flight hardware wire and cable specifications listed below:  
 
• • Cable specification ANSI/NEMA WC 27500, Standard for Aerospace and Industrial 
Electrical Cable. 
• • Cable specification MIL-C-17, Cables, Radio Frequency, Flexible and Semi-rigid. 
• • Wire specification MIL-W-22759, Wire, Electrical, Fluoropolymer Insulated Copper or 
Copper Alloy. 
• • Wire and cable defined in SSP 30423, EEE Parts Selection for the Space Station 
Program. 
 
Other wire procurement specifications may be authorized by the procuring agency.  
Spacecraft wire and cable shall also comply with applicable program materials and 
process requirements. 
If the wiring used in any spacecraft application is unknown, as it may be in the case of off-
the-shelf equipment, pig-tailed components, heater strips, etc. and if the application is 
non-critical, the assembly is required only to meet applicable program materials and 
process requirements. 
 
Two methods for certifying wire are: 
 
1. As required by the procurement specification, Government Source Inspection shall 
certify that the test specified below has been performed by the wire manufacturer on the 
length of wire procured. In addition to meeting the requirements of the appropriate 
procurement specification, each shipment shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s 
test report.  
2. Wire certification can also be performed by a NASA-approved test facility.  
In either case, testing shall consist of the tests below.   
 
Testing for insulation flaws of cable’s basic wires shall be done prior to cable assembly. 
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100-Percent Testing 
1.     Insulated single conductor wires and cable basic wires 
 a. Impulse dielectric test (no greater than 80% of military specification) 
2. Cable 
 a. Dielectric withstand of component wires 
 b. Jacket flaws for shielded cables 
 
Sample Testing 
As a minimum, a sample or samples of each lot of wire/cable shall be subjected to the 
following applicable quality conformance inspections.  (Applicability is determined by the 
specifications cited above). 
 
1) Insulated single-conductor wires and cable basic wires 
 a. Conductor resistance 
b. Wrap test 
c. Shrinkage (heat resistance) 
d. Cold bend followed by wet dielectric  
e. Visual and mechanical examination (finished wire o.d., identification of 
product, conductor diameter, strand diameter, conductor stranding, wire base 
metal, and the plating material) 
f. Polyimide cure test (applicable to modified aromatic polyimide coatings 
only) 
g. Crosslink proof testing for crosslinked insulation materials 
 
2) Cable 
 a. Shield coverage 
b. Identification of product 
c. Jacket wall thickness 
d. Cold bend 
e. Thermal shock 
f. Stress-Crack Resistance testing (MIL-C-17 Cable only) 
Continued next page 
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STATEMENT OF STANDARD [CONT] 
 
Any failure during sample testing shall be cause for immediate rejection of the entire lot.  
 
Certification Processes 
 
Certification of a NASA-approved test facility is done by an audit team with 
representatives from the S&MA and Engineering Directorates, or their representatives.   
 
The team shall assure the test lab is qualified to perform the test methods referenced in 
this standard. 
 
At the using installation, before placing wire/cable into bonded storage, representatives 
from the Engineering team and/or receiving inspection function shall verify that the test 
report indicating conformance with all applicable procurement specification requirements 
accompanies each lot shipped. 
 
Storage shelf life:  Silver plated wire and cable that has exceeded a shelf life of 10 years 
from its manufacturing date shall be downgraded to non-flight status and not be used on 
flight hardware.  
 
This standard does not apply to non-flight wire and cable. 
 
 
The primary reason for downgrading silver plated wire after 10 years of age is to control 
increased solderability problems with silver and the potential for Red Plague for wire 
stored in a high moisture environment.  
 
Additional requirements for processing and dispositioning wire/cable lots are defined in 
JSC 49879 JSC Wire & Cable Integrity Compliance Program. 
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STATEMENT OF STANDARD 
 
Electrical wire(s), cables, bundles, and wire harnesses shall be: 
• designed and installed to withstand anticipated stresses induced by ground 
handling and flight operations, 
• adequately protected to prevent insulation damage from such causes as chafing, 
abrasion and cold flow when passing through or touching any structure or panel; 
• verified during qualification to withstand the anticipated environments. 
 
REMARKS 
 
Cold flow of Teflon®, and other “soft” polymer wire insulation materials, is the physical 
movement of the insulator under a compressive/directional load, and is often considered 
a latent reliability concern for electronic assemblies using wiring harnesses and cables.  
Cold flow only becomes a reliability issue affecting performance, if the insulation 
displacement becomes significant enough to thin the insulation jacket below the minimum 
isolation/electrical separation limit. 
 
Panel and chassis hole edges should be properly chamfered and protected by a resilient-
material grommet or non-conductive tape, e.g., Kapton® 
 
Multiple broken wires have been detected in wire bundles at connectors. These breaks 
were caused by a stiff, hard coating on the bundles which did not allow sufficient flexing 
of the enclosed wires creating stress concentrations. Example causes include untapered 
tape or heatshrink tubing.  
 
Problems have been caused by normal handling, thermal cycling, operating deformations, 
inadequate stress relief, vibration, and inadequate service loops. 
 
This standard supersedes JPG 8080.5 Standard M/S-3. 
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Where pressurized components could fail in such a way that the total gas supply dumped 
directly into a compartment would be greater than the compartment relief valve or venting 
could handle without overpressurization of the compartment, necessary flow restrictions 
shall be incorporated to restrict the mass flow to a level that can be handled by the relief 
valve and/or venting.   
 
For pressurized oxygen systems, flow restrictions shall be designed in accordance with 
ASTM Manual 36, Safe Use of Oxygen and Oxygen Systems Guidelines for Oxygen 
System Design, Materials Selection, Operation, Storage, and Transportation to prevent 
flow-induced ignition hazards. 
 
 
 
 
Pressurized components could fail in such a way that the total gas supply would be 
dumped directly into the compartment. If the pressure relief valve of the compartment 
were unable to handle the resulting pressure increase, compartment structural failure 
could result.  
 
Relief valves in compartments are normally designed to maintain a preestablished 
pressure within the compartment during launch and reentry or in the event of a pressure 
regulator failure. They are not designed to maintain pressure in the event of a break or 
rupture of a pressure line or vessel. 
 
High velocity oxygen flow can pose ignition hazards in improperly designed flow 
restrictors. 
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2.3-4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the design of water separators for use in gas streams under zero-gravity conditions, if 
the design includes a condensing heat exchanger and a downstream liquid/gas 
separator: 
 
1. The liquid collection components and plumbing upstream of the separator shall be 
designed to preclude the collection of large quantities of liquid that could accumulate 
and be carried to the separator as a slug.  If this cannot be assured then the design 
shall accommodate liquid entering the separator as a slug.  
2. The hardware shall accommodate the expected proportions of liquid and gas that the 
separator will have to process (see #5 in Remarks). 
3. Atmospheric debris shall be prevented from entering the separator to prevent clogging 
of small openings or channels. 
4. Cabin trace contaminants shall not reduce the functionality of the heat exchanger 
coating below the required separator performance. 
 
 
 
Design considerations include: 
 
1. The behavior of water droplets changes once the influence of gravity is removed.  
Droplets tend to cling to surfaces more in zero-gravity. 
 
2. In zero-gravity the extent to which the droplet beads up on a hydrophobic surface is 
more pronounced than in one-gravity.  If the surface is hydrophobic, the droplet can 
bead up and be stripped away by the air stream.  If the surface is hydrophilic, the 
droplet will spread out into a thin layer.    Over time, metabolically-produced trace 
contaminants tend to coat surfaces, altering the hydrophobic or hydrophilic properties 
of surfaces or membranes.  Separator designs that rely on the hydrophillic or 
hydrophobic nature of surfaces or membranes may lose that property with time.  This 
may cause blockage or liquid carryover. 
Continued next page. 
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2.3-5 
 
Continued from previous page 
 
 
3. Liquid carryover from the separator can result from degradation of hydrophilic coatings, 
the separator not being designed for the liquid/gas proportions that it has to 
accommodate, a slug that is larger than the separator is designed to handle, or from a 
blockage of flow channels from debris. 
 
4. Design verification of a liquid/gas separator can only be satisfactorily completed in a 
zero-gravity environment that has a long enough duration to experience the range of 
liquid/gas processing phases that will be expected on-orbit. Experience has shown that 
testing in a zero-gravity aircraft, which produces, at most, 20 seconds of micro-gravity 
is not always sufficient to identify problems with slugging or carryover.  Results may 
even be misleading, since a period of increased gravity follows each 20 second micro-
gravity interval.  Testing for an extended period of zero-gravity is essential to verify the 
design of a liquid/gas separator. 
 
5. Separators that have to process mostly liquid in a gas stream will have a different 
design than those that have to process mostly gas in a liquid stream. 
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2.3-6 
 
 
Service points for spacecraft fluid systems shall be designed with positive protection by 
location, connector size, or type to prevent connection to incorrect fluid service lines. 
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2.3-7 
 
 
Ground service points for fluid systems including those for filling, draining, purging, or 
bleeding shall be accessible from the exterior of the spacecraft or element. 
 
Gas purge or bleed fittings shall exhaust outside the spacecraft or element. 
 
Portable fluid systems and systems that are located entirely within the pressurized 
compartment(s) of the spacecraft are excluded from the above requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here, accessible means that the service points can be behind a door or access panel  
 
A dry hose may be attached to the interior of the spacecraft for servicing by GSE. 
 
Servicing of fluid systems from inside compartment(s) may result in the following: 
 
1. Exposure of equipment to fluid spillage  
 
2. Damage of service points due to inaccessibility 
 
3. Unnecessary traffic in the compartment 
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2.3-8 
 
 
For separation of space-vehicle modules where one is being discarded, fluid lines that are 
required to be disconnected or severed on separation shall be designed such that any 
breakage resulting from failure of the disconnecting device to function will occur on the 
discarded side of the disconnect. The check valve or shutoff valve, used on the retained 
side of the disconnect for preventing unacceptable loss of fluid after disconnection, shall 
be a type that will function (i.e., that will close) in spite of such a failure. 
 
For separation of space-vehicle modules where both need to function after separation but 
are not intended for subsequent reconnection, fluid lines that are required to be 
disconnected on separation shall be designed to preclude unacceptable loss of fluid after 
disconnection. 
 
For separation of space-vehicle modules where both need to function after separation 
and are intended for subsequent reconnection, fluid lines that are required to be 
disconnected on separation shall be designed to preclude unacceptable loss of fluid after 
disconnection and shall include provisions to enable successful reconnection.   
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2.3-9 
 
 
 
 
All spacecraft systems and ground support servicing equipment requiring storage of 
reactive fluids (e.g., hydrogen peroxide, oxidizers, and monopropellants) shall be 
designed to include devices for monitoring temperature and pressure. 
 
 
 
 
 
This approach permits accurate determination of the rates of decomposition of the fluids 
contained in their respective systems. 
 
These monitoring devices will provide time for corrective action in the event that abnormal 
decomposition of fluids is initiated. 
 
Transfer lines and pumps should be considered as part of the overall monitoring effort but 
not necessarily individually instrumented. 
 
This standard combines G-49 and F-6 into single standard. 
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2.3-10 
 
 
 
 
Fluid servicing and test ports, not required to function in flight, shall be designed so that 
they can be capped immediately after servicing or test in order to preclude leakage in 
flight.  
 
The method and material used for capping shall be compatible with the applicable 
spacecraft subsystem and the expected environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capping of these ports is necessary to prevent leakage of the applicable subsystem. 
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2.3-11 
 
 
 
 
 
The following positive measures shall be taken to prevent incorrect installation of fluid 
system components whose function is dependent on direction of flow: 
 
1. The direction of fluid flow shall be indicated with permanent markings on the exterior of 
the component and on the parts and lines to be mated with the component. 
 
2. A flow check shall be performed after each installation or change. 
 
3. Where flow checks cannot be made, provisions shall be incorporated in the fluid line 
components’ design, end fittings, or connections to preclude incorrect installation. 
 
 
 
 
In a complex plumbing installation, it is difficult for fabrication or assembly personnel to 
know the direction of flow. 
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2.3-12 
 
 
Sources of venting that could occur during the mission shall be identified and an analysis 
made to ensure that the total vent condition is designed to be compatible with vehicle 
and/or mission control capabilities. Impingement of vent plumes on spacecraft shall be 
analyzed. 
 
Nonpropulsive vent concepts, opposed venting, operational procedures, or similar 
methods shall be used to eliminate the undesirable effects of perturbing forces resulting 
from such vents. 
 
 
 
 
Typical sources of planned or expected overboard venting include water boilers, cabin 
relief valves, fuel cell purges, waste disposals, dryers, waste compartments, and air 
locks.  
 
Such venting is a major cause of error in spacecraft precision control and navigation. In 
addition, venting may be a major source of exterior contamination of precision optical and 
electromagnetic instruments on spacecraft.  
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2.3-13 
 
 
 
 
All nozzles and vents used in crewed spacecraft systems, such as those of the reaction 
control system and environmental control system, shall be protected from entrance of 
rain, debris, or other contaminants prior to launch. (This standard applies throughout 
assembly, testing, shipment, and checkout of the spacecraft and its systems). 
 
Protective covers for nozzles or vents located within a payload bay shall be designed to 
be readily removable during the countdown before launch or before final closure of 
payload bay doors.  
 
Covers shall be designed so that removal can be accomplished without risk of dumping 
accumulated debris into the nozzle or vent, damaging nozzle radiation coatings or 
generating debris that poses a risk to the vehicle. 
 
Covers shall be designed so that failure to remove the cover will not cause failure of the 
system or any other subsystem.  
 
 
Protection is advisable at all times and is particularly required whenever any nozzle axis 
is pointing substantially above the horizontal axis. 
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2.3-14 
 
 
 
 
Ground support equipment, facilities, fluid containers, and other equipment to be 
connected to a spacecraft system for operation, testing, checkout, or maintenance shall 
be designed so that routine verification tests can be conducted before each connection is 
made to ensure that each fluid input to the spacecraft will be compatible with the 
spacecraft system. 
 
Procedures shall be provided to accomplish the verification tests with the equipment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instances have occurred where a spacecraft has sustained damage by inputs from 
equipment which was not checked to be within acceptable limits before it was connected 
to spacecraft systems. 
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2.3-15 
 
 
 
 
Where maintenance of fluid pressure is critical to prevent major damage to a space 
vehicle component such as a propellant tank or fuel cell, the ground support equipment 
(GSE), airborne support equipment (ASE) or flight support equipment (FSE) shall be 
designed to provide sufficient pressure to the space vehicle component in the event of a 
failure of the pressurant source. 
 
The GSE, ASE or FSE shall be designed such that recovery from failures of the 
pressurant source can be accomplished without damage to the space vehicle component.   
 
The GSE, ASE or FSE shall be designed to monitor pressure (or pressure differential) 
both from the source and to the system. 
 
 
Depletion of the GSE, ASE or FSE pressure source or line pressure drops resulting from 
fluid flow have resulted in serious equipment damage in operations where the 
requirements of this standard were not met. 
 
Good practice is to use separate fluid pressure sources for purge or flushing. 
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2.3-16 
 
 
 
 
To prevent over-pressurization, all habitable pressurized elements shall have pressure 
relief venting systems.   
 
Each pressurized element shall have its own vent system so that venting systems are not 
shared.   
 
The venting system shall be capable of isolating the flow path from the ambient 
environment of the pressurized element to space vacuum, and the venting system shall 
be configurable to or already have online a secondary vent system in the event the 
primary vent fails. 
 
 
Contamination control, fire control, and other emergency response procedures require 
that all pressurized elements of a spacecraft can be isolated from the other pressurized 
elements, and that each pressurized element can be independently vented.   
 
Experience with Shuttle and ISS have demonstrated that vents can ice up in permanently 
open or closed positions.  Vents can also become corroded by contact with vented 
products.   
 
Vents should not be shared.  Vents can fail and must be capable of isolation from the 
ambient environment by actions internal to the element and alternate vents should be 
configurable or concurrently available.   
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2.3-17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-14 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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2.3-18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oxidizer and fuel (both liquids and vapors) shall be positively separated using all-metal 
containment with mixing only allowed in the controlled combustion area. 
 
 
 
 
 
Common pressurant gas supply for fuel and oxidizer should not be used. 
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2.3-19 
 
 
 
 
 
Flight and GSE fluid line routing and installation shall meet the following requirements: 
 
• Detailed drawings and procedures shall be provided for routing and installation of all 
fluid lines, including pressure-sensor lines. 
• If temperature conditions are not within acceptable limits for the fluid involved, 
measures shall be taken to provide passive or active thermal control as appropriate.   
• A design analysis shall be provided for each line installation to show that the 
temperature extremes to which it will be subjected (including storage, handling, 
transportation, and operations) are within acceptable limits for the fluid involved.  
• Fluid lines installed external to spacecraft shall be Extravehicular Activity (EVA) 
compatible, if intended for future EVA maintenance or repair.  
• Strain relief shall accommodate design loads, deflections, and thermal expansion.  
• Fluid lines shall be restrained at intervals in accordance with the governing standard 
for the application.  
• Fluid lines carrying oxygen shall not be configured with sharp bends that could pose a 
blunt flow impingement ignition hazard, in accordance with ASTM Manual 36. 
 
 
EVA compatibility information is provided in JSC 26626A EVA Generic Design 
Requirements Document.   
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2.3-20 
 
 
 
 
 
Spacecraft systems that will contain gases or liquids to be used or expended during the 
mission shall be maintained in the state of cleanliness required by the specification for the 
particular substance involved after factory assembly and up to and including final 
servicing prior to flight.  
 
This requirement shall also apply to the gas- and liquid-handling systems of all servicing, 
maintenance, handling, testing, and checkout equipment. 
 
Such systems fluids, as well as test fluids that enter spacecraft systems, shall be filtered 
or controlled such that the degree of cleanliness required by the specification for the 
particular substance is maintained. 
 
Spacecraft systems that will contain such gases or liquids shall be designed so that 
required draining, flushing, drying, cold trapping, etc. can be accomplished with the 
spacecraft in its checkout or working attitude.  The length of time to accomplish this task 
shall be presented for approval during design reviews. 
 
Calibration fluids shall be furnished with analysis reports which are signed by the preparer 
and the source inspection agency 
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2.3-21 
 
 
 
 
 
To provide consistency in initial and subsequent testing of pressure relief valves, the 
manufacturer shall specify values for: crack and reseat pressure, mass-flow rates, 
pressures corresponding to full flow, and allowable leakage.  
 
These values shall be specified for operation with the flight fluid and any other fluid 
recommended for test purposes. 
 
Retest time intervals shall be specified for valves that are subject to deterioration with 
time. 
 
 
Specific flow-rate values have been found necessary for verification of these valve 
characteristics with the precision required in preflight checkout. 
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2.3-22 
 
 
 
Handling of flight and flight interface GSE fluid systems shall meet the following 
requirements: 
 
1. Design drawings and/or process specifications shall designate the method of 
complying with this standard.  
 
2. In each step of the manufacturing process and buildup, all ends of tubing, fittings, and 
components used in fluid systems shall be protected against damage and entry of 
contaminants.  Equivalent protection shall be provided for tubing, fittings, and/or 
components when the subsystem is open to effect repair or replacement.   
 
3. Protective caps shall meet the cleanliness requirement of the manufacturing 
specification.  Protective cap material and design shall be compatible with the fluid. 
 
4. All assemblies shall be cleaned and dried before packaging.  For oxygen components, 
cleaning and packaging materials shall not pose residue or particle contamination 
hazards, in accordance with ASTM Manual 36.  
 
5. Refill procedures shall provide the same protection against damage or contamination 
as the initial manufacturing procedures establish.   
 
6. Protection devices for components to be installed external to spacecraft shall be 
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) compatible. 
 
7. Tubing assemblies, fittings, or components that are stored or shipped shall be 
protected and sealed in a clean, transparent, moisture-proof bag with sufficient 
protective strength and thickness for the intended handling.  
Open plumbing and components must be protected to avoid entrance of foreign material 
and to protect the sealing surfaces.   
 
Additional protection and procedures may be required by the regulatory authority for the 
fluid in question. 
 
EVA compatibility information is provided in JSC 26626A EVA Generic Design 
Requirements Document.  
 
Methods of protection to maintain cleanliness of the hardware include but are not limited 
to: bagging, handling in a clean room or flow bench, and clean gas purge during 
assembly.    
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2.3-23 
 
 
 
 
 
After manufacturing and after any subsequent exposure to the probable entry of 
contaminants, fluid systems and servicing equipment shall be cleaned by flushing to 
remove all contaminants which could be detrimental to the system. 
 
The flushing fluid shall be compatible with the system materials and the working fluid to 
be used in the system. Cleanliness levels of the flushing fluid and the system maximum 
allowable contamination shall be specified. During flushing, the fluid entering the system 
shall be filtered to the same level of cleanliness or better than that of the working fluid to 
be used in the system. 
 
Whenever it is necessary to verify the cleanliness level of a spacecraft fluid system or its 
servicing equipment, samples of the fluid leaving the system from draining, purging or 
flushing operations shall be analyzed to determine that particulate and/or chemical 
contamination are within specified limits.  
 
The fluid sample shall be taken at the end of the draining, purging or flushing operation. 
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2.3-24 
 
 
 
 
 
Gases used for purging propellant vapors or other vapors from space-vehicle 
compartments shall have a dew point low enough to preclude moisture condensation 
from the purge gas on the coldest surfaces that the purging gas will contact. 
 
 
 
 
This standard does not apply to cryogenic system surfaces when in a supercold condition 
and does not preclude consideration of other problems, such as static electricity or 
equipment temperature requirements, that may be involved with selection of proper dew 
point. 
 
Purge gases may become saturated with the vapor being purged. When the gases later 
come in contact  with colder surfaces in the compartment, the absorbed vapor may be 
deposited on these surfaces. 
 
Transfer of the liquid from the point where it is being absorbed to other locations in the 
compartment may be dangerous. 
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2.3-25 
 
 
 
 
 
Systems which supply pressure to crew pressure garments shall be designed so that a 
major failure of one crew member's garment or garment pressure supply will not cause 
loss of life to other crew members. 
 
 
 
 
Systems supplying gas to pressure suits should be so designed that an abrupt 
decompression of the suit of one crew member (such as might result from a rip in the 
fabric or a broken or unlatched faceplate) will not result immediately in a similar rapid loss 
of pressure in the suits of the other members or in a sudden total depletion of the gas 
supply.  
 
The time available before the loss of pressure occurs in the other suits or before a critical 
depletion of the gas supply occurs should be sufficient to allow: 
 
1. time for reasonable attempts to aid the decompressed crew member (e.g., by closing 
an unlatched faceplate) and  
 
2. time to shut off flow to the open suit in the event the damage is beyond repair and the 
crew member cannot be saved.  
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2.3-26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-23 has been reclassified as General Standard G-53.   
 
See G-53 for revised standard text. 
 
 
F-23 Reclassified as G-53 
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2.3-27 
 
 
 
Spacecraft fluid systems and related servicing equipment shall be designed to permit 
complete flushing and draining during ground and on-orbit servicing operations.  
 
The following conditions shall be satisfied, as a minimum: 
 
1. The systems shall be free from dead-ended piping or passages through which flushing 
fluid cannot be made to flow. 
 
2. Drain and bleed ports shall be provided for attitudes anticipated during ground 
servicing of the systems. 
 
 
This standard is to clarify that the design requirements pertain to on-orbit as well as 
ground servicing operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
F-24 Fluid Systems - Design For 
Flushing and Draining 
Document No. 
 JSC-STD-
8080.5 
Standard No.  
 F-24 
Page  
1 of 1 
Previous 
Revision  
04/01/1991 
 
Current as of 08 March 2005: 
STATEMENT OF STANDARD 
REMARKS 
 JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
 
2.3-28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fluids capable of producing toxic fumes shall not be used in systems within the crew 
compartment if a nontoxic substitute with equivalent performance exists. 
 
Where no satisfactory substitute for the fluid exists, tests shall be performed to ensure 
that the total leakage is less than the concentration which would result in a level of toxicity 
that would impair crew health and safety. 
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2.3-29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spacecraft and habitable modules shall be designed and operated so that atmospheric 
pressure and composition control systems maintain a habitable environment under all 
nominal and contingency operational scenarios. 
 
Provisions shall be made to monitor and control oxygen, nitrogen, carbon monoxide, 
carbon dioxide, partial and total atmospheric pressure, and credible atmospheric 
contaminants.  
 
Crew compartments shall be designed with forced ventilation to prevent stagnant air 
pockets from forming in crew-habitable areas of the compartment. 
 
 
Nominal and contingency operational scenarios include, but are not limited to: nominal 
operations, planned or inadvertent fluid system venting into the crew compartment, 
planned or inadvertent crew compartment venting to space, fluid system leakage into a 
crew compartment, and crew compartment leakage to space. 
 
Credible contaminants may be organic, inorganic, or biological.  Refer to MP-9 for 
additional information. 
 
In the absence of natural convective air circulation in a microgravity environment, 
stagnant pockets may accumulate in areas without forced ventilation.  Pockets of crew-
generated carbon dioxide pose a toxicity hazard to the crew. 
 
Planned or inadvertent venting of inert gas into a crew compartment may reduce oxygen 
concentration to a level that could pose a confined space hazard. 
 
Planned or inadvertent venting of oxygen into a crew compartment may increase oxygen 
concentration to a level that poses a fire hazard.  Refer to ASTM Manual 36 for guidance 
on proper selection of crew cabin materials for oxygen- enriched environments. 
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2.3-30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The contents of each individual liquid or gas container to be used in flushing, testing, 
checkout, and operation of spacecraft and/or life support systems shall be shown by 
laboratory analysis to conform to specified requirements prior to introduction into the 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instances have occurred where incorrect labeling of containers has caused application of 
incorrect fluids to subsystems. 
 
In other cases, the contents of the container have failed to meet the specified standards 
of purity. Inspection of shipments by sampling some of the containers has proven 
unsatisfactory for determining impurities in the entire shipment. 
 
The term “prior to introduction” in the statement is interpreted to mean at the time of 
introduction of the fluid into the spacecraft system (recommendation is within one month) 
and prior to exposure of the spacecraft system to possible contamination by that fluid. 
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2.3-31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-28 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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2.3-32 
 
 
 
Fluid system components subject to malfunction from particulate contamination in zero-
gravity or reverse flow situations shall be protected by filters from particulates which might 
enter from either flow direction. 
 
Filters shall be designed either to accommodate the worst expected conditions of service 
for their entire expected service life or to be cleaned and/or replaced as a standard 
maintenance item. 
 
 
 
Components subject to malfunction from particulate contamination should be protected 
on their inlet and outlet by filters. 
 
This applies to both mechanically active (e.g., regulators, solenoid valves, and check 
valves) and mechanically passive (e.g., porous plate sublimators and membrane 
separators) components. 
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2.3-33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fluid system components subject to malfunction from particulate contamination in zero-
gravity or reverse flow situations shall be protected by filters from particulates which might 
enter from either flow direction. 
 
 
 
 
Components that are subject to malfunction from particulate contamination should be 
protected on their inlet and outlet by filters. 
 
This applies to both mechanically active (e.g., regulators, solenoid valves, and check 
valves) and mechanically passive (e.g., porous plate sublimators and membrane 
separators) components. 
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2.3-34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pressure relief capability shall be provided for pressure vessels/systems where the 
contents, system design, environment or operation may cause an increase in internal 
pressure above the maximum design pressure (as defined below).  
 
For pressure vessels/systems where pressure can fluctuate only because of external 
ambient temperature, a mechanical relief device shall not be required provided the 
fluctuations cannot cause the maximum design pressure to be exceeded. 
 
All flight pressure vessels/systems shall be protected during servicing, either on the 
ground or in flight, by relief valves in the servicing equipment. The relief valves shall be 
sized for sufficient mass flow to protect the pressure vessel/system in the event of 
servicing pressure regulator failure.  Such a failure shall not cause the pressure 
vessel/system to exceed the maximum design pressure. 
 
Where mechanical relief devices are required, they shall be sized for sufficient mass flow 
to protect the pressure vessel/system from exceeding the maximum design pressure.   
 
The effects of thrust or torque imparted to the pressure vessel or associated equipment 
by actuation of the relief device shall be considered.  The effects of thrust or torque 
imparted to the spacecraft by actuation of the relief device shall also be considered. 
 
Pressure rise in the compartment where the relief device vent is located shall be 
assessed at relief device maximum flow conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued next page 
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2.3-35 
 
 
 
Continued from previous page 
 
 
Maximum design pressure is the highest pressure defined by maximum relief pressure 
and flow capability, maximum failed regulator pressure, maximum temperature or any 
combination of the above that may occur with one failure.  Transient pressures shall be 
considered. 
 
The pressure vessel/system includes all pressurized hardware (e.g. tankage, lines, 
fittings, and components). 
 
Portions of fluid systems that can trap fluids (become locked-up) shall be specifically 
evaluated for the need of relief capabilities. 
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2.3-1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Fluids 
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2.3-3 
 
 
 
Where pressurized components could fail in such a way that the total gas supply dumped 
directly into a compartment would be greater than the compartment relief valve or venting 
could handle without overpressurization of the compartment, necessary flow restrictions 
shall be incorporated to restrict the mass flow to a level that can be handled by the relief 
valve and/or venting.   
 
For pressurized oxygen systems, flow restrictions shall be designed in accordance with 
ASTM Manual 36, Safe Use of Oxygen and Oxygen Systems Guidelines for Oxygen 
System Design, Materials Selection, Operation, Storage, and Transportation to prevent 
flow-induced ignition hazards. 
 
 
 
 
Pressurized components could fail in such a way that the total gas supply would be 
dumped directly into the compartment. If the pressure relief valve of the compartment 
were unable to handle the resulting pressure increase, compartment structural failure 
could result.  
 
Relief valves in compartments are normally designed to maintain a preestablished 
pressure within the compartment during launch and reentry or in the event of a pressure 
regulator failure. They are not designed to maintain pressure in the event of a break or 
rupture of a pressure line or vessel. 
 
High velocity oxygen flow can pose ignition hazards in improperly designed flow 
restrictors. 
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2.3-4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the design of water separators for use in gas streams under zero-gravity conditions, if 
the design includes a condensing heat exchanger and a downstream liquid/gas 
separator: 
 
1. The liquid collection components and plumbing upstream of the separator shall be 
designed to preclude the collection of large quantities of liquid that could accumulate 
and be carried to the separator as a slug.  If this cannot be assured then the design 
shall accommodate liquid entering the separator as a slug.  
2. The hardware shall accommodate the expected proportions of liquid and gas that the 
separator will have to process (see #5 in Remarks). 
3. Atmospheric debris shall be prevented from entering the separator to prevent clogging 
of small openings or channels. 
4. Cabin trace contaminants shall not reduce the functionality of the heat exchanger 
coating below the required separator performance. 
 
 
 
Design considerations include: 
 
1. The behavior of water droplets changes once the influence of gravity is removed.  
Droplets tend to cling to surfaces more in zero-gravity. 
 
2. In zero-gravity the extent to which the droplet beads up on a hydrophobic surface is 
more pronounced than in one-gravity.  If the surface is hydrophobic, the droplet can 
bead up and be stripped away by the air stream.  If the surface is hydrophilic, the 
droplet will spread out into a thin layer.    Over time, metabolically-produced trace 
contaminants tend to coat surfaces, altering the hydrophobic or hydrophilic properties 
of surfaces or membranes.  Separator designs that rely on the hydrophillic or 
hydrophobic nature of surfaces or membranes may lose that property with time.  This 
may cause blockage or liquid carryover. 
Continued next page. 
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2.3-5 
 
Continued from previous page 
 
 
3. Liquid carryover from the separator can result from degradation of hydrophilic coatings, 
the separator not being designed for the liquid/gas proportions that it has to 
accommodate, a slug that is larger than the separator is designed to handle, or from a 
blockage of flow channels from debris. 
 
4. Design verification of a liquid/gas separator can only be satisfactorily completed in a 
zero-gravity environment that has a long enough duration to experience the range of 
liquid/gas processing phases that will be expected on-orbit. Experience has shown that 
testing in a zero-gravity aircraft, which produces, at most, 20 seconds of micro-gravity 
is not always sufficient to identify problems with slugging or carryover.  Results may 
even be misleading, since a period of increased gravity follows each 20 second micro-
gravity interval.  Testing for an extended period of zero-gravity is essential to verify the 
design of a liquid/gas separator. 
 
5. Separators that have to process mostly liquid in a gas stream will have a different 
design than those that have to process mostly gas in a liquid stream. 
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2.3-6 
 
 
Service points for spacecraft fluid systems shall be designed with positive protection by 
location, connector size, or type to prevent connection to incorrect fluid service lines. 
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2.3-7 
 
 
Ground service points for fluid systems including those for filling, draining, purging, or 
bleeding shall be accessible from the exterior of the spacecraft or element. 
 
Gas purge or bleed fittings shall exhaust outside the spacecraft or element. 
 
Portable fluid systems and systems that are located entirely within the pressurized 
compartment(s) of the spacecraft are excluded from the above requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here, accessible means that the service points can be behind a door or access panel  
 
A dry hose may be attached to the interior of the spacecraft for servicing by GSE. 
 
Servicing of fluid systems from inside compartment(s) may result in the following: 
 
1. Exposure of equipment to fluid spillage  
 
2. Damage of service points due to inaccessibility 
 
3. Unnecessary traffic in the compartment 
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2.3-8 
 
 
For separation of space-vehicle modules where one is being discarded, fluid lines that are 
required to be disconnected or severed on separation shall be designed such that any 
breakage resulting from failure of the disconnecting device to function will occur on the 
discarded side of the disconnect. The check valve or shutoff valve, used on the retained 
side of the disconnect for preventing unacceptable loss of fluid after disconnection, shall 
be a type that will function (i.e., that will close) in spite of such a failure. 
 
For separation of space-vehicle modules where both need to function after separation but 
are not intended for subsequent reconnection, fluid lines that are required to be 
disconnected on separation shall be designed to preclude unacceptable loss of fluid after 
disconnection. 
 
For separation of space-vehicle modules where both need to function after separation 
and are intended for subsequent reconnection, fluid lines that are required to be 
disconnected on separation shall be designed to preclude unacceptable loss of fluid after 
disconnection and shall include provisions to enable successful reconnection.   
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2.3-9 
 
 
 
 
All spacecraft systems and ground support servicing equipment requiring storage of 
reactive fluids (e.g., hydrogen peroxide, oxidizers, and monopropellants) shall be 
designed to include devices for monitoring temperature and pressure. 
 
 
 
 
 
This approach permits accurate determination of the rates of decomposition of the fluids 
contained in their respective systems. 
 
These monitoring devices will provide time for corrective action in the event that abnormal 
decomposition of fluids is initiated. 
 
Transfer lines and pumps should be considered as part of the overall monitoring effort but 
not necessarily individually instrumented. 
 
This standard combines G-49 and F-6 into single standard. 
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2.3-10 
 
 
 
 
Fluid servicing and test ports, not required to function in flight, shall be designed so that 
they can be capped immediately after servicing or test in order to preclude leakage in 
flight.  
 
The method and material used for capping shall be compatible with the applicable 
spacecraft subsystem and the expected environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capping of these ports is necessary to prevent leakage of the applicable subsystem. 
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2.3-11 
 
 
 
 
 
The following positive measures shall be taken to prevent incorrect installation of fluid 
system components whose function is dependent on direction of flow: 
 
1. The direction of fluid flow shall be indicated with permanent markings on the exterior of 
the component and on the parts and lines to be mated with the component. 
 
2. A flow check shall be performed after each installation or change. 
 
3. Where flow checks cannot be made, provisions shall be incorporated in the fluid line 
components’ design, end fittings, or connections to preclude incorrect installation. 
 
 
 
 
In a complex plumbing installation, it is difficult for fabrication or assembly personnel to 
know the direction of flow. 
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2.3-12 
 
 
Sources of venting that could occur during the mission shall be identified and an analysis 
made to ensure that the total vent condition is designed to be compatible with vehicle 
and/or mission control capabilities. Impingement of vent plumes on spacecraft shall be 
analyzed. 
 
Nonpropulsive vent concepts, opposed venting, operational procedures, or similar 
methods shall be used to eliminate the undesirable effects of perturbing forces resulting 
from such vents. 
 
 
 
 
Typical sources of planned or expected overboard venting include water boilers, cabin 
relief valves, fuel cell purges, waste disposals, dryers, waste compartments, and air 
locks.  
 
Such venting is a major cause of error in spacecraft precision control and navigation. In 
addition, venting may be a major source of exterior contamination of precision optical and 
electromagnetic instruments on spacecraft.  
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2.3-13 
 
 
 
 
All nozzles and vents used in crewed spacecraft systems, such as those of the reaction 
control system and environmental control system, shall be protected from entrance of 
rain, debris, or other contaminants prior to launch. (This standard applies throughout 
assembly, testing, shipment, and checkout of the spacecraft and its systems). 
 
Protective covers for nozzles or vents located within a payload bay shall be designed to 
be readily removable during the countdown before launch or before final closure of 
payload bay doors.  
 
Covers shall be designed so that removal can be accomplished without risk of dumping 
accumulated debris into the nozzle or vent, damaging nozzle radiation coatings or 
generating debris that poses a risk to the vehicle. 
 
Covers shall be designed so that failure to remove the cover will not cause failure of the 
system or any other subsystem.  
 
 
Protection is advisable at all times and is particularly required whenever any nozzle axis 
is pointing substantially above the horizontal axis. 
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2.3-14 
 
 
 
 
Ground support equipment, facilities, fluid containers, and other equipment to be 
connected to a spacecraft system for operation, testing, checkout, or maintenance shall 
be designed so that routine verification tests can be conducted before each connection is 
made to ensure that each fluid input to the spacecraft will be compatible with the 
spacecraft system. 
 
Procedures shall be provided to accomplish the verification tests with the equipment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instances have occurred where a spacecraft has sustained damage by inputs from 
equipment which was not checked to be within acceptable limits before it was connected 
to spacecraft systems. 
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2.3-15 
 
 
 
 
Where maintenance of fluid pressure is critical to prevent major damage to a space 
vehicle component such as a propellant tank or fuel cell, the ground support equipment 
(GSE), airborne support equipment (ASE) or flight support equipment (FSE) shall be 
designed to provide sufficient pressure to the space vehicle component in the event of a 
failure of the pressurant source. 
 
The GSE, ASE or FSE shall be designed such that recovery from failures of the 
pressurant source can be accomplished without damage to the space vehicle component.   
 
The GSE, ASE or FSE shall be designed to monitor pressure (or pressure differential) 
both from the source and to the system. 
 
 
Depletion of the GSE, ASE or FSE pressure source or line pressure drops resulting from 
fluid flow have resulted in serious equipment damage in operations where the 
requirements of this standard were not met. 
 
Good practice is to use separate fluid pressure sources for purge or flushing. 
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2.3-16 
 
 
 
 
To prevent over-pressurization, all habitable pressurized elements shall have pressure 
relief venting systems.   
 
Each pressurized element shall have its own vent system so that venting systems are not 
shared.   
 
The venting system shall be capable of isolating the flow path from the ambient 
environment of the pressurized element to space vacuum, and the venting system shall 
be configurable to or already have online a secondary vent system in the event the 
primary vent fails. 
 
 
Contamination control, fire control, and other emergency response procedures require 
that all pressurized elements of a spacecraft can be isolated from the other pressurized 
elements, and that each pressurized element can be independently vented.   
 
Experience with Shuttle and ISS have demonstrated that vents can ice up in permanently 
open or closed positions.  Vents can also become corroded by contact with vented 
products.   
 
Vents should not be shared.  Vents can fail and must be capable of isolation from the 
ambient environment by actions internal to the element and alternate vents should be 
configurable or concurrently available.   
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2.3-17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-14 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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2.3-18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oxidizer and fuel (both liquids and vapors) shall be positively separated using all-metal 
containment with mixing only allowed in the controlled combustion area. 
 
 
 
 
 
Common pressurant gas supply for fuel and oxidizer should not be used. 
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2.3-19 
 
 
 
 
 
Flight and GSE fluid line routing and installation shall meet the following requirements: 
 
• Detailed drawings and procedures shall be provided for routing and installation of all 
fluid lines, including pressure-sensor lines. 
• If temperature conditions are not within acceptable limits for the fluid involved, 
measures shall be taken to provide passive or active thermal control as appropriate.   
• A design analysis shall be provided for each line installation to show that the 
temperature extremes to which it will be subjected (including storage, handling, 
transportation, and operations) are within acceptable limits for the fluid involved.  
• Fluid lines installed external to spacecraft shall be Extravehicular Activity (EVA) 
compatible, if intended for future EVA maintenance or repair.  
• Strain relief shall accommodate design loads, deflections, and thermal expansion.  
• Fluid lines shall be restrained at intervals in accordance with the governing standard 
for the application.  
• Fluid lines carrying oxygen shall not be configured with sharp bends that could pose a 
blunt flow impingement ignition hazard, in accordance with ASTM Manual 36. 
 
 
EVA compatibility information is provided in JSC 26626A EVA Generic Design 
Requirements Document.   
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2.3-20 
 
 
 
 
 
Spacecraft systems that will contain gases or liquids to be used or expended during the 
mission shall be maintained in the state of cleanliness required by the specification for the 
particular substance involved after factory assembly and up to and including final 
servicing prior to flight.  
 
This requirement shall also apply to the gas- and liquid-handling systems of all servicing, 
maintenance, handling, testing, and checkout equipment. 
 
Such systems fluids, as well as test fluids that enter spacecraft systems, shall be filtered 
or controlled such that the degree of cleanliness required by the specification for the 
particular substance is maintained. 
 
Spacecraft systems that will contain such gases or liquids shall be designed so that 
required draining, flushing, drying, cold trapping, etc. can be accomplished with the 
spacecraft in its checkout or working attitude.  The length of time to accomplish this task 
shall be presented for approval during design reviews. 
 
Calibration fluids shall be furnished with analysis reports which are signed by the preparer 
and the source inspection agency 
 
 
 
 
  
F-17 Cleanliness Of Flowing Fluids 
And Associated Systems 
Document No. 
 JSC-STD-
8080.5 
Standard No.  
 F-17 
Page  
1 of 1 
Previous 
Revision  
04/01/1991 
 
Current as of 08 March 2005: 
STATEMENT OF STANDARD 
REMARKS 
 JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
 
2.3-21 
 
 
 
 
 
To provide consistency in initial and subsequent testing of pressure relief valves, the 
manufacturer shall specify values for: crack and reseat pressure, mass-flow rates, 
pressures corresponding to full flow, and allowable leakage.  
 
These values shall be specified for operation with the flight fluid and any other fluid 
recommended for test purposes. 
 
Retest time intervals shall be specified for valves that are subject to deterioration with 
time. 
 
 
Specific flow-rate values have been found necessary for verification of these valve 
characteristics with the precision required in preflight checkout. 
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2.3-22 
 
 
 
Handling of flight and flight interface GSE fluid systems shall meet the following 
requirements: 
 
1. Design drawings and/or process specifications shall designate the method of 
complying with this standard.  
 
2. In each step of the manufacturing process and buildup, all ends of tubing, fittings, and 
components used in fluid systems shall be protected against damage and entry of 
contaminants.  Equivalent protection shall be provided for tubing, fittings, and/or 
components when the subsystem is open to effect repair or replacement.   
 
3. Protective caps shall meet the cleanliness requirement of the manufacturing 
specification.  Protective cap material and design shall be compatible with the fluid. 
 
4. All assemblies shall be cleaned and dried before packaging.  For oxygen components, 
cleaning and packaging materials shall not pose residue or particle contamination 
hazards, in accordance with ASTM Manual 36.  
 
5. Refill procedures shall provide the same protection against damage or contamination 
as the initial manufacturing procedures establish.   
 
6. Protection devices for components to be installed external to spacecraft shall be 
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) compatible. 
 
7. Tubing assemblies, fittings, or components that are stored or shipped shall be 
protected and sealed in a clean, transparent, moisture-proof bag with sufficient 
protective strength and thickness for the intended handling.  
Open plumbing and components must be protected to avoid entrance of foreign material 
and to protect the sealing surfaces.   
 
Additional protection and procedures may be required by the regulatory authority for the 
fluid in question. 
 
EVA compatibility information is provided in JSC 26626A EVA Generic Design 
Requirements Document.  
 
Methods of protection to maintain cleanliness of the hardware include but are not limited 
to: bagging, handling in a clean room or flow bench, and clean gas purge during 
assembly.    
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2.3-23 
 
 
 
 
 
After manufacturing and after any subsequent exposure to the probable entry of 
contaminants, fluid systems and servicing equipment shall be cleaned by flushing to 
remove all contaminants which could be detrimental to the system. 
 
The flushing fluid shall be compatible with the system materials and the working fluid to 
be used in the system. Cleanliness levels of the flushing fluid and the system maximum 
allowable contamination shall be specified. During flushing, the fluid entering the system 
shall be filtered to the same level of cleanliness or better than that of the working fluid to 
be used in the system. 
 
Whenever it is necessary to verify the cleanliness level of a spacecraft fluid system or its 
servicing equipment, samples of the fluid leaving the system from draining, purging or 
flushing operations shall be analyzed to determine that particulate and/or chemical 
contamination are within specified limits.  
 
The fluid sample shall be taken at the end of the draining, purging or flushing operation. 
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2.3-24 
 
 
 
 
 
Gases used for purging propellant vapors or other vapors from space-vehicle 
compartments shall have a dew point low enough to preclude moisture condensation 
from the purge gas on the coldest surfaces that the purging gas will contact. 
 
 
 
 
This standard does not apply to cryogenic system surfaces when in a supercold condition 
and does not preclude consideration of other problems, such as static electricity or 
equipment temperature requirements, that may be involved with selection of proper dew 
point. 
 
Purge gases may become saturated with the vapor being purged. When the gases later 
come in contact  with colder surfaces in the compartment, the absorbed vapor may be 
deposited on these surfaces. 
 
Transfer of the liquid from the point where it is being absorbed to other locations in the 
compartment may be dangerous. 
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2.3-25 
 
 
 
 
 
Systems which supply pressure to crew pressure garments shall be designed so that a 
major failure of one crew member's garment or garment pressure supply will not cause 
loss of life to other crew members. 
 
 
 
 
Systems supplying gas to pressure suits should be so designed that an abrupt 
decompression of the suit of one crew member (such as might result from a rip in the 
fabric or a broken or unlatched faceplate) will not result immediately in a similar rapid loss 
of pressure in the suits of the other members or in a sudden total depletion of the gas 
supply.  
 
The time available before the loss of pressure occurs in the other suits or before a critical 
depletion of the gas supply occurs should be sufficient to allow: 
 
1. time for reasonable attempts to aid the decompressed crew member (e.g., by closing 
an unlatched faceplate) and  
 
2. time to shut off flow to the open suit in the event the damage is beyond repair and the 
crew member cannot be saved.  
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2.3-26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-23 has been reclassified as General Standard G-53.   
 
See G-53 for revised standard text. 
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2.3-27 
 
 
 
Spacecraft fluid systems and related servicing equipment shall be designed to permit 
complete flushing and draining during ground and on-orbit servicing operations.  
 
The following conditions shall be satisfied, as a minimum: 
 
1. The systems shall be free from dead-ended piping or passages through which flushing 
fluid cannot be made to flow. 
 
2. Drain and bleed ports shall be provided for attitudes anticipated during ground 
servicing of the systems. 
 
 
This standard is to clarify that the design requirements pertain to on-orbit as well as 
ground servicing operations. 
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2.3-28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fluids capable of producing toxic fumes shall not be used in systems within the crew 
compartment if a nontoxic substitute with equivalent performance exists. 
 
Where no satisfactory substitute for the fluid exists, tests shall be performed to ensure 
that the total leakage is less than the concentration which would result in a level of toxicity 
that would impair crew health and safety. 
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2.3-29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spacecraft and habitable modules shall be designed and operated so that atmospheric 
pressure and composition control systems maintain a habitable environment under all 
nominal and contingency operational scenarios. 
 
Provisions shall be made to monitor and control oxygen, nitrogen, carbon monoxide, 
carbon dioxide, partial and total atmospheric pressure, and credible atmospheric 
contaminants.  
 
Crew compartments shall be designed with forced ventilation to prevent stagnant air 
pockets from forming in crew-habitable areas of the compartment. 
 
 
Nominal and contingency operational scenarios include, but are not limited to: nominal 
operations, planned or inadvertent fluid system venting into the crew compartment, 
planned or inadvertent crew compartment venting to space, fluid system leakage into a 
crew compartment, and crew compartment leakage to space. 
 
Credible contaminants may be organic, inorganic, or biological.  Refer to MP-9 for 
additional information. 
 
In the absence of natural convective air circulation in a microgravity environment, 
stagnant pockets may accumulate in areas without forced ventilation.  Pockets of crew-
generated carbon dioxide pose a toxicity hazard to the crew. 
 
Planned or inadvertent venting of inert gas into a crew compartment may reduce oxygen 
concentration to a level that could pose a confined space hazard. 
 
Planned or inadvertent venting of oxygen into a crew compartment may increase oxygen 
concentration to a level that poses a fire hazard.  Refer to ASTM Manual 36 for guidance 
on proper selection of crew cabin materials for oxygen- enriched environments. 
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2.3-30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The contents of each individual liquid or gas container to be used in flushing, testing, 
checkout, and operation of spacecraft and/or life support systems shall be shown by 
laboratory analysis to conform to specified requirements prior to introduction into the 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instances have occurred where incorrect labeling of containers has caused application of 
incorrect fluids to subsystems. 
 
In other cases, the contents of the container have failed to meet the specified standards 
of purity. Inspection of shipments by sampling some of the containers has proven 
unsatisfactory for determining impurities in the entire shipment. 
 
The term “prior to introduction” in the statement is interpreted to mean at the time of 
introduction of the fluid into the spacecraft system (recommendation is within one month) 
and prior to exposure of the spacecraft system to possible contamination by that fluid. 
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2.3-31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-28 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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2.3-32 
 
 
 
Fluid system components subject to malfunction from particulate contamination in zero-
gravity or reverse flow situations shall be protected by filters from particulates which might 
enter from either flow direction. 
 
Filters shall be designed either to accommodate the worst expected conditions of service 
for their entire expected service life or to be cleaned and/or replaced as a standard 
maintenance item. 
 
 
 
Components subject to malfunction from particulate contamination should be protected 
on their inlet and outlet by filters. 
 
This applies to both mechanically active (e.g., regulators, solenoid valves, and check 
valves) and mechanically passive (e.g., porous plate sublimators and membrane 
separators) components. 
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2.3-33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fluid system components subject to malfunction from particulate contamination in zero-
gravity or reverse flow situations shall be protected by filters from particulates which might 
enter from either flow direction. 
 
 
 
 
Components that are subject to malfunction from particulate contamination should be 
protected on their inlet and outlet by filters. 
 
This applies to both mechanically active (e.g., regulators, solenoid valves, and check 
valves) and mechanically passive (e.g., porous plate sublimators and membrane 
separators) components. 
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2.3-34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pressure relief capability shall be provided for pressure vessels/systems where the 
contents, system design, environment or operation may cause an increase in internal 
pressure above the maximum design pressure (as defined below).  
 
For pressure vessels/systems where pressure can fluctuate only because of external 
ambient temperature, a mechanical relief device shall not be required provided the 
fluctuations cannot cause the maximum design pressure to be exceeded. 
 
All flight pressure vessels/systems shall be protected during servicing, either on the 
ground or in flight, by relief valves in the servicing equipment. The relief valves shall be 
sized for sufficient mass flow to protect the pressure vessel/system in the event of 
servicing pressure regulator failure.  Such a failure shall not cause the pressure 
vessel/system to exceed the maximum design pressure. 
 
Where mechanical relief devices are required, they shall be sized for sufficient mass flow 
to protect the pressure vessel/system from exceeding the maximum design pressure.   
 
The effects of thrust or torque imparted to the pressure vessel or associated equipment 
by actuation of the relief device shall be considered.  The effects of thrust or torque 
imparted to the spacecraft by actuation of the relief device shall also be considered. 
 
Pressure rise in the compartment where the relief device vent is located shall be 
assessed at relief device maximum flow conditions. 
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2.3-35 
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Maximum design pressure is the highest pressure defined by maximum relief pressure 
and flow capability, maximum failed regulator pressure, maximum temperature or any 
combination of the above that may occur with one failure.  Transient pressures shall be 
considered. 
 
The pressure vessel/system includes all pressurized hardware (e.g. tankage, lines, 
fittings, and components). 
 
Portions of fluid systems that can trap fluids (become locked-up) shall be specifically 
evaluated for the need of relief capabilities. 
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Materials used in the fabrication and processing of flight hardware shall comply with 
NASA-STD-6016, Standard Materials and Processes requirements for Spacecraft. 
 
Applicability to GSE is specified in NASA-STD-6016. 
 
 
JSC 27301, Materials and Processes Selection, Control, and Implementation Plan for 
JSC Flight Hardware is used to implement the requirements of NASA-STD-6016 for JSC 
in-house flight hardware.  
 
Selection of materials is based on the worst-case operational requirements for the 
particular application and the design engineering properties of the candidate materials.  
 
The operational requirements include, but are not limited to, operational temperature 
limits, loads, contamination, life expectancy, moisture or other fluid media exposure, and 
vehicle-related induced and natural space environments.  
 
Properties to be considered in material selection include, but are not limited to, 
mechanical properties, fracture toughness, flammability and offgassing characteristics, 
corrosion, stress corrosion, thermal and mechanical fatigue properties, vacuum 
outgassing, fluids compatibility, microbial resistance, moisture resistance, fretting, galling, 
susceptibility to electrostatic discharge (ESD).  
 
Conditions that contribute to deterioration of hardware in service receive special 
consideration.  
 
This standard supersedes JSC-STD-8080.5 (rev. date 3/8/2005) standard MP-1 and 
incorporates  the following standards that were identified separately in JSCM 8080 (rev. 
date 4/1/91): MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, MP-10, MP-12, MP-14, MP-
15, MP-16, MP-17, MP-18, MP-19, MP-20, MP-21, MP-23, MP-24, MP-25 
(materials/fluids compatibility), and MP-26. 
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MP Standards 2 - 8 have been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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Direct inhalation breathing systems shall not contain any sources of mercury.  Examples 
include but are not limited to: spacesuits, launch entry suits, underwater breathing 
systems, environmental chambers, and auxiliary life support systems. 
 
Closed habitable atmospheres shall not contain sources of mercury that could lead to 
unsafe levels of contamination as determined by the JSC Toxicologist for spaceflight 
equipment and the Industrial Hygienist for ground support equipment. 
 
 
 
If mercury sources are identified, the mercury should either be removed, or a waiver from 
JSC environmental health should be obtained.  If a waiver is obtained and a source of 
mercury remains in the system, a test of the air will be conducted using calibrated 
analytical instruments capable of detecting concentrations of mercury less than 0.005 
mg/m3.  The minimum temperature of a system while undergoing testing will be 20 
degrees C (68 degrees F). 
 
JSC 20584, Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations (SMAC) for Airborne 
Contaminants defines the limit for continuous exposure to mercury. 
 
JPG 1700.1, The JSC Safety and Health Handbook, Chapter 9.1, Section 19 cites 40 
CFR 61, EPA National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), and 
lists mercury as a restricted substance at JSC. 
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MP 10 has been cancelled.   
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cancellation. 
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Manufacturing, processing, and pressurization histories shall be maintained for each 
spaceflight pressure vessel. The minimum data required are: 
 
1. Material certification and composition 
2. Actual fabrication and processing sequence 
3. Fluid exposure and temperature during fabrication and testing 
4. Actual chronological tests and checkout history including all proof, leak, and cycling 
data along with the magnitude of pressure, type of pressurant, and number of pressure 
cycles to which the tank was subjected  
5. Discrepancy history 
6. Inspection Plan 
7. Damage Control Plan for Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs) 
8. Fracture Control Summary 
9. Certification Report 
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Histories may include manufacturing, processing, and pressurization information on 
pressure vessels, including those used for qualification and other tests. The data should 
be comprehensive and enable an assessment of the similarity of production units to those 
subjected to qualification and other nonproduction testing. 
 
Because of the high sensitivity of pressure vessels to structural degradation, which can 
occur during manufacturing, shipping, handling, and testing, conditions can develop 
which have not been demonstrated to be acceptable by the qualification test. 
Documentation should be available to assess the overall condition of each pressure 
vessel. 
 
In addition to the above minimum requirements, it is desirable to maintain any pertinent 
backup data that would facilitate an investigation in the event of an unanticipated failure 
or problem related to the pressure vessel material or related components. 
 
For the purposes of this standard, a pressure vessel is as defined in ANSI/AIAA S-080, 
“Space Systems-Metallic Pressure Vessels, Pressurized Structures, and Pressure 
Components”, and ANSI/AIAA S-081, “Space Systems-Composite Overwrapped 
Pressure Vessels (COPVs)” (see Standard MP-13 
 
). 
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The design, manufacture, test, inspection, qualification, and use of space systems 
pressure vessels and special pressurized equipment shall meet the requirements of: 
 
1. American National Standards ANSI/AIAA S-080-1998, Space Systems-Metallic 
Pressure Vessels, Pressurized Structures, and Pressure Components 
2. ANSI/AIAA S-081-2000, Space Systems-Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels 
(COPVs) 
 
NASA-contracted ground support equipment (GSE) pressure vessels shall meet Center 
requirements (such as JSC-STD-1710.13, Design, Inspection, and Certification of 
Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems) or the pertinent requirements of The 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Code for Unfired 
Pressure Vessels, Section VIII.  
 
In addition, GSE pressure vessels shall have demonstrated resistance to 
environmentally-induced flaw propagation sufficient to preclude degradation of the tank 
under expected use conditions. 
 
 
 
Examples of special pressurized equipment include, but are not limited to: dewars, heat 
pipes, and certain batteries. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 (4/1/1991) standards MP-13, MP-23, and MP-25. 
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MP Standards 14 - 26 have been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MP Standards 14 –26 - Cancelled – See Appendix B 
 JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
2.5-1 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5. Mechanics and Structural 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
2.5-2 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
 
2.5. Mechanics and Structural .................................................................................. 2.5-1 
MS-1    Equipment Containers – Design For Rapid Spacecraft Decompression ...... 2.5-3 
MS-2    Alignment, Adjustment, and Rigging of Mechanical Systems ...................... 2.5-4 
MS-3    Reclassified  - See E-25 .............................................................................. 2.5-5 
MS-4    Crew Hatches .............................................................................................. 2.5-6 
MS-5    Threaded Fasteners..................................................................................... 2.5-8 
MS-6    Cancelled – See Appendix B ..................................................................... 2.5-10 
MS-7    Windows And Glass Structure ................................................................... 2.5-11 
MS-8    Penetration Of Inhabited Spacecraft Compartments ................................. 2.5-12 
MS-9    Positive Indication Of Status For Mechanisms ........................................... 2.5-13 
MS-10  Cancelled – See Appendix B ..................................................................... 2.5-14 
MS-11  Meteoroid And Orbital Debris Protection Levels For Structures ................. 2.5-15 
MS-12  Spacecraft Recovery Hoist Loops .............................................................. 2.5-17 
MS-13  Cancelled – See Appendix B ..................................................................... 2.5-18 
MS-14  Structural Analysis ..................................................................................... 2.5-19 
MS-15  Fluid Systems - Method Of Joining Metallics ............................................. 2.5-20 
MS-16  Pressure Vessels – Negative Pressure Damage ....................................... 2.5-21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
2.5-3 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
 
 
 
Equipment containers or enclosures for use within pressurized compartments of 
spacecraft shall be designed to withstand rapid decompression of the spacecraft without 
yielding, fracturing, or sustaining damage. 
 
 
Rapid decompression is defined as that decompression rate associated with the sudden 
opening of the largest inlet or outlet which vents to the space environment. 
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Mechanical systems requiring accurate alignment, adjustment, or rigging of the system or 
system components shall incorporate provisions allowing for such alignment, adjustment 
or rigging to be made without the removal of the system, any of its components, or any 
neighboring hardware. 
 
Where the actual alignment, adjustment, or rigging equipment is not incorporated into the 
flight hardware, provisions for mounting and using the necessary alignment, adjustment 
or rigging equipment shall be incorporated into the flight system. 
 
Where in-flight alignment, adjustment, or rigging is required, such capability shall be 
incorporated into the flight hardware.  If in-flight alignment, adjustment, or rigging requires 
tooling, the tools shall be standard tools. 
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MS-3 has been reclassified as Electrical Standard E-25.   
 
See Section 2.2 Electrical for standard text  
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Crew hatches shall meet the following requirements. 
 
1. OPERATION 
a. Hatches and associated hardware (hinges, latches, actuators, attenuators, seals, 
etc.) shall be designed for repeated operation.   
b. Hatches shall be designed to be operable on the ground with the vehicle in any 
ground processing orientation.   
c. Hatches shall be capable of one-handed operation under zero-g conditions.  
d. Hatches shall be capable of being manually closed and opened from both sides. 
i. Internal hatches shall have in-place provisions for latch-unlatch and opening 
operations from either side of the hatch.  
ii. External hatches shall have in-place provisions for latch-unlatch and opening 
operations from the interior of the hatch, and shall have provisions for latch-
unlatch and opening operations from the exterior of the hatch. 
e. Hatch latch actuation shall require two (2) separate and distinct operations to 
unlatch. 
f. The hatch latch mechanism shall have an indicating system to display hatch latch 
locked and safe. 
g. Internal hatches shall have a means of pressure equalization and display of 
pressure delta across the hatch on each side of each hatch. 
h. Opening assist devices shall be provided to break the seals of the hatch to allow the 
differential pressure across the hatch to reduce to an acceptable level before 
releasing the hatch to the fully open position. 
 
2. MAINTENANCE 
a. Hatches and associated hardware (hinges, latches, actuators, attenuators, seals, 
etc.) shall be designed to allow for inspection. 
b. Hatches shall have provisions for ease of removal.   
c. All associated hatch hardware (hinges, latches, actuators, attenuators, seals, etc.) 
shall be designed to be repairable, replaceable, or both on the ground.  If operated 
during flight, all associated hardware shall be designed to be repairable, 
replaceable, or both during flight. 
 
Continued next page.  
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3. SEAL INTEGRITY 
a. The capability shall be provided to leak check between redundant pressure seals 
without pressurizing/depressurizing the adjacent pressure volumes.   
b. The capability for verification of hatch seal integrity shall be provided on both sides of 
the hatch. 
4. THERMAL AND STRUCTURAL LOADS 
a. Hatches and associated mechanisms shall not be designed to carry primary 
structural loads.   
b. The design of the structure surrounding hatches used in escape operations shall 
consider provisions to minimize the probability of jamming which would prevent crew 
egress following emergency landing or ditching. 
c. Hatches and associated mechanisms shall allow for differential movement between 
structural frame and the hatch as well as maintain compartment sealing under these 
conditions. 
5. VISIBILITY 
a. Hatches shall incorporate a window designed in accordance with NASA STD 3000. 
 
 
 
Refer to MS-8 for hatch requirements related to ground and emergency operations; G-9 
Exclusion of Shatterable Material and MS-7 Window and Glass Structure for 
requirements with respect to the use of glass 
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1. All fasteners shall meet the following generic requirements. 
a. Thread form of all fasteners shall be UN, UNJ, UNR, or ACME. 
i. Fasteners with the external thread form UNJ shall only be used in conjunction 
with internal thread form UNJ. 
b. Use of liquid locking compounds such as Vibratite and Loctite shall meet the 
requirements of JSC 49774 (Rev. A), Standard Manned Spacecraft Requirements 
for Materials and Processes.  
c. Use of silver-plated fasteners shall meet the requirements of JSC 49774.   
d. Wet installation of fasteners shall meet the requirements of JSC 49774. 
e. Installation of titanium fasteners and associated parts shall meet the requirements of 
JSC 49774. 
f. Each fastener system shall incorporate at least one verifiable locking feature. 
i. Loosening of fasteners with only one verifiable locking feature shall be 
addressed in the “Failure Modes and Effect Analysis” (FMEA) or other hazard 
analysis document. 
g. Fasteners shall be designed or selected to minimize the generation of particulate 
debris or foreign material. Self-tapping screws and bolts shall not be used. 
 
2. All fasteners defined as “Safety Critical Fasteners” (see Remarks) shall meet 
requirement 1 above and the following additional requirements: 
a. Each fastener system shall incorporate at least two separate verifiable locking 
features.   
i. At least one locking feature shall be positive torque locking and vibration rated.   
ii. Joint preload may be counted as one of the locking features provided the 
preload level is adequate to produce the intended locking effect.   
b. Joints subject to rotation shall use at least one non-friction locking feature such as 
cotter pins or lockwire.  
c. Preload torques and running torques, along with their acceptable ranges, shall be 
specified on the installation drawings. 
d. Installation procedures shall include performing and recording functional verification 
of the locking feature for each individual fastener such as measurement of running 
torque or visual inspection of locking feature integrity.   
e. Installation procedures shall include functional verification of preload such as 
measurement of preload torque.   
Continued next page 
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3. All fasteners defined as “Safety Critical Fasteners” (see Remarks) that are installed, 
removed, or adjusted during the mission shall meet requirements 1 and 2 above and 
the following additional requirements: 
a. At least one side of the fastener interface shall be lubricated. 
i. If both internal and external threads of the fastener interface are dry-film 
lubricated and the interface has a significant life requirement, the interface 
shall be life-tested. 
ii. Fastener male and female interfaces shall be gauged or fit-checked (in and 
out) at room temperature after application of lubrication to verify no 
interference between the fastener interfaces.  
iii. Fasteners with dry-film lubrication shall undergo burnishing or wear-in. 
b. Provisions shall be made to reduce the possibility of cross-threading for EVA 
fasteners installed during the mission.  See Remarks for suggested methods 
 
Fasteners intended for an IVA operation must be designed in accordance with NASA-
STD-3000. 
 
Safety Critical Fastener – A fastener whose failure could potentially result in a Critical 
Hazard or a Catastrophic Hazard. 
 
Critical Hazard – Hazard that can result in a non-disabling personnel injury, damage to 
flight hardware, ground facilities, or mission-critical equipment, or loss of mission. 
 
Catastrophic Hazard – Hazard that can result in a disabling or fatal personnel injury or 
loss of flight hardware, ground facilities, or mission-critical equipment. 
 
Self Locking (Running, Prevailing) Torque – Torque required to overcome kinetic friction 
of the mating threads plus the torque required to overcome the kinetic friction of the 
locking feature when 100 percent of the locking feature is engaged and the fastener is 
unseated.  This torque can be measured in a loosening or tightening direction. 
 
Positive Torque Locking – Device or feature that positively locks the fastener, or a self 
locking feature that retains full running torque after relief of preload. 
 
Suggested methods to prevent cross threading of EVA fasteners include separate or 
integral alignment features, choice of thread form, ensuring proper visibility during 
installation, and eliminating shear loads on the fastener during installation.  These 
methods are also suggested for safety critical IVA fasteners installed during the mission. 
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MS-6 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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The design of all spacecraft windows and other glass structures shall include evaluation 
of flaw growth under the design stress and environment. A fracture mechanics analysis 
shall be performed for each configuration of glass structure. A proof acceptance test 
consistent with the type of loading shall be conducted to screen flaws in each glass 
structural flight item based on the results of the fracture mechanics analysis. All proof 
testing shall be performed in a suitable environment to limit flaw growth during the proof 
testing. 
 
Until a satisfactory fracture mechanics analysis can be provided for tempered glass 
structures, a fracture mechanics analysis may be performed on an annealed glass 
structure of the same material composition, and the tempered glass proof test rationale 
can be based on this analysis. The design environment for the tempered glass shall be 
used for the annealed glass analysis. 
Windows and other glass structures (optics, instrument covers, etc.) include any piece of 
glass and other glass-like materials, such as germanium and sapphire, which must carry 
stress and which, if broken, will endanger the crew or the mission success. 
 
Television, photographic, and other electro-optical device lenses, which do not carry 
stress, are specifically exempted from this standard.  See standard G-9 for guidance on 
controlling hazards associated with these items. 
 
Spacecraft windows and glass structures in instruments and optical equipment must be 
designed with adequate structural rigor. Window design requirements and structural 
characteristics of glass must be clearly understood for application in environments 
associated with spacecraft. Fracture mechanics analysis is the best method for 
understanding and evaluating the structural characteristics of glass and for providing the 
structural rationale specifying proof test requirements. 
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Inhabited spacecraft compartments shall be so designed that all penetrations shall take 
advantage of normal pressure-induced forces to aid in maintaining vessel structure and 
cabin pressure integrity. 
 
The primary flight crew ingress/egress hatch used during ground operations shall be 
designed to be outward opening from the pressurized spacecraft compartment. For 
designs where it is impractical to have an outward opening hatch, provisions shall be 
made to rapidly equalize the pressure across the hatch. 
 
Reliable, redundant safety devices shall be provided to prevent inadvertent opening or 
rapid depressurization on orbit. 
 
 
 
 
Penetrations include ingress/egress and manufacturing access hatches. 
 
The purpose of the outward opening feature specified is to enable rapid egress of the 
crew from the spacecraft. 
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All movable mechanical systems shall provide positive indication that the mechanism has 
achieved its desired position. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examples of desired position include ready-to-latch, latched, locked, stowed, deployed, 
etc.--any state in which a failure to achieve this state results in a failure of the mechanism 
to perform its function. 
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MS-10 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MS-10 Cancelled – See Appendix B 
 JSC-STD-8080  
October 2011 
2.5-15 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
 
 
Protection levels against impacts from micrometeoroids and orbital debris (MMOD) for 
spacecraft structures shall be determined by hypervelocity impact tests and analysis.  
 
The risks for loss of crew, loss of vehicle, and loss of mission from MMOD shall be 
established. Such risks shall be equal to or better than MMOD risks for previous 
spacecraft programs.   
 
The MMOD risk assessments shall be updated as the MMOD environment definitions 
change.   
 
Actual damage from MMOD impacts shall be identified and compared to predictions in 
order to track and trend MMOD effects on the spacecraft. 
 
Empirical equations have been derived from hypervelocity impact testing on a variety of 
single-sheet or double-sheet structures. When the structural configuration differs 
significantly from the test specimen configurations from which the equations were 
derived, the equations cannot be considered accurate. For example, if multilayer 
insulation is added, the equations are likely to be invalid; or if a honeycomb core joins the 
MMOD bumper to the main structural shell, the protection level may be significantly 
altered. 
 
Hypervelocity impact tests are considered to be the most accurate method of determining 
the protection levels of spacecraft structures. Current impact test capabilities are limited 
in velocity such that tests cover only a portion of the MMOD threat. The mass of test 
particles should be determined by test at the ballistic limit (or failure limit) of the structure 
in question as a function of impact velocity, angle and particle density, and extended by 
analytical means to cover all MMOD impact conditions.  The resulting ballistic limit 
equations are used in probability analysis to assess MMOD risks for the spacecraft.  
 
Remarks continued next page 
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Suggested references:  
1. NASA SP-8042, Meteoroid Damage Assessment, 1970;  
2. NASA TP-2003-210788, Meteoroid/Debris Shielding, 2003 
3. NASA SP-8013, Meteoroid Environment Model, 1969 
 
The Program will establish requirements for MMOD protection that provides for crew 
safety, vehicle survivability and mission success.  Different levels of allowable MMOD risk 
have historically been specified for loss-of-crew (LOC), loss-of-vehicle (LOV), early 
mission termination/loss-of-mission (LOM), and functional failure for equipment and 
systems that can degrade mission success.  Future crewed spacecraft should be 
designed to meet or exceed levels of MMOD protection provided by previous spacecraft, 
in particular the Apollo Program, the International Space Station (ISS), and the Space 
Shuttle.  
 
Risks from MMOD impact can be mitigated by a combination of design and operational 
options including but not limited to: advanced low-weight shielding, leak stop or self-
sealing materials in the shielding, leak detection/damage detection sensors and repair 
procedures, collision avoidance maneuvers from trackable orbital debris, and flying low-
MMOD risk attitudes. 
 
The orbital debris environment and to a certain extent meteoroid environment definition 
models are subject to change.  Spacecraft MMOD risk assessments must be updated 
with the latest MMOD environment definitions that have been officially released and 
accepted by NASA.    
 
Actual MMOD impact damage to the spacecraft should be monitored during the life of the 
program for:  trending MMOD damage, comparing predictions, and identifying any 
potential near-misses for potential corrective action to reduce MMOD risk.  
  
MMOD damage can be monitored through photo evaluation on-orbit or by examination of 
returned surfaces on ground.  
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Spacecraft recovery hoist loops shall be provided on all recoverable spacecraft. 
 
Design of the spacecraft recovery hoist loop(s) shall be based on the following minimum 
requirements: 
 
1. Before retrieval, a minimum open area equivalent to that of a 10-inch diameter circle 
shall be deployed. When the spacecraft is in its normal flotation or upright attitude, the 
loop shall be visible and accessible to retrieval personnel. The loop shall be located 
with respect to the spacecraft center of gravity such that the spacecraft may be readily 
carried and/or placed aboard the recovery vessel, vehicle, aircraft, etc. in a stable 
position. 
 
2. The load envelope for the hoist loop and backup structure shall be derived from an 
analysis which considers the dynamic load resulting from relative motion of the 
spacecraft and the recovery vessel, vehicle, or aircraft. Factors to be considered in this 
analysis shall be defined for each particular case. In general, the minimum factors to 
be included in the analysis shall be: 
a) Spacecraft weight, including the effect of trapped water, unspent fluids, and cargo 
b) The relative motion of the spacecraft and the recovery vessel, vehicle, or aircraft 
resulting from worse case conditions in the recovery area 
c) Retrieval winch in-haul speed 
d) Stiffness characteristics of the retrieval line 
 
3. The recovery hoist loop shall be adequate to withstand the environment experienced 
when the spacecraft is carried externally by a recovery vessel, vehicle, or aircraft. The 
environment to be considered shall be defined for each particular case. 
Hoisting weights and accelerations vary considerably from one spacecraft type to 
another. 
 
Spacecraft       Spacecraft dry weight       Spacecraft hoisting weight 
Mercury            1,088.6 kg (2,400 Ib)       4,535.9 kg (10,000 Ib) (including water 
trapped in landing attenuation bag) 
Gemini             1,769 kg (3,900 Ib)              2,268 kg (5,000 Ib) 
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MS-13 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MS-13 Cancelled – See Appendix B 
 JSC-STD-8080  
October 2011 
 
2.5-19 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
 
 
 
 
Structural analysis shall be performed on all spacecraft structures, including pressure 
vessels, to show that all elements of the design such as the strength, stiffness, structural 
stability, and life meet all specified criteria for the anticipated loads and environments.  
 
The analyses shall include stress analyses, fatigue or fracture analyses, loads and 
environmental data, and the appropriate references for the purpose of certifying the 
flightworthiness of structures.  
 
The analyses shall be compiled and documented as part of certification of the 
flightworthiness of the structure. 
 
The analyses shall comply with NASA-STD-5001 "STRUCTURAL DESIGN AND TEST 
FACTORS OF SAFETY FOR SPACEFLIGHT HARDWARE". 
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Metallic vessels, tubing, and fittings used in fluid systems (pressurized / non-pressurized) 
shall be joined by brazing or welding except where: 
  
1) mechanical disconnects are required for replacement or servicing,   
2) components would be adversely affected by brazing or welding, or   
3) brazing or welding cannot be performed or verified. 
 
 
 
Welding and brazing are considered more reliable methods for joining metallic vessels, 
tubing, and fittings in order to prevent leaks. 
 
Fluid systems in this context refer to both liquid and gas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
MS-15 Fluid Systems - Method Of 
Joining Metallics 
Document No. 
 JSC-STD-8080.5 
Standard No.  
 MS-15 
Page  
1 of 1 
Previous Revision  
04/01/1991 
 
Current as of 08 March 2010 
STATEMENT OF STANDARD 
REMARKS 
 JSC-STD-8080  
October 2011 
 
2.5-21 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
 
 
Pressure vessels shall be evaluated for susceptibility to damage by negative pressures 
that could occur during fabrication, testing, installation, transportation, storage, servicing, 
operation, and maintenance.  
 
Those vessels identified as susceptible to damage shall be appropriately tagged and 
protected against negative pressure during the life cycle of the tank, particularly during 
manufacturing and testing, by detailed formal procedures or protective devices. 
 
Where such protection is not required in flight, the protection shall be provided as part of 
the ground equipment. 
 
 
For the purposes of this standard, "negative pressure" exists when the external pressure 
exceeds the internal pressure of the vessel. 
 
Thin-walled pressure vessels and tanks designed for use in space vehicles are often 
vulnerable to very costly damage by relatively small negative pressure differentials. This 
problem is particularly prevalent during initial manufacture and ground testing on new 
programs. The intent of this standard is to have all vessels reviewed early in the program 
to identify those vessels susceptible to this type damage so protective measures can be 
taken in all phases of the vessel life cycle. The preventive measure selected for specific 
vessels will vary with programs and considerations of safety, initial cost of vessel, cost of 
protection, and time required for and cost of replacement or repair of the vessel. 
 
Remarks continued on next page. 
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Typical sources of negative pressure damage to pressure vessels include the following:  
 
1. Premature closure of manually operated vent during draining. 
 
2. Rupture of a service line, allowing vessel to drain without venting. Check valves in the 
vent line or insufficient venting through a vent not designed for this contingency has 
contributed to this problem. 
 
3. Use of a vacuum hose to remove cutting chips from a service line connected to a 
vessel that was not vented. 
 
4. Failure of vents to compensate for rate of descent of aircraft during air transportation. 
 
5. Undetected leakage of internal pressure during altitude chamber testing when the 
chamber is repressurized 
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2.6. Pyrotechnics 
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In the design and operation of spacecraft systems, provisions shall be made for arming 
pyrotechnic devices as near to the time of expected use as is feasible without compromising 
reliability or safety.  
 
Provisions shall be made to promptly disarm pyrotechnic devices when no longer needed. 
  
"Arm" and "fire" shall be separate functions that are separately controlled and displayed. 
 
Manual arm and fire switches shall be physically separate and guarded. 
 
"As near to the time of expected use as is feasible" would mean that it is preferable to arm the 
device within seconds of use as opposed to hours or days.  This would prevent leaving a 
pyrotechnic device armed for an extended period of time and thus prevent premature firing of 
the device. 
 
Premature firing of a pyrotechnic device could jeopardize the crew and/or mission. 
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For newly (less than 5 years of service) designed pyrotechnic systems and devices, within 365 
days (1 year) of each scheduled spacecraft launch, one device from each lot of pyrotechnic 
devices installed on that (scheduled) spacecraft shall be fired in a performance test, performed 
at ambient temperature.  
 
The test equipment, instrumentation, and procedures shall be adequate to permit an accurate 
comparison of data with the appropriate lot acceptance test data.  
 
The criteria for device performance shall be the same as for lot acceptance of the device. 
 
For existing (more than 5 years of service) pyrotechnic designs, with a successful performance 
history, a Pre-Flight Verification Test shall not be required. Existing test screening including 
environment and destructive test firings during Lot Acceptance Testing and age-life extension 
shall be used instead of the Pre-Flight Verification Testing.      
 
The object of these tests is to reduce the probability of installing hardware that has become 
degraded. 
 
These tests are in addition to all other tests, destructive or nondestructive, such as 
qualification, certification, lot acceptance, receiving, and preinstallation.  
 
This test shall be performed as late as possible prior to the flight use of the subject lot.  
 
Pre-Flight Verification Tests (PVTs) are not required for a pyrotechnic device used within 1 
year of its manufacturing date (i.e., the Lot Acceptance Test data suffices for 1 year.)  
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P-3 – P-4 have been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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Pyrotechnic devices shall be labeled on exterior surface with the following minimum 
information: 
 
1. NASA part, lot and serial numbers 
2. Contractor and Government Entity (CAGE) code 
3. Date of Manufacture 
 
Pyrotechnic devices shall be identified and stored with the following information: 
 
1. Part name  
2. CAGE Code  
3. Manufacturer  
4. Part, lot, and serial number  
5. Date of manufacture  
 
 
 
This standard furnishes a checklist of identification requirements for pyrotechnic devices. 
This information is necessary for the handling, storing, installation, and traceability for 
explosive devices.  
 
Documentation requirements which were identified in the earlier version(s) of this 
Standard are specifically addressed in NSTS 08060, Space Shuttle Pyrotechnic 
Specification, paragraph 5.4.2, Lot Acceptance Data Package.  
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The firing circuits for the NASA Standard Initiator (NSI) shall include: 
 
1. A means of limiting current surges resulting from multiple instantaneous firings  
 
2. Protection for the power supplies for the NSI to prevent power loss or voltage drops 
that might result from postfiring short circuits in the devices.  
 
The protective means shall in no way degrade operation or reliability of the 
electroexplosive device (EED). 
 
 
 
Electrical Circuit Requirements for Shuttle pyros are delineated in NSTS 08060, Space 
Shuttle Pyrotechnic Specification, paragraph 8.0. Specific firing circuit characteristics 
appear in paragraph 8.2 and include references to balanced, shielded, twisted-pairs of 
leads. Voltage breakdown from the balanced two-wire line to vehicle structure or direct 
current return should be greater than 1500 VAC RMS at a frequency of 60 Hz. 
 
Fusistors may be provided when necessary to prevent high current surges during EED 
firing and to limit current and interrupt flow in the event of a post firing short in the EED. 
 
Pyrotechnics for Shuttle also meet the requirements of NSTS 07636, Lightning 
Protection.  Also reference NSTS 08060 Space Shuttle Pyrotechnic Specification 
paragraph 8.3.1.1 for lightning protection. 
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P-7 has been cancelled.   
 
See Appendix B for standard text and rationale for 
cancellation. 
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3.0 KEY WORD INDEX 
 
How To Use This Key Word Index: 
 
Words that indicate the scope of the JPR Design and Procedural Standards are 
presented in alphabetical order in the following list of key words. Next to the key 
words, the applicable standards are referenced.  They are listed both by title and 
alphanumeric category code. Key word listings for cancelled standards have 
been removed. 
 
The actual standards are located in Section 2, arranged numerically within their 
respective categories 
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KEY WORD STD. NO. STANDARD TITLE 
ACCEPTANCE E 08 Electrical and Electronic Supplies and Loads - Verification Tests 
 F 11 Fluid Supplies - Verification Tests 
 M/S 07 Windows and Glass Structure 
 E 24 Electrical Wire and Cable Acceptance Tests 
ACCESSIBILITY G 01 Equipment Accessibility for Maintenance 
 F 04 Ground Service Points - Fluid Systems 
 M/S 02 Alignment of Mechanical Systems 
ADJUSTMENT M/S 02 Alignment of Mechanical Systems 
ALIGNMENT M/S 02 Alignment of Mechanical Systems 
ANALYSIS G 16 Operating Limits on Temperature-Controlled Equipment 
 G 37 Verification of Adequate External Visibility 
 G 48 Onboard Experiments - Required Preinstallation Checklist 
 F 09 Spacecraft VentinG Induced Perturbing Forces 
 F 16 Fluid Line Installation 
 F 20 Fluid Systems - Cleanliness 
 F 23 Qualification Fluid 
 F 27 Liquid or Gas Containers - Verification of Contents 
 M/P 26 Repair of Sandwich-Type Structures 
 M/S 07 Windows and Glass Structure 
 M/S 12 Spacecraft Recovery  Hoist Loops 
 M/S 14 Structural Analysis 
ANOMALY G 15 Equipment Failure - Verification of Flight Readiness 
ARM P 01 Explosive Devices - Arming and Disarming 
ATTITUDE G 29 Reentry Propulsion Subsystem In-Flight Test 
 G 44 Attitude Control Authority 
 F 09 Spacecraft Venting Induced Perturbing Forces 
AUTOMATIC 
CONTROL G 44 Attitude Control Authority 
AUTOMATIC 
SHUTDOWN E 18 
Circuitry for Automatic Shutdown of Launch Vehicle 
Engine(s) 
BIOINSTRUMENT
ATION E 13 
Bioinstrumentation Systems - Crew Electrical Shock 
Protection 
BRAZE M/S 15 Stainless Steel Tubing - Method of Joining 
BREATHING 
ATMOSPHERE F 26 Atmospheric Pressure and Composition Control 
CABLE E 24 Electrical Wire and Cable Acceptance Tests 
CAPACITOR E 07 Tantalum Wet Slug Capacitors - Restriction on Use 
CAPPING F 07 Capping of Servicing and Test Ports 
CARBON DIOXIDE F 26 Atmospheric Pressure and Composition Control 
CHECKLIST G 48 Onboard Experiments - Required Preinstallation Checklist 
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CIRCUlT G 02 Separation of Redundant Equipment 
CIRCUIT 
BREAKER E 09 Electrical Circuits - Deenergizing Requirement 
 E 15 Electrical Power Distribution Circuits - Overload Protection 
CLASSIFICATION G 14 Identification and Classification of Flight and Nonflight Equipment 
CLEANLINESS G 04 Protection of Spacecraft Electrical and Mechanical Systems From Debris 
CLEANLINESS G 05 Interior Design of Spacecraft for Cleanliness 
 G 20 Spacecraft Equipment - Protection From System Liquids 
 E 10 Cleaning of Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
 E 11 Protective Covers or Caps for Electrical Receptacles and Plugs 
 F 10 Nozzles and Vents - Protection Prior to Launch 
 F 14 Crew Cabin Module Ventilating Fans - Protection From Debris 
 F 17 Cleanliness of Flowing Fluids and Associated Systems 
 F 20 Fluid Systems - Cleanliness 
 F 24 Fluid Systems- Design for Flushing and Draining 
 F 27 Liquid or Gas Containers - Verification of Contents 
 M/S 05 Threaded Fittings - Restrictions on Release of Particles and Foreign Material 
CLOSURE E 17 Electrical and Electronic Piece Parts - Closure Construction 
COATING M/S 03 Wire Bundles - Protective Coating 
COLOR CODE P 07 Explosive Devices - Color Coding Requirements 
COMPARTMENT M/S 08 Penetration of Inhabited Spacecraft Compartments 
COMPONENT G 10 Control of Limited-Life Components 
 F 08 
Fluid System Components Whose Function Is 
Dependent on Direction of Flow - Protection Against 
Incorrect Installation 
 F 19 
Protection for Tubing, Fittings, and Fluid System 
Components - Flight Hardware and Associated 
Equipment 
CONNECTOR G 02 Separation of Redundant Equipment 
 E 01 Mating Provisions for Electrical Connectors 
 E 04 Electrical Connectors - Moisture Protection 
 E 05 Electrical Connectors - Pin Assignment 
 E 09 Electrical Circuits - Deenergizing Requirement 
 E 12 Electrical Connectors - Disconnection for Troubleshooting and Bench Testing 
 E 14 Electrical Wire Harnesses - Dielectric Tests 
 F 03 Service Points - Positive Protection From Interchangeability of Fluid Service Lines 
 M/P 01 Material Selection, Review, and Drawing Sign-Off 
 JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
 
 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
3-5 
CONNECTOR P 07 Explosive Devices - Color Coding Requirements 
CONSTRUCTION E 17 Electrical and Electronic Piece Parts - Closure Construction 
CONTAINER F 27 Liquid or Gas Containers - Verification of Contents 
 M/S 01 Equipment Containers - Design for Rapid Spacecraft Decompression 
CONTENT F 27 Liquid or Gas Containers - Verification of Contents 
CONTROL G 01 Equipment Accessibility for Maintenance 
 G 10 Control of Limited-Life Components 
 G 22 Parts Identification 
 G 31 Detachable Crew-Operated Tools - Restriction in Spacecraft 
CORONA E 06 Corona Suppression 
CORROSION M/P 01 Material Selection, Review, and Drawing Sign-Off 
COVER E 11 Protective Covers or Caps for Electrical Receptacles and Plugs 
 F 10 Nozzles and Vents - Protection Prior to Launch 
COVERGUARD G 30 Switch Protection Devices 
CREW STATION G 30 Switch Protection Devices 
 G 31 Detachable Crew-Operated Tools - Restriction in Spacecraft 
CREW STATION G 32 Measurement Systems That Display Flight Information to the Crew - Indication of Failure 
CURRENT 
LIMITING P 06 
Protection of Electrical Circuitry for Explosive Devices 
Employing Hot Bridgewire Initiators 
CUT E 02 Protection of Severed Electrical Circuits 
DATA G 12 Application of Previous Qualification Tests 
 M/P 11 Pressure Vessel Documentation 
DEBRIS G 04 Protection of Spacecraft Electrical and Mechanical Systems From Debris 
 G 05 Interior Design of Spacecraft for Cleanliness 
 F 14 Crew Cabin Module Ventilating Fans - Protection From Debris 
DECOMPRESSIO
N F 22 
Pressure Garments - Protection Against Failure 
Propagation 
 M/S 01 Equipment Containers - Design for Rapid Spacecraft Decompression 
DEENERGIZE E 09 Electrical Circuits - Deenergizing Requirement 
DEFORMATION G 46 Separation Sensing System - Structural Deformation 
DERATE E 15 Electrical Power Distribution Circuits - Overload Protection 
DESIGN G 01 Equipment Accessibility for Maintenance 
 G 02 Separation of Redundant Equipment 
 G 03 Systems Checkout Provisions 
 G 04 Protection of Spacecraft Electrical and Mechanical Systems From Debris 
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DESIGN G 05 Interior Design of Spacecraft for Cleanliness 
 G 08 Redundant Paths - Verification of Operation 
 G 19 Special Processes - Identification of Drawings 
 G 20 Spacecraft Equipment - Protection From System Liquids 
 G 21 Spacecraft Equipment - Moisture Protection 
 G 38 Pressurization or Repressurization - Precluding Ingress of Undesirable Elements 
 G 39 Lightning Protection Design 
 G 40 Radioactive Luminescent Devices 
 G 48 Onboard Experiments - Required Preinstallation Checklist 
 E 05 Electrical Connectors - Pin Assignment 
 E 09 Electrical Circuits - Deenergizing Requirement 
 E 19 Equipment Design - Power Transients 
 E 22 Ionizing Radiation Effects 
 F 01 Flow Restriction Requirements - Pressurized Sources 
 F 03 Service Points - Positive Protection From Interchangeability of Fluid Service Lines 
 F 04 Ground Service Points - Fluid Systems 
 F 05 Fluid Lines - Separation Provisions 
 F 12 
Protection of Pressurized Systems From Damage Due to 
Pressurant Depletion - Ground Support Equipment and 
Airborne Support Equipment 
 F 13 Crew Cabin Module Pressure - Venting Restriction 
 F 15 Separation of Hypergolic Reactants 
 F 16 Fluid Line Installation 
 F 17 Cleanliness of Flowing Fluids and Associated Systems 
 F 24 Fluid Systems - Design for Flushing and Draining 
DESIGN M/P 13 Pressure Vessel Design 
 M/S 01 Equipment Containers - Design for Rapid Spacecraft Decompression 
 M/S 02 Alignment of Mechanical Systems 
 M/S 07 Windows and Glass Structure 
 M/S 11 Meteoroid Protection Levels for Structures 
 M/S 12 Spacecraft Recovery Hoist Loops 
 P 01 Explosive Devices - Arming and Disarming 
DETECTION F 26 Atmospheric Pressure and Composition Control 
DIELECTRIC E 14 Electrical Wire Harnesses - Dielectric Tests 
DISARM P 01 Explosive Devices - Arming and Disarming 
DISCONNECT E 02 Protection of Severed Electrical Circuits 
DISPLAY G 01 Equipment Accessibility for Maintenance 
DISPLAY G 31 Detachable Crew-Operated Tools - Restriction in Spacecraft 
 G 32 Measurement Systems That Display Flight Information to the Crew - Indication of Failure 
DOCUMENTATION G 10 Control of Limited-Life Components 
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DOCUMENTATION G 11 Procurement Document Identification for Manned Spaceflight Vehicle Items 
 G 12 Application of Previous Qualification Tests 
 G 22 Parts Identification 
 G 50 Direct Procurement of Parts 
 M/P 11 Pressure Vessel Documentation 
 M/P 26 Repair of Sandwich-Type Structures 
 P 03 Wire Splicing 
DRAIN F 17 Cleanliness of Flowing Fluids and Associated Systems 
 F 20 Fluid Systems - Cleanliness 
 F 24 Fluid Systems - Design for Flushing and Draining 
DRAWING G 19 Special Processes - Identification of Drawings 
ELECTRICAL G 01 Equipment Accessibility for Maintenance 
 G 02 Separation of Redundant Equipment 
 G 03 Systems Checkout Provisions 
 G 04 Protection of Spacecraft Electrical and Mechanical Systems From Debris 
 G 23 Pressure Garment Wiring - Ignition of Materials by Electrical Current 
 G 30 Switch Protection Devices 
 G 44 Attitude Control Authority 
 E 01 Mating Provisions for Electrical Connectors 
 E 02 Protection of Severed Electrical Circuits 
 E 03 Electrical and Electronic Devices - Protection From Reverse Polarity and/or Other Improper Electrical Inputs 
 E 04 Electrical Connectors - Moisture Protection 
 E 05 Electrical Connectors - Pin Assignment 
 E 06 Corona Suppression 
 E 07 Tantalum Wet Slug Capacitors - Restriction on Use 
 E 08 Electrical and Electronic Supplies and Loads - Verification Tests 
 E 09 Electrical Circuits- Deenergizing Requirement 
 E 10 Cleaning of Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
ELECTRICAL E 11 Protective Covers or Caps for Electrical Receptacles and Plugs 
 E 12 Electrical Connectors - Disconnection for Troubleshooting and Bench Testing 
 E 13 Bioinstrumentation Systems - Crew Electrical Shock Protection 
 E 14 Electrical Wire Harnesses - Dielectric Tests 
 E 15 Electrical Power Distribution Circuits - Overload Protection 
 E 16 Testing Protective Devices for Solid-State Circuits 
 E 17 Electrical and Electronic Piece Parts - Closure Construction 
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ELECTRICAL E 18 Circuitry for Automatic Shutdown of Launch Vehicle Engine(s) 
 E 19 Equipment Design - Power Transients 
 E 20 Control of Electrostatic Discharge for Electronic Parts and Assemblies 
 E 22 Ionizing Radiation Effects 
 E 24 Electrical Wire and Cable Acceptance Tests 
 M/S 01 Equipment Containers   Design for Rapid Spacecraft Decompression 
 M/S 03 Wire Bundles  Protective Coating 
 P 03 Wire Splicing 
 P 04 Explosive Devices  Packaging Material 
 P 06 Protection of Electrical Circuitry for Explosive Devices Employing Hot Bridgewire Initiators 
ELECTRlCAL 
SHOCK E 13 
Bioinstrumentation Systems   Crew Electrical Shock 
Protection 
ELECTROSTATIC 
DISCHARGE E 20 
Control of Electrostatic Discharge for Electronic Parts 
and Assemblies 
ENGINE E 18 Circuitry for Automatic Shutdown of Launch Vehicle Engine(s) 
ENVIRONMENT G 28 Sealing   Solid Propellant Rocket Motors 
 G 45 Solid Propellant Rocket Motors  Ignition Capability With Unsealed Nozzle 
 E 04 Electrical Connectors   Moisture Protection 
 E 06 Corona Suppression 
 F 01 Flow Restriction Requirements Pressurized Sources 
 F 16 Fluid Line Installation 
 M/P 01 Material Selection, Review, and Drawing Sign Off 
 M/S 01 Equipment Containers  Design for Rapid Spacecraft Decompression 
 M/S 11 Meteoroid Protection Levels for Structures 
EQUIPMENT G 02 Separation of Redundant Equipment 
 G 15 Equipment Failure Verification of Flight Readiness 
EXPERIMENT G 48 Onboard Experiments  Required Preinstallation Checklist 
EXPLOSIVE 
DEVICE P 01 Explosive Devices   Arming and Disarming 
 P 02 Pyrotechnic Devices   Preflight Verification Tests at Launch Sites 
 P 04 Explosive Devices   Packaging Material 
EXPLOSIVE 
DEVICE P 05 Explosive Devices  Identification Requirements 
 P 06   Protection of Electrical Circuitry for Explosive Devices Employing Hot Bridgewire Initiators 
 P 07 Explosive Devices   Color Coding Requirements 
FAILURE G 15 Equipment  I Failure   Verification of Flight Readiness 
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FAILURE G 32 Measurement Systems That Display Flight Information to the Crew   Indication of Failure 
 G 46 Separation Sensing System   Structural Deformation 
 E 05 Electrical Connectors   Pin Assignment 
 F 05 Fluid Lines  Separation Provisions 
 F 22 Pressure Garments  Protection Against Failure Propagation 
FASTENER M/S 05 Threaded Fittings   Restrictions on Release of Particles and Foreign Material 
FIRE G 27 Fire Control 
FITTING M/S 05 Threaded Fittings   Restrictions on Release of Particles and Foreign Material 
FITTING M/S 15 Stainless Steel Tubing   Method of Joining 
FLAMMABILITY G 23 Pressure Garment Wiring   Ignition of Materials by Electrical Current 
FLIGHT 
READINESS G 15 Equipment Failure   Verification of Flight Readiness 
FLOW DIRECTION F 08 
Fluid System Components Whose Function Is 
Dependent on Direction of Flow  Protection Against 
Incorrect Installation 
FLOW 
RESTRICTION F 01 Flow Restriction RequirementsPressurized Sources 
FLUID G 01 Equipment Accessibility for Maintenance 
 G 03 Systems Checkout Provisions 
 G 04 Protection of Spacecraft Electrical and Mechanical Systems From Debris 
 G 20 Spacecraft Equipment   Protection From System Liquids 
 G 38 Pressurization or Repressurization Precluding Ingress of Undesirable Elements 
 F 01 Flow Restriction Requirements Pressurized Sources 
 F 02 Moisture Separators in a Zero Gravity Environment 
 F 03 Service Points  Positive Protection From Interchangeability of Fluid Service Lines 
 F 04 Ground Service Points   Fluid Systems 
 F 05 Fluid Lines   Separation Provisions 
 F 06 Temperature and Pressure Monitoring Requirements for Potentially Hazardous Reactive Fluids 
 F 07 Capping of Servicing and Test Ports 
 F 08 
Fluid System Components Whose Function Is 
Dependent on Direction of Flow - Protection Against 
Incorrect Installation 
 F 09 Spacecraft VentinG Induced Perturbing Forces 
 F 10 Nozzles and Vents - Protection Prior to Launch 
 F 11 Fluid Supplies - Verification Tests 
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FLUID F 12 
Protection of Pressurized Systems From Damage Due to 
Pressurant Depletion - Ground Support Equipment and 
Airborne Support Equipment 
 F 13 Crew Cabin Module Pressure - Venting Restriction 
 F 14 Crew Cabin Module Ventilating Fans - Protection From Debris 
 F 15 Separation of Hypergolic Reactants 
 F 16 Fluid Line Installation 
 F 17 Cleanliness of Flowing Fluids and Associated Systems 
 F 18 Pressure Relief Valves - Standardization of Functional Testing 
 F 19 
Protection for Tubing, Fittings, and Fluid System 
Components - Flight Hardware and Associated 
Equipment 
 F 20 Fluid Systems - Cleanliness 
 F 21 Purge Gases-Temperature and Humidity Requirements 
 F 22 Pressure Garments - Protection Against Failure Propagation 
 F 23 Qualification Fluid 
 F 24 Fluid Systems - Design for Flushing and Draining 
 F 25 Toxicity- Fluids Contained in Systems in the Crew Compartment 
 F 26 Atmospheric Pressure and Composition Control 
 F 27 Liquid or Gas Containers - Verification of Contents 
 F 29 Filter Protection of Active Fluid Components 
 F 30 Pressure Relief for Pressure Vessels 
 M/P 01 Material Selection, Review, and Drawing Sign-Off 
 M/P 09 Breathing Systems - Requirement To Test for Mercury Contamination 
 M/S 15 Stainless Steel Tubing - Method of Joining 
 M/S 16 Pressure Vessels - Negative Pressure Damage 
FLUID LINE F 05 Fluid Lines - Separation Provisions 
FLUSH F 17 Cleanliness of Flowing Fluids and Associated Systems 
 F 20 Fluid Systems - Cleanliness 
 F 24 Fluid Systems - Design for Flushing and Draining 
FORCE F 09 Spacecraft VentinG Induced Perturbing Forces 
GLASS M/S 07 Windows and Glass Structure Hydrogen Peroxide Systems 
GROUND E 03 Electrical and Electronic Devices -Protection From Reverse Polarity and/or Other Improper Electric Inputs 
GROUND 
EQUIPMENT G 14 
identification and Classification of Flight and Nonflight 
Equipment 
 G 18 Safety Precautions -Test and Operating Procedures 
 G 19 Special Processes - Identification of Drawings 
 G 20 Spacecraft Equipment -Protection From System Liquids 
 G 50 Direct Procurement of Parts 
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GROUND 
EQUIPMENT E 08 
Electrical and Electronic Supplies and Loads - 
Verification Tests 
 E 11 Protective Covers or Caps for Electrical Receptacles and Plugs 
 E 12 Electrical Connectors -Disconnection for Troubleshooting and Bench Testing 
 E 19 Equipment Design - Power Transients 
 F 11 Fluid Supplies - Verification Tests 
 F 12 
Protection of Pressurized Systems From Damage Due to 
Pressurant Depletion Ground Support Equipment and 
Airborne Support Equipment 
 F 17 Cleanliness of Flowing Fluids and Associated Systems 
 F 20 Fluid Systems - Cleanliness 
 F 24 Fluid Systems - Design for Flushing and Draining 
 M/P 09 Breathing Systems - Requirement To Test for Mercury Contamination 
 M/P 13 Pressure Vessel Design 
HABITABLE AREA G 01 Equipment Accessibility for Maintenance 
 G 05 Interior Design of Spacecraft for Cleanliness 
 G 09 Shatterable Material - Exclusion From Habitable Compartment 
 G 21 Spacecraft Equipment - Moisture Protection 
 G 30 Switch Protection Devices 
 G 31 Detachable Crew-Operated Tools Restriction in Spacecraft 
HABITABLE AREA G 32 Measurement Systems That Display Flight Information to the Crew - Indication of Failure 
 G 38 Pressurization or Repressurization Precluding Ingress of Undesirable Elements 
 F 04 Ground Service Points - Fluid Systems 
 F 13 Crew Cabin Module Pressure - Venting Restriction 
 F 25 Toxicity - Fluids Contained in Systems in the Crew Compartment 
 F 26 Atmospheric Pressure and Composition Control 
 M/P 09 Breathing Systems Requirement To Test for Mercury Contamination 
HARDWARE USE G 51 Flight Hardware  Restriction on Use for Training 
 G 52 Reuse of Flight Hardware 
HATCH M/S 04 Hatches  Repeated Use 
HOIST LOOP M/S 12 Spacecraft Recovery Hoist Loops 
HUMIDITY F 21 Purge Gases   Temperature and Humidity Requirements 
HYPERGOLIC 
REACTANT F 15 Separation of Hypergolic Reactants 
IDENTIFICATION G 11 Procurement Document Identification for  Manned Spaceflight Vehicle Items 
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IDENTIFICATION G 14 Identification and Classification of Flight and Nonflight Equipment 
 G 17 Separate Stock for Spaceflight Parts and Materials 
 G 19 Special ProcessesIdentification of Drawings 
 G 22 Parts Identification 
 F 09 Spacecraft Venting lnduced Perturbing Forces 
 P 05 Explosive Devices   Identification Requirements 
 P 07 Explosive Devices   Color Coding Requirements 
IGNITION G 45 Solid Propellant Rocket MotorsIgnition Capability With Unsealed Nozzle 
INDICATION G 32 Measurement Systems That Display Flight Information to the Crew   Indication of Failure 
 F 08 
Fluid System Components Whose Function Is 
Dependent on Direction of Flow Protection Against 
Incorrect Installation 
INFORMATION G 32 Measurement Systems That Display Flight Information to the Crew   Indication of Failure 
INITIATOR P 06 Protection of Electrical Circuitry for Explosive Devices Employing Hot Bridgewire Initiators 
INSPECTION G 52 Reuse of Flight Hardware  
INSTALLATION F 08 
Fluid System Components Whose Function Is 
Dependent on Direction of Flow Protection Against 
Incorrect Installation 
 F 16 Fluid Line Installation 
INTERCHANGEAB
ILITY E 01 Mating Provisions for Electrical Connectors 
 F 03 Service Points - Positive Protection From Interchangeability of Fluid Service Lines 
INTERMITRENT G 15 Equipment Failure -Verification of Flight Readiness 
IONIZATION E 06 Corona Suppression 
 E 22 Ionizing Radiation Effects 
JUMPER CABLE E 12 Electrical Connectors -Disconnection for Troubleshooting and Bench Testing 
JUMPER WIRE E 12 Electrical Connectors -Disconnection for Troubleshooting and Bench Testing 
KEY E 01 Mating Provisions for Electrical Connectors 
LAUNCH SITE P 02 Pyrotechnic Devices - Preflight Verification Tests at Launch Sites 
LAUNCH VEHICLE E 18 Circuitry for Automatic Shutdown of Launch Vehicle Engine(s) 
 F 21 Purge Gases - Temperature and Humidity Requirements 
LEAKAGE F 07 Capping of Servicing and Test Ports 
LIGHTNING G 39 Lightning Protection Design 
LIMITED LIFE G 10 Control of Limited-Life Components 
LINE F 16 Fluid Line Installation 
LIQUID G 20 Spacecraft Equipment -Protection From System Liquids 
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LOCATION F 04 Ground Service Points - Fluid Systems 
LUMINESCENT 
DEVICE G 40 Radioactive Luminescent Devices 
MAINTAINABILITY G 01 Equipment Accessibility for Maintenance 
MAINTENANCE G 01 Equipment Accessibility for Maintenance 
 G 40 Radioactive Luminescent Devices 
 F 19 
Protection for Tubing, Fittings, and Fluid System 
Components  Flight Hardware and Associated 
Equipment 
MALFUNCTION G 15 Equipment Failure   Verification of Flight Readiness  
MANUAL 
CONTROL G 44 Attitude Control Authority 
MANUFACTURE G 17 Separate Stock for Spaceflight Parts and Materials 
 G 19 Special Processes  Identification of Drawings 
 E 14 Electrical Wire Harnesses Dielectric Tests 
 F 19 
Protection for Tubing, Fittings, and Fluid System 
Components  Flight Hardware and Associated 
Equipment 
 M/S 15 Stainless Steel Tubing   Method of Joining 
MARK G 22 Parts Identification 
MATE AND 
DEMATE E 09 Electrical Circuits  Deenergizing Requirement 
MATERIAL G 09 Shatterable Material   Exclusion From Habitable Compartment 
 G 17 Separate Stock for Spaceflight Parts and Materials 
 G 18 Safety Precautions   Test and Operating Procedures 
 G 23 Pressure Garment Wiring   Ignition of Materials by Electrical Current 
 F 15 Separation of Hypergolic Reactants 
 F 20 Fluid Systems  Cleanliness 
 F 25 Toxicity   Fluids Contained in Systems in the Crew Compartment 
 M/P 01 Material Selection, Review, and Drawing Sign Off 
 M/P 26 Repair of Sandwich Type Structures 
 P 04 Explosive Devices   Packaging Material 
MEASUREMENT  F 26 Atmospheric Pressure and Composition Control 
MEASUREMENT 
SYSTEM  G 32 
Measurement Systems That Display Flight Information to 
the Crew Indication of Failure 
MECHANICAL G 01 Equipment Accessibility for Maintenance 
 G 04 Protection of Spacecraft Electrical and Mechanical Systems From Debris 
 E 01 Mating Provisions for Electrical Connectors 
 M/S 01 Equipment Containers  Design for Rapid Spacecraft Decompression 
 M/S 02 Alignment of Mechanical Systems 
MECHANICAL M/S 04 Hatches   Repeated Use 
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MECHANICAL M/S 05 Threaded Fittings   Restrictions on Release of Particles and Foreign Material 
 M/S 12 Spacecraft Recovery Hoist Loops 
MECHANISMS M/S 09 Mechanisms 
MERCURY G 18 Safety Precautions   Test and Operating Procedures 
 M/P 09 Breathing Systems   Requirement To Test for Mercury Contamination 
METALLIC G 18 Safety Precautions  Test and Operating Procedures 
METEOROID M/S 11 Meteoroid Protection Levels for Structures 
MOISTURE G 21 Spacecraft Equipment Moisture Protection 
 E 04 Electrical Connectors   Moisture Protection 
 F 01 Flow Restriction Requirements Pressurized Sources 
 F 02 Moisture Separators in a Zero Gravity Environment 
 F 21 Purge Gases   Temperature and Humidity Requirements 
MONITOR F 06 Temperature and Pressure Monitoring Requirements for Potentially Hazardous Reactive Fluids 
NEGATIVE 
PRESSURE M/S 16 Pressure Vessels  Negative Pressure Damage 
NONFLIGHT 
HARDWARE G 14 
Identification and Classification of Flight and Nonflight 
Equipment 
NOZZLE F 10 Nozzles and Vents   Protection Prior to Launch 
OPERATlNG LIMIT G 16 Operating Limits on Temperature Controlled Equipment 
OPERATION G 08 Redundant Paths   Verification of Operation 
 G 15 Equipment  Failure   Verification of Flight Readiness 
 G 29 Reentry Propulsion Subsystem InFlight Test 
 G 45 Solid Propellant Rocket MotorsIgnition Capability With Unsealed Nozzle 
 E 04 Electrical Connectors  Moisture Protection 
 F 09 Spacecraft Venting Induced Perturbing Forces 
 P 01 Explosive Devices   Arming and Disarming 
OVERLOAD E 15 Electrical Power Distribution Circuits Overload Protection 
OXYGEN G 23 Pressure Garment Wiring   Ignition of Materials by Electrical Current 
 M/P 09 Breathing Systems   Requirement To Test for Mercury Contamination 
PACKAGING P 04 Explosive Devices   Packaging Material 
PAINT P 07 Explosive Devices   Color Coding Requirements 
PANEL G 01 Equipment Accessibility for Maintenance 
PART G 17 Separate Stock for Spaceflight Parts and Materials 
 G 22 Parts Identification 
 G 50 Direct Procurement of Parts 
PATH G 08 Redundant Paths   Verification of Operation 
PHOTOGRAPHIC 
EQUIPMENT G 09 
Shatterable Material   Exclusion From Habitable 
Compartment 
PIECE PART E 17 Electrical and Electronic Piece PartsClosure Construction 
PLAN M/P 30 Pressure Vessels  Nondestructive Evaluation Plan 
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POLARITY E 03 Electrical and Electronic DevicesProtection From Reverse Polarity and/or Other Improper Electrical Inputs 
POSITION  G 30 Switch Protection Devices G 31 Detachable Crew Operated Tools Restriction in Spacecraft 
POWER E 19 Equipment Design   Power Transients 
POWER 
DISTRIBUTION E 15 Electrical Power Distribution Circuits Overload Protection 
PRESSURE F 01 Flow Restriction Requirements Pressurized Sources 
PRESSURE 
GARMENT G 23 
Pressure Garment Wiring   Ignition of Materials by 
Electrical Current 
 E 13 Bioinstrumentation Systems   Crew Electrical Shock Protection 
 F 22 Pressure Garments   Protection Against Failure Propagation 
PRESSURE 
VESSEL F 30 Pressure Relief for Pressure Vessels 
 M/P 11 Pressure Vessel Documentation 
 M/P 13 Pressure Vessel Design 
 M/S 16 Pressure Vessels   Negative Pressure Damage 
PRESSURIZATION  G 38 Pressurization or Repressurization Precluding Ingress of Undesirable Elements 
PROCEDURE G 38 Pressurization or Repressurization  Precluding Ingress of Undesirable Elements 
 E 08 Electrical and Electronic Supplies and Loads   Verification Tests 
 F 11 Fluid Supplies   Verification Tests 
 M/S 16 Pressure Vessels  Negative Pressure Damage 
PROCESS G 19 Special Processes  Identification of Drawings 
 M/P 26 Repair of Sandwich Type Structures 
PROCUREMENT G 11 Procurement Document Identification for Manned Spaceflight Vehicle Items 
 G 50 Direct Procurement of Parts 
PROGRAM G 01 Equipment Accessibility for Maintenance 
 G 02 Separation of Redundant Equipment 
PROGRAM G 08 Redundant Paths   Verification of Operation 
 G 12 Application of Previous Qualification Tests 
 G 14 Identification and Classification of Flight and Nonflight Equipment 
 G 15 Equipment Failure   Verification of Flight Readiness 
 G 20 Spacecraft Equipment   Protection From System Liquids 
 G 21 Spacecraft Equipment  Moisture Protection 
 G 50 Direct Procurement of Parts 
 G 51 Flight Hardware   Restriction on Use for Training 
 G 52 Reuse of Flight Hardware 
 M/P 26 Repair of Sandwich Type Structures 
 M/S 16 Pressure Vessels   Negative Pressure Damage 
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PROPULSION G 28 Sealing Solid Propellant Rocket Motors 
 G 29 Reentry Propulsion Subsystem Inflight Test 
 G 45 Solid Propellant Rocket Motors Ignition Capability With Unsealed Nozzle 
PROTECTI0N G 02 Separation of Redundant Equipment 
 G 04 Protection of Spacecraft Electrical and Mechanical Systems From Debris 
 G 05 Interior Design of Spacecraft for Cleanliness 
 G 09 Shatterable Material   Exclusion From Habitable Compartment 
 G 18 Safety Precautions Test and Operating Procedures 
 G 20 Spacecraft Equipment  Protection From System Liquids 
 G 21 Spacecraft Equipment  Moisture Protection 
 G 28 Sealing   Solid Propellant Rocket Motors 
 G 30 Switch Protection Devices 
 G 39 Lightning Protection Design 
 E 01 Mating Provisions for Electrical Connectors 
 E 02 Protection of Severed Electrical Circuits 
 E 03 Electrical and Electronic Devices Protection From Reverse Polarity and/or Other Improper Electrical Inputs 
 E 04 Electrical Connectors   Moisture Protection 
 E 09 Electrical Circuits  Deenergizing Requirement 
 E 11 Protective Covers or Caps for Electrical Receptacles and Plugs 
 E 12 Electrical Connectors  Disconnection for Troubleshooting and Bench Testing 
 E 13 Bioinstrumentation Systems Crew Electrical Shock Protection 
 E 15 Electrical Power Distribution Circuits Overload Protection 
 E 18 Circuitry for Automatic Shutdown of Launch Vehicle Engine(s) 
 F 03 Service Points   Positive Protection From Interchangeability of Fluid Service Lines 
 F 07 Capping of Servicing and Test Ports 
 F 10 Nozzles and Vents   Protection Prior to Launch 
 F 12 
Protection of Pressurized Systems From Damage Due to 
Pressurant Depletion   Ground Support Equipment and 
Airborne Support Equipment 
 F 13 Crew Cabin Module Pressure  Venting Restriction 
 F 19 
Protection for Tubing, Fittings, and Fluid System 
Components   Flight Hardware and Associated 
Equipment 
 F 22 Pressure Garments   Protection Against Failure Propagation 
 M/S 03 Wire Bundles-Protective Coating 
 M/S 16 Pressure Vessels   Negative Pressure Damage 
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PROTECTI0N P 06 Protection of Electrical Circuitry for Explosive Devices Employing Hot Bridgewire Initiators 
PURGE F 17 Cleanliness of Flowing Fluids and Associated Systems 
 F 20 Fluid Systems   Cleanliness 
PURGE GAS F 21 Purge Gases Temperature and Humidity Requirements 
PYROTECHNIC P 01 Explosive Devices Arming and Disarming 
 P 02 Pyrotechnic Devices   Preflight Verification Tests at Launch Sites 
 P 03 Wire Splicing 
 P 04 Explosive Devices   Packaging Material 
 P 05 Explosive Devices  Identification Requirements 
 P 06 Protection of Electrical Circuitry for Explosive Devices Employing Hot Bridgewire Initiators 
 P 07 Explosive Devices   Color Coding Requirements 
QUALIFICATION G 12 Application of Previous Qualification Tests 
 E 07 Tantalum Wet Slug Capacitors Restriction on Use 
 E 08 Electrical and Electronic Supplies and Loads   Verification Tests 
 F 11 Fluid Supplies   Verification Tests 
 F 23 Qualification Fluid 
RADIATION E 02 Ionizing Radiation Effects 
RADIOACTIVE G 40 Separation Sensing System Structural Deformation 
RECORD M/P 11 Pressure Vessel Documentation 
RECOVERY M/S 12 Spacecraft Recovery Hoist Loops 
REDUNDANT G 02 Separation of Redundant Equipment 
 G 08 Redundant Paths   Verification of Operation 
 G 44 Attitude Control Authority 
 F 15 Separation of Hypergolic Reactants 
REENTRY G 29 Reentry Propulsion Subsystem InFlight Test 
RELIEF VALVE F 01 Flow Restriction Requirements  Pressurized Sources 
 F 18 Pressure Relief Valves Standardization of Functional Testing 
REUSE G 52 Reuse of Flight Hardware 
ROCKET MOTOR G 28 Sealing   Solid Propellant Rocket Motors 
 G 45 Solid Propellant Rocket MotorsIgnition Capability With Unsealed Nozzle 
SAFETY F 22 Pressure Garments  Protection Against Failure Propagation 
SAFETY FACTOR M/P 13 Pressure Vessel Design 
SEAL G 28 Sealing   Solid Propellant Rocket Motors 
 G 40 Radioactive Luminescent Devices 
 G 45 Solid Propellant Rocket Motors Ignition Capability With Unsealed Nozzle 
 E 04 Electrical Connectors  Moisture Protection 
 E 06 Corona Suppression 
SENSOR G 46 Separation Sensing System Structural Deformation 
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SENSOR F 26 Atmospheric Pressure and Composition Control 
SEPARATION G 02 Separation of Redundant Equipment 
 G 46 Separation Sensing System Structural Deformation 
 F 05 Fluid Lines Separation Provisions 
 F 15 Separation of Hypergolic Reactants 
 F 01 Flow Restriction RequirementsPressurized Sources 
SERVICE POINT F 03 Service Points   Positive Protection From Interchangeability of Fluid Service Lines 
 F 04 Ground Service Points  Fluid Systems 
 F 07 Capping of Servicing and Test Ports 
 F 24 Fluid Systems  Design for Flushing and Draining 
SHATTERABLE G 09 Shatterable Material   Exclusion From Habitable Compartment 
SHIPPING F 19 
Protection for Tubing, Fittings, and Fluid System 
Components  Flight Hardware and Associated 
Equipment 
 P 04 Explosive Devices   Packaging Material 
SHORT CIRCUIT G 23 Pressure Garment Wiring   Ignition of Materials by Electrical Current 
 E 02 Protection of Severed Electrical Circuits 
 E 05 Electrical Connectors   Pin Assignment 
SHORTING CUP E 12 Electrical Connectors Disconnection for Troubleshooting and Bench Testing 
SHORTING 
SPRING E 12 
Electrical Connectors  Disconnection for Troubleshooting 
and Bench Testing 
SlMULATION G 37 Verification of Adequate External Visibility 
SINGLE POINT 
FAILURE E 05 Electrical Connectors   Pin Assignment 
SOLID 
PROPELLANT' G 28 SealinG Solid Propellant Rocket Motors 
SOURCE G 50 Direct Procurement of Parts 
SPACE VEHICLE G 46 Separation Sensing System -Structural Deformation 
 F 21 Purge Gases - Temperature and Humidity Requirements 
SPARE G 17 Separate Stock for Spaceflight Parts and Materials 
SPECIFICATION G 19 Special Processes - Identification of Drawings 
SPLICE P 03 Wire Splicing 
STATIC 
ELECTRICITY P 04 Explosive Devices - Packaging Material 
STOCK G 17 Separate Stock for Spaceflight Parts and Materials 
STORAGE G 10 Control of Limited-Life Components 
 G 17 Separate Stock for Spaceflight Parts and Materials 
 G 28 Sealing - Solid Propellant Rocket Motors 
STRESS 
ANALYSIS M/S 07 Windows and Glass Structure 
 M/S 14 Structural Analysis 
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STRESS 
CORROSION M/P 01 Material Selection, Review, and Drawing Sign-Off 
STRUCTURE G 18 Safety Precautions - Test and Operating Procedures 
 G 46 Separation Sensing System - Structural Deformation 
 M/P 26 Repair of Sandwich-Type Structures 
 M/S 01 Equipment Containers - Design for Rapid Spacecraft Decompression 
 M/S 04 Hatches - Repeated Use 
 M/S 12 Spacecraft Recovery Hoist Loops 
 M/S 14 Structural Analysis 
SUPPLY E 08 Electrical and Electronic Supplies and Loads - Verification Tests 
SUPPLY F 11 Fluid Supplies -Verification Tests 
 F 12 
Protection of Pressurized Systems From Damage Due to 
Pressurant Depletion Ground Support Equipment and 
Airborne Support Equipment 
 F 22 Pressure Garments - Protection Against Failure Propagation 
SUPPORT 
EQUIPMENT G 24 
Ground Support Equipment and Airborne Support 
Equipment Protective Devices 
SUPPRESSION E 06 Corona Suppression 
SWITCH G 30 Switch Protection Devices 
 G 40 Radioactive Luminescent Devices 
SYSTEM G 02 Separation of Redundant Equipment 
TANTALUM E 07 Tantalum Wet Slug CapacitorsRestriction on Use 
TEMPERATURE G 16 Operating Limits on TemperatureControlled Equipment 
 F 21 Purge Gases   Temperature and Humidity Requirements 
TEST G 03 Systems Checkout Provisions 
 G 08 Redundant Paths   Verification of Operation 
 G 12 Application of Previous Qualification Tests 
 G 16 Operating Limits on TemperatureControlled Equipment 
 G 29 Reentry Propulsion Subsystem InFlight Test 
 G 37 Verification of Adequate External Visibility 
 G 39 Lightning Protection Design 
 G 48 Onboard Experiments Required Preinstallation Checklist 
 G 52 Reuse of Flight Hardware 
 E 03 Electrical and Electronic Devices Protection From Reverse Polarity and/or Other Improper Electrical Inputs 
 E 04 Electrical Connectors   Moisture Protection 
 E 06 Corona Suppression 
TEST E 07 Tantalum Wet Slug Capacitors Restriction on Use 
 E 08 Electrical and Electronic Supplies and Loads   Verification Tests 
 E 12 Electrical Connectors Disconnection for Troubleshooting and Bench Testing 
 E 14 Electrical Wire Harnesses  Dielectric Tests 
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 E 16 Testing Protective Devices for SolidState Circuits 
 E 19 Equipment Design   Power Transients 
 E 24 Electrical Wire and Cable Acceptance Tests 
 F 08 
Fluid System Components Whose Function Is 
Dependent on Direction of Flow   Protection Against 
Incorrect Installation 
 F 11 Fluid Supplies   Verification Tests 
TEST F 18 Pressure Relief Valves Standardization of Functional Testing 
 F 23 Qualification Fluid 
 M/P 01 Material Selection, Review, and Drawing Sign Off 
 M/P 09 Breathing Systems   Requirement To Test for Mercury Contamination 
 M/P 13 Pressure Vessel Design 
 M/P 26 Repair of Sandwich Type Structures 
 M/S 03 Wire Bundles  Protective Coating 
 M/S 04 Hatches  Repeated Use 
 M/S 07 Windows and Glass Structure 
 P 02 Pyrotechnic Devices   Preflight Verification Tests at Launch Sites 
TEST POINT G 03 Systems Checkout Provisions 
 F 07 Capping of Servicing and Test Ports 
THERMAL G 25 Thermal Design and Analysis Thermal Parameters 
THREAD M/S 05 Threaded Fittings   Restrictions on Release of Particles and Foreign Material 
TIME SENSITIVE G 10 Control of Limited Life Components 
TIMING E 07 Tantalum Wet Slug Capacitors Restriction on Use 
TOOL G 31 Detachable Crew Operated ToolsRestriction in Spacecraft 
TOXICITY G 18 Safety Precautions   Test and Operating Procedures 
 G 38 Pressurization or Repressurization Precluding Ingress of Undesirable Elements 
 F 25 Toxicity  Fluids Contained in Systems in the Crew Compartment 
 M/P 09 Breathing Systems   Requirement To Test for Mercury Contamination 
TRACEABILITY E 07 Tantalum Wet Slug Capacitors Restriction on Use 
TRAINING G 51 Flight Hardware   Restriction on Use for Training 
TRANSIENT E 19 Equipment Design   Power Transients 
TRANSISTOR M/P 13 Transistors   Selection of Types 
TUBING F 19 
Protection for Tubing, Fittings, and Fluid System 
Components  Flight Hardware and Associated 
Equipment 
 M/S 15 Stainless Steel Tubing Method of Joining 
ULTRASONIC 
CLEANING E 10 Cleaning of Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
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VALVE F 05 Fluid Lines Separation Provisions 
 F 18 Pressure Relief Valves Standardization of Functional Testing 
VENT G 38 Pressurization or Repressurization  Precluding Ingress of Undesirable Elements 
 F 01 Flow Restriction Requirements Pressurized Sources 
VENT F 09 Spacecraft Venting Induced Perturbing Forces 
 F 10 Nozzles and Vents   Protection Prior to Launch 
 F 13 Crew Cabin Module PressureVenting Restriction 
VERIFICATION G 08 Redundant Paths   Verification of Operation 
 G 37 Verification of Adequate External Visibility 
 G 39 Lightning Protection Design 
VERIFICATION E 16 Testing Protective Devices for SolidState Circuits 
 F 20 Fluid Systems   Cleanliness 
 F 27 Liquid or Gas Containers Verification of Contents 
 P 02 Pyrotechnic Devices   Preflight Verification Tests at Launch Sites 
VISIBILITY G 37 Verification of Adequate External Visibility 
WEIGHT M/S 12 Spacecraft Recovery Hoist Loops 
WELD E 17 Electrical and Electronic Piece PartsClosure Construction 
 F 15 Separation of Hypergolic Reactants 
 M/S 14 Structural Analysis 
 M/S 15 Stainless Steel Tubing   Method of Joining 
WINDOW M/S 07 Windows and Glass Structure 
 G 02 Separation of Redundant Equipment 
 G 23 Pressure Garment Wiring   Ignition of Materials by Electrical Current 
 E 02 Protection of Severed Electrical Circuits 
 E 14 Electrical Wire Harnesses  Dielectric Tests 
 E 15 Electrical Power Distribution Circuits Overload Protection 
 E 24 Electrical Wire and Cable Acceptance Tests 
 M/S 03 Wire Bundles   Protective Coating 
 P 03 Wire Splicing 
WIRE HARNESS E 14  Electrical Wire Harnesses  Dielectric Tests 
ZERO  GRAVITY  F 01 Flow Restriction Requirements  Pressurized Sources 
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4.0  RELEASE HISTORY OF STANDARDS 
 
4.1 DOCUMENT NUMBERING SYSTEM CHANGES 
The JSC Standards (JSC-STD) document numbering system was established in 2010. Prior to 
that, standards were contained in many different document numbering schemes and document 
management systems. The previous numbering scheme for 8080.5 was JPR. Prior to that, the 
document was JPG 8080.5. 
4.2 GENERAL BACKGROUND 
Center policies released through the Manned Spacecraft Criteria and Standards program were 
initially called Design Standard (DS)) Bulletins, Procedural Standard (PS) Bulletins, and 
Engineering Criteria (EC) Bulletins. The Engineering Criteria Bulletins were changed to Design 
Standard Bulletins in 1965. All bulletins were reissued March 6, 1970, as MSC Design and 
Procedural Standards. Subsequent to Change 5, dated October 16, 1972, the Center name was 
changed to the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC); therefore, the standards are now being 
issued as JSC Design and Procedural Standards. 
4.3 BULLETIN NUMBERING 
The bulletin numbering system consisted of bulletin numbers and code numbers. A series of 
alphanumeric bulletin numbers was assigned to each bulletin type: Design Standard Bulletins 
were numbered DS 1, DS2, etc.; Procedural Standard Bulletins were PS 1, PS2, etc.; and 
Engineering Criteria Bulletins were EC 1, EC 2, etc. These bulletins were compiled into a single 
manual entitled Manned Spacecraft Criteria and Standards (JSCM 8080). The manual was 
initially divided into 28 sections by subject. The code number on each bulletin indicated the 
section and subsection of the manual in which it was located. 
4.4 ENGINEERING CRITERIA BULLETINS 
Seven Engineering Criteria Bulletins (EC 1 through EC 7) were released between November 
1963 and July 1965. These bulletins were subsequently redesignated Design Standard Bulletins 
and were renumbered DS 21 through DS 27. No changes were made to the requirements when 
these seven bulletins were renumbered, and the same dates were maintained.  
4.5 DESIGN STANDARDS AND PROCEDURAL STANDARDS 
BULLETINS 
There were 75 Design Standard Bulletins and 45 Procedural Standard Bulletins released 
between November 1963 and July 1969. A number of these bulletins were also revised during 
this period. In March 1970 all bulletins were redesignated MSC Design and Procedural 
Standards, renumbered, and dated March 6, 1970. The code numbers were deleted from the 
standards. 
4.6 CROSS REFERENCE – OLD: NEW STANDARD NUMBERS  
The following list cross references old standard numbers (per Manned Spacecraft Criteria and 
Standards, JSCM 8080, Change 11, December 22, 1989) to the new standard numbers (per JSC 
Design and Procedural Standards Manual, JSCM 8080, April 1, 1991). 
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A. CUMULATIVE REVISION HISTORY OF DESIGN AND 
PROCEDURAL STANDARDS 
 
In an effort to streamline the information provided by the JSC-STD-8080.5 document, the 
cumulative history of initial effective date and revision dates for each standard have been 
removed from the standard heading.  Up to and including the last official version of these 
standards signed on 1 April 1991, revision information has been captured in this appendix 
which will serve as a living history record of the standards. 
 
Active standards will henceforth only carry the most current effective date. 
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STD.NO. Effective Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date 
Revision 
Date 
G-1 3/30/64 (DS-1) 3/6/70 (No. 1) 6/7/71 (No. 1-A) 4/1/91 (G-10)     
G-2 9/23/64 (DS-4) 3/6/70 (No. 4) 7/8/70 (No. 4A) 11/2/71 (G-4B) 4/1/91 (G-2)    
G-3 9/23/64 (DS-7) 3/6/70 (No. 7) 4/1/91 (G-3)      
G-4 9/23/64 (DS-9) 3/6/70 (No. 9) 4/1/91 (G-4)      
G-5 9/23/64 (DS-10) 3/6/70 (No. 10) 4/1/91 (G-5)      
G-6 7/6/65 (DS-12) 3/6/70 (No. 12) 5/19/75 (G-12A) 4/1/91 (G-6)     
G-7 7/6/65 (DS-11) 3/6/70 (No. 11) 6/7/71 (G-11A) 4/1/91 (G-7)     
G-8 2/21/66 (DS-11) 3/6/70 (No. 36) 4/1/91 (G-8)      
G-9 2/21/66 (DS-41) 3/6/70 (No. 41) 12/16/75 (NO. 41A) 4/1/91 (G-9)     
G-9 2/21/66 (DS-41) 3/6/70 (No. 41) 12/16/75 (NO. 41A) 4/1/91 (G-9)     
G-10 3/30/64 (PS-2) 3/6/70 (No. 77) 4/1/91 (G-10)      
G-11 3/30/64 (PS-4) 9/23/64 (PS-4A) 7/6/65 (PS-4B) 3/6/70 (NO. 79) 4/1/91 (G-11)    
G-12 7/6/65 (PS-8) 3/6/70 (No. 83) 4/1/91 (G-12)      
G-13 7/6/65 (PS-9) 3/6/70 (No. 84) 5/19/79 (G-84A)      
G-14 2/21/66 (PS-24) 3/6/70 (No. 99) 2/1/71 (G-99A) 4/21/72 (NO. 99B) 12/1/77 (NO. 99C) 4/1/91 (G-14)   
G-15 2/21/66 (PS-25) 3/6/70 (No. 100) 4/1/91 (G-15)      
G-16 6/30/66 (PS-27) 3/6/70 (No. 102) 4/1/91 (G-16)      
G-17 6/30/66 (PS-32) 3/6/70 (No. 107) 4/1/91 (G-17)      
G-18 8/22/67 (PS-27) 3/6/70 (No. 102) 4/1/91 (G-16)      
G-19 8/22/67 (PS-44) 3/6/70 (No. 119) 4/1/91 (G-19)      
G-20 3/6/70 (NO.-121) 4/1/91 (G-20)       
G-21 3/6/70 (NO.-122) 4/1/91 (G-21)       
G-22 7/8/70 (NO.-129) 4/1/91 (G-22)       
G-23 7/8/70 (NO.-130) 4/1/91 (G-23)       
G-24 12/1/77 (NO.-153) 4/1/91 (G-24)       
G-25 4/1/91 (G-25)        
G-26 4/1/91 (G-26)        
G-27 4/1/91 (G-27)        
G-28 5/15/67 (DS-53) 3/6/70 (NO. 53) 4/1/91 (G-28)      
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STD.NO. Effective Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date 
Revision 
Date 
G-29 5/15/67 (DS-54) 3/6/70 (NO. 54) 4/1/91 (G-29)      
G-30 5/15/67 (DS-59) 3/6/70 (NO. 59) 4/1/91 (G-30)      
G-31 1/6/69 (DS-81) 3/6/70 (NO. 75) 4/1/91 (G-32)      
G-32 1/6/69 (DS-81) 3/6/70 (NO. 75) 4/1/91 (G-32)      
G-33 4/1/91 (G-32)        
G-34 4/1/91 (G-34)        
G-35 4/1/91 (G-35)        
G-36 4/1/91 (G-36)        
G-37 3/6/70 (NO. 126) 4/1/91 (G-37)       
G-38 3/6/70 (NO. 127) 4/1/91 (G-38)       
G-39 2/8/72 (NO. 138) 4/1/91 (G-39)       
G-40 4/2/72 (NO. 141) 5/19/75 (NO. 141A)) 4/1/91 (G-40) 
   
  
G-41 10/16/72 (NO. 145) 
5/19/75 (NO. 
141A)) 
    
  
G-42 5/15/67 (DS-55) 3/6/70 (NO. 55) 4/1/91 (G-42)      
G-44 5/15/67 (DS-57) 3/6/70 (NO. 57) 7/6/70 (NO. 57A) 4/1/91 (G-44)     
G-45 11/3/67 (DS-69) 3/6/70 (NO. 66) 4/1/91 (G-45)      
G-46 3/6/70  (DS-124) 4/1/91 (G-46)       
G-47 3/6/70 (NO. 16) 4/1/91 (G-47)       
G-48 7/6/65 (EC-7) 7/6/65 (DS-27) 3/6/70 (NO. 27) 4/1/91 (G-48)     
G-49 11/3/66 (DS-44) 3/6/70 (NO. 44) 4/1/91 (G-49)      
G-50 7/6/65 (PS-11) 3/6/70 (NO. 86) 4/1/91 (G-50)      
G-51 6/30/66 (PS-29) 3/6/70 (NO. 104) 4/1/91 (G-51)      
G-52 6/30/66 (PS-33) 1/4/69 (PS-33A) 3/6/70 (NO. 108) 2/8/72 (NO. 108A) 4/1/91 (G-52)    
G-53         
G-54         
E-1 9/23/64 (DS-3) 3/6/70 (No. 3) 6/7/71 (No. 3A) 4/1/91 (E-1)     
E-2 9/23/64 (DS-6) 3/6/70 (No. 6) 6/7/71 (No. 6A) 4/1/91 (E-2)     
E-3 7/6/65 (DS-13) 3/6/70 (No. 13) 4/1/91 (E-2)      
E-4 11/12/65 (DS-31) 3/6/70 (No. 31) 4/1/91 (E-4)      
E-5 11/12/65 (DS-32) 3/6/70 (No. 32) 4/1/91 (E-5)      
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STD.NO. Effective Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date 
Revision 
Date 
E-6 2/21/66 (DS-37) 3/6/70 (No. 37) 4/1/91 (E-6)      
E-7 1/24/67 (DS-52) 1/6/69 (DS-52A) 3/6/70 (NO.52)      
E-8 1/23/68 (DS-72) 3/6/70 (N0. 68) 4/1/91 (E-8)      
E-9 6/27/68 (DS-75) 3/6/70 (N0. 69) 4/1/91 (E-9)      
E-10 9/24/64 (PS-6) 3/6/70 (N0. 81) 4/1/91 (E-10)      
E-11 7/6/65 (PS-10) 1/23/68 (PS-10A) 3/6/70 (N0. 85) 2/1/71 (NO. 85A) 4/1/91 (E-11)    
E-12 5/15/67 (PS-37) 3/6/70 (N0. 112) 4/1/91 (E-12)      
E-13 7/8/70 (NO.-131) 4/1/91 (E-13)       
E-14 7/27/70 (NO-133) 12/1/77 (NO-13A3) 5/1/78 (NO. 133B) 2/1/80 (NO. 133C) 8/1/80 (NO. 
133D)( 
4/1/91 (E-14)   
E-15 7/27/70 (NO.-134) 4/1/91 (E-15)       
E-16 10/16/72 (NO.-
148) 
4/1/91 (E-16)       
E-17 9/1/65 (DS-19) 3/6/70 (NO.-19) 4/1/91 (E-17)      
E-18 11/3/66 (DS-48) 3/6/70 (NO.-48) 4/1/91 (E-18)      
E-19 10/16/72 (DS-146) 4/1/91 (E-19)       
E-20 4/1/91 (E-20)        
E-21 4/1/91 (E-21)        
E-22 4/1/91 (E-22)        
E-23 9/23/64 (DS-5) 3/6/70 (NO. 5) 4/1/91 (E-23)      
E-24 11/12/65 (DS-20) 3/6/79 (95) 7/8/79 (95A) 2/1/80 (95B) 7/24/80 (95C) 8/7/81 (95D) 3/2/82 (95E) (4/1/91 (E-24) 
E-25 7/6/65 (EC 5) 7/6/65 (DS-25) 3/6/70 (No.25) 4/1/91 (M/S -3) 6/17/91 (M/S-3)    
F-1 7/6/65 (DS-17) 3/6/70 (No. 17) 4/1/91 (F-1)      
F-2 9/23/64 (EC-4) 9/23/64 (DS-24) 3/6/70 (No. 24) 4/1/91 (F-2)     
F-3 11/12/65 (DS-30) 3/6/70 (No. 30) 4/1/91 (F-3)      
F-4 2/21/66 (DS-35) 3/6/70 (No. 35) 4/1/91 (F-4)      
F-5 6/30/66 (DS-42) 3/6/70 (No. 42) 4/1/91 (F-5)      
F-6 4/1/91 (F-6)        
F-7 11/3/66 (DS-47) 3/6/70 (No. 47) 4/1/91 (F-7)      
F-8 11/3/66 (DS-49) 3/6/70 (No. 49) 4/1/91 (F-8)      
F-9 11/3/66 (DS-50) 3/6/70 (No. 50) 7/6/70 (No. 50A) 4/1/91 (F-9)     
F-10 11/3/67 (DS-66) 3/6/70 (No. 64) 4/1/91 (F-10)      
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STD.NO. Effective Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date 
Revision 
Date 
F-11 1/23/68 (DS-71) 3/6/70 (No. 67) 4/1/91 (F-11)      
F-12 6/27/68 (DS-77) 3/6/70 (No. 71) 4/1/91 (F-12)      
F-13 1/6/69 (DS-78) 3/6/70 (No. 72) 4/1/91 (F-13)      
F-14 1/6/69 (DS-79) 3/6/70 (No. 73) 4/1/91 (F-14)      
F-15 1/6/69 (DS-80) 3/6/70 (No. 74) 4/1/91 (F-15)      
F-16 3/30/64 (PS-1) 3/6/70 (No. 76) 4/1/91 (F-16)      
F-17 3/30/64 (PS-3) 3/6/70 (No. 78) 4/1/91 (F-17)      
F-18 9/1/65 (PS-17) 3/6/70 (No. 92) 4/1/91 (F-18)      
F-19 9/1/65 (PS-18) 3/6/70 (No. 93) 4/1/91 (F-19)      
F-20 11/12/65 (PS-19) 3/6/70 (No. 94) 4/1/91 (F-20)      
F-21 6/27/68 (PS-43) 3/6/70 (No. 118) 4/1/91 (F-21)      
F-22 3/6/70 (No. 123) 4/1/91 (F-22)       
F-23 
10/16/72 (NO. 
147) 12/1/71 (No.147A) 4/1/91 (F-23)      
F-24 2/21/66 (DS-38) 3/6/70 (No 38) 2/8/72 (No 38A) 4/1/91 (F-24)     
F-25 11/12/65 (DS-34) 3/6/70 (No 34) 4/1/91 (F-25)      
F-26 4/21/72 (NO. 143) 4/1/91 (F-26)       
F-27 9/1/65 (PS. 16) 3/6/70 (NO. 31) 4/1/91 (F-27)      
F-28 4/1/91 (F-28)        
F-29 4/1/91 (F-29)        
M/P-1 7/6/65 (DS-14) 3/6/70 (No. 14) 5/19/75 (No. 14A) 4/1/91 (M/P-1)     
M/P-3 3/30/64 (EC-3) 3/30/64 (DS-23) 11/12/65 (DS-23A) 3/6/70 (No. 23) 4/1/91 (M/P-3)    
M/P-4 11/3/67 (DS-63) 3/6/70 (No. 63) 4/1/91 (M/P-4)      
M/P-5 6/27/68 (DS-76) 3/6/70 (No. 70) 4/1/91 (M/P-5)      
M/P-6 9/1/65 (PS-14) 3/6/70 (No. 89) 4/1/91 (M/P-6)      
M/P-7 2/21/66 (PS-26) 3/6/70 (No. 101) 4/1/91 (M/P-7)      
M/P-8 5/15/67 (PS-36) 3/6/70 (No. 111) 4/1/91 (M/P-8)      
M/P-9 1/6/69 (PS-46) 3/6/70 (No. 120) 6/3/80 (No. 120A) 4/1/91 (M/P-9)     
M/P-10 
12/16/75 (NO. 
152) 
12/1/77 (NO. 
152A) 3/2/82 (NO. 152B) 4/1/91 (M/P-10)     
M/P-11 2/8/72 (No. 140) 4/1/91 (M/P-11)       
M/P-12 4/1/91 (M/P-12)        
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STD.NO. Effective Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date 
Revision 
Date 
M/P-13 2/8/72 (No. 139) 4/1/91 (M/P-13)       
M/P-14 4/1/91 (M/P-14)        
M/P-15 11/3/67 (PS-41) 3/6/70 (No. 116) 4/1/91 (M/P-15)      
M/P-16 6/30/66 (DS-43) 3/6/70 (No. 43) 4/1/91 (M/P-16)      
M/P-17 7/6/65 (PS-12) 3/6/70 (No. 87) 2/1/71 (NO.-87A) 4/1/91 (M/P-17)     
M/P-18 9/20/66 (PS-34) 3/6/70 (No. 109) 4/26/84 (No. 109A) 4/28/88 (NO. 109B) 4/1/91 (M/P-18)    
M/P-19 9/1/65 (DS-18) 3/6/70 (No. 18) 4/1/91 (M/P-19)      
M/P-20 7/6/65 (EC-6) 7/6/65 (DS-26) 3/6/70 (No. 26) 4/1/91 (M/P-20)     
M/P-21 1/24/67 (DS-51) 3/6/70 (No. 51) 4/1/91 (M/P-21)      
M/P-22 7/6/65 (PS-7) 3/6/70 (No. 82) 4/1/91 (M/P-22)      
M/P-23 11/3/67 (PS-39) 3/6/70 (No. 114) 5/19/75 (No. 114A) 4/1/91 (M/P-23)     
M/P-24 3/6/70 (No. 125) 4/1/91 (M/P-24)       
M/P-25 11/2/71 (No. 137) 4/1/91 (M/P-25)       
M/P-26 2/1/71 (No. 135) 4/1/91 (M/P-26)       
M/S-1 3/30/64 (DS-2) 7/6/65 (DS-2A) 3/6/72 (No. 2) 11/2/71 (NO. 2A) 4/1/91 (M/S-1)    
M/S-2 9/23/64 (DS-8) 3/6/70 (N0. 8) 6/7/71 (NO. 8A) 4/1/91 (M/S-2)     
M/S-4 8/22/67 (DS-61) 3/6/70 (No. 61) 4/1/91 (M/S-4)      
M/S-5 11/23/67 (DS-62) 3/6/70 (No. 62) 4/1/91 (M/S-5)      
M/S-6 4/21/72 (No. 142) 4/1/91 (M/S-6)       
M/S-7 10/16/72 (No. 144) 4/1/91 (M/S-7)       
M/S-8 12/16/75 (No. 151) 4/1/91 (M/S-8)       
M/S-9 4/1/91 (M/S-9)        
M/S-10 12/16/75 (No. 150) 4/1/91 (M/S-10)       
M/S-11 11/8/63 (EC-1) 7/6/65 (EC-1A) 7/6/65 (DS-21) 1/24/67 (No. 21A) 3/6/70 (NO. 21) 
7/6/70 (NO. 
21A) 
4/1/91 (M/S-
11)  
M/S-12 8/22/67 (DS-60) 3/4/70 (NO. 60) 4/1/91 (M/S-12)      
M/S-13 4/1/91 (M/S-13)        
M/S-14 1/24/67 (PS-35) 3/6/70 (No. 110) 6/7/71 (NO-110A) 5/19/75 (NO. 110B) 4/1/91 (M/S-14)    
M/S-15 9/1/65 (DS-29) 3/6/70 (No. 29) 4/1/91 (M/S-15)      
M/S-16 7/8/70 (No. 132) 4/1/91 (M/S-16)       
P-1 2/21/66 (DS-39) 3/6/70 (NO. 39) 7/6/70 (NO. 39A) 4/1/91 (P-1)     
JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
 
 
 
 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
A-8 
STD.NO. Effective Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date Revision Date 
Revision 
Date 
P-3 6/30/66 (PS-30) 3/6/70 (NO. 105) 10/16/72 (NO.105A) 
12/22/89 
(NO.105A) 4/1/91 (P-3)    
P-3 9/1/65 (PS-13) 3/6/70 (NO. 88) 
12/16/75  (NO. 
88A)) 4/1/91 (P-3)     
P-4 9/1/65 (PS-15) 3/6/70 (NO. 90) 7/27/70 (NO.90A) 12/1/77 (NO. 90B) 4/1/91 (P-4)    
P-5 11/12/65 (PS-21) 3/6/70 (NO. 96) 5/19/75 (NO.96A) 4/1/91 (P-5)     
P-6 11/3/63 (DS-46) 3/6/70 (NO. 46) 4/1/91 (P-6      
P-7 6/30/66 (PS-28)) 1/4/69 (PS-28A) 3/6/70 (No.103) 12/22/89 (No.103A) 4/1/91 (P-7)    
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
 JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
 
B-1 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
CANCELLED DESIGN AND PROCEDURAL STANDARDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Cancelled Design and Procedural Standards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
 
B-1 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
Appendix 
 
B. Cancelled Design and Procedural Standards ............................................................ B-1 
 
G-6 Redundancy Requirements ....................................................................................... B-3 
G-7 Time Displays ............................................................................................................ B-4 
G-13 Shipping and Handling Protection for Spaceflight Hardware ................................... B-5 
G-30 Switch Protection Devices ....................................................................................... B-7 
G-33 Surface Temperatures ............................................................................................. B-8 
G-34 Extravehicular Activity Electronic Connectors ......................................................... B-9 
G-35 Enclosure Panels External to the Habitable Modules ............................................ B-10 
G-36 Thermal Blankets- Extravehicular Activity ............................................................. B-11 
G-41 Acoustic Noise Criteria .......................................................................................... B-12 
G-42 Solar Wind Environment ........................................................................................ B-14 
G-43 Centralized Subsystem Controls ........................................................................... B-15 
G-49 Temperature And Pressure Monitoring Requirements Of  
Hydrogen Peroxide Systems ................................................................................ B-16 
 
E-18   Circuitry For Automatic Shutdown Of Launch Vehicle Engine(S) ........................ B-17 
E-21 Electrical Connectors ............................................................................................. B-18 
E-23 Transistors – Selection of Types............................................................................ B-19 
 
F-14 Crew Cabin Module Ventilating Fans - Protection From Debris ............................. B-20 
F-23  Qualification Fluid ................................................................................................. B-21 
F-28 Use Of Halogen Method For Coolant System Leak Detection ............................... B-22 
 
MP-2 Flammability of Wiring Material ............................................................................. B-23 
MP-3 Toxicity Of Materials Used In Crew Compartments - Wire Insulation,  
Ties, Identification Marks, And Protective Covering .............................................. B-25 
MP-4 Metals and Metal Couples -Restriction on Use ..................................................... B-26 
MP-5 Solutions Which Contain Ethylene Glycol – Requirements For  
Silver Chelating Agent .......................................................................................... B-29 
MP-6 Toxicity - Requirements For Nonmetallic Materials Proposed For  
Use Within Crew Compartment ............................................................................ B-30 
MP-7 Material Detrimental to Electrical Connectors ....................................................... B-32 
MP-8 Leak Detectors - Wetting Agents .......................................................................... B-33 
MP-10 Liquid Locking Compounds - Restrictions And Controls ..................................... B-35 
MP-12 Multilayer Blanket Bake-Out ............................................................................... B-37 
MP-14 Silicate Ester Coolant System Design ................................................................ B-38 
MP-15 Mercury - Restriction On Use.............................................................................. B-39 
MP-16 Restriction on Coatings for Areas Subject to Abrasion ....................................... B-41 
MP-17 Radiographic Inspection of Brazed and Welded Tubing Joints ........................... B-43 
MP-18 Etching Fluorocarbon Insulated Electrical Wire .................................................. B-45 
MP-19 Spacecraft Material – Restriction on Use of Polyvinyl Chloride .......................... B-47 
MP-20 Titanium Or Its Alloys – Prohibited Use With Oxygen ......................................... B-49 
MP-20 Titanium Or Its Alloys – Prohibited Use With Oxygen ......................................... B-50 
MP-21 Beryllium - Restricted Use Within Crew Compartment(s) ................................... B-51 
MP-22 Brazed Joints – Identification Marks ................................................................... B-52 
 JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
 
B-2 
Verify correct revision before use  
 
MP-23 Pressure Vessels – Materials  Compatibility And Vessel  Qualification Tests .... B-53 
MP-24 Cadmium - Restriction On Use ........................................................................... B-55 
MP-25 Pressure Vessels- Nondestructive Evaluation Plan ............................................ B-57 
 
MS-6 Exposed Sharp Surfaces Or Protrusions .............................................................. B-58 
MS-10 Functional Doors That Operate In Flight ............................................................. B-59 
MS-13 Lifting And Hoisting Ground Support Equipment Identification Standard ............ B-60 
 
P-3 Pyrotechnic Circuits- Prohibited Wire Splicing ......................................................... B-61 
P-4 Pyrotechnic Devices- Packaging Material ................................................................ B-62 
P-7 Pyrotechnic Devices Color Coding Requirements ................................................... B-63 
 
 JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
B-3 
 
Approval Signature: ______/s/ Frank Benz_________________  
 
Date:____08 March 2005__________ 
                           Director, Engineering 
  
 
 
 
The redundancy requirements for critical flight vehicle subsystems (except structure, 
thermal protective system, and pressure vessels) shall be established on an individual 
subsystem basis but shall not be less than fail-safe. Flight hardware and payloads will be 
designed, as a minimum, to sustain a failure of a single item of hardware in any 
subsystem without loss of life or vehicle. 
 
The crew may be considered as an active operating system available to provide backup 
or redundancy to an appropriate critical subsystem except during periods of acceleration 
or other forces that would restrict physical movement. 
 
Where the above criteria are not met, a list shall be provided of critical nonredundant 
items, the failure of which could cause loss of the crew or require abort of mission. The 
list shall also contain critical redundant items, the status of which cannot be readily 
determined or the function of which can be lost by a single cause. 
 
The list shall include justification for the use of each critical item. 
Mission costs, complexity, and crew survival require this design approach. 
 
Definitions are as follows: 
 
A "critical subsystem" is a major functional arrangement of parts, components, or 
assemblies that perform a function which if lost could cause loss of life or vehicle or could 
cause an abort. 
 
"Fail-safe" is defined as able to sustain  failure while retaining the capability to 
successfully terminate the mission. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 12A. 
 
 
These requirements are superseded by NPR 8705.2 Human-Rating Requirements and 
Guidelines for Space Flight Systems.  The Critical Items List is a part of risk management 
already covered by NPR 7120….   
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Time units for displays in spacecraft and mission-related ground support equipment shall 
indicate time or time intervals in seconds (or decimal fractions of seconds), minutes, 
hours, and days. 
 
Crew station time measurement indicators shall be of the digital-readout type, except in 
cases where the presentation is used primarily for rate determination or where frequent 
resetting is required. 
 
 
This requirement standardizes time units for spacecraft and mission-related ground 
support equipment to avoid use or confusion with other fractions of time. 
 
The provisions of this standard are not intended to apply to timers used solely for 
recording accumulated time on equipment. 
 
This requirement is not to be construed to mean that every timer must have days, hours, 
minutes, and seconds as a readout capability. If mission requirements can adequately be 
met by timers showing only hours, or only minutes, etc., then use of such units meets the 
requirements of this standard. 
 
Presentations on digital time measurement indicators give readouts which are less likely 
to be misread and which require less readout time than do analog indicators. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standards 11A and 58. 
 
The content of this 8080 standard is already covered in higher-tier NASA STD 3000, 
paragraph 9.4.2.3.3.5 "Clock and Timer Design Requirements." 
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Suitably package or support spaceflight hardware to provide protection of the hardware 
from damage during handling and shipping. 
 
Contractor or National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) personnel will 
determine when shock-indicating devices are required. The use of such devices must be 
approved by the appropriate program office or project office before installation. 
 
Suitably package hardware considered especially sensitive to handling or shipping 
damage to ensure that the hardware will arrive undamaged. The packaging shall also 
provide a visible indication when the hardware is subjected to potentially damaging 
stresses. This will facilitate the inspection for damage. 
 
Design the mechanical means for closing and securing spacecraft ground support 
equipment (GSE) containers such that the spacecraft hardware flight attachments are not 
penetrated; i.e., GSE threaded fasteners are not to be run through flight hardware 
mounting holes. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 84A and incorporates SSP 30213 no.G-
13.t 
RATIONALE FOR CANCELLATION 
 
The NPR 6000.1 (Requirements for Packaging, Handling, and Transportation for 
Aeronautical and Space Systems, Equipment, and Associated Components) is the 
higher-level document that is used for shipping and handling all hardware.  The NPR 
precludes the need for Standard G-13. 
NPR 6000.1 references: 
 
Paragraph P.1.  Purpose:  “The NPR establishes packaging, handling, and transportation 
practices adequate to maintain the reliability of NASA items and to achieve their damage-
free delivery to the place and time of ultimate use.  The purpose of this NPR is to promote 
a standard, streamlined approach for transportation shipment activities and to provide 
guidance for meeting packaging, handling, and transportation requirements pursuant to 
institutional, program, and project goals and missions throughout NASA.” 
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RATIONALE FOR CANCELLATION [CONT] 
 
Paragraph P.2.  Applicability,  “The NPR is applicable to NASA and NASA Centers, 
including Component Facilities.  Its use is recommended for all contractors, shipping on 
behalf of NASA, to satisfy contractual program and project obligations.” 
 
Chapter 3. Supplier Handling and Transportation Requirements, Paragraph 3.5, 
Monitoring Devices for Class III Shipments:  “When use of a monitoring device is 
indicated or has been recommended, and its use authorized, such devices shall be of a 
type and nature that will detect and provide a permanent notation that the packaged 
contents have been subjected to adverse conditions such as temperature, shock, or 
moisture that could impair their ability to perform their principal function in a satisfactory 
manner.  Monitoring devices shall be installed in a manner that will permit their 
observation and inspection with a minimum of assembly or disassembly of the container.  
The location of devices, including shock-measuring instruments, shall be marked 
prominently on the exterior container.  Shock measuring instruments shall be used in 
accordance with applicable standards.” 
 
Appendix A., Paragraph 11, Special Design Packaging,  “Packaging that is used for items 
possessing characteristics requiring specially designed cushioning, blocking and bracing, 
or specially designed containers to provide necessary protection.  The approval of a 
packaging engineer or specialist may be required.  Special design packaging applies to 
items that present the following:   
 
11.1. Special handling, packaging or transportation problems because of restrictive 
shock or vibration characteristics. 
11.2. A requirement for special environmental control. 
11.3. A requirement for maintenance within special or critical pressure or temperature 
limits. 
11.4. A requirement for specialized container design, special handling devices, fixtures, 
or monitoring devices.”   
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Switches requiring protection against inadvertent actuation shall have the device 
designed so that the position of the switch can be determined without moving the 
protection device.  
 
Emergency switches for ordnance (safe, arm, and the like) should be color coded or 
otherwise identified. 
 
 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 59 and incorporates SSP 30213 no. G-
30. 
 
 
 
The content of this 8080 standard is already covered in NASA STD 3000, paragraphs 
9.3.3.2 "Accidental Acuation Design Requirements, and " 9.5.3.1.13 "Caution and 
Warning Labels Design Requirements."  In addition, the TO DO action item database for 
updates to NASA STD 3000 also includes a formal action to address the following 
specific content portion from 8080 standard G-30: "Color code or otherwise identify 
emergency switched for ordnance (safe, are, and the like)." This formal action item was 
assigned by the Habitability and Environmental Factors Office (HEFO CCB) on Sept. 2, 
2004, and closed on Sept. 15, 2004. 
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Surface temperatures within habitable volumes shall be designed to be less than 45 C 
(113 F) and greater than 4 C(41.2 F). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is to prevent exposure of the astronaut to hazardous temperatures without the 
benefit of protective clothing.   
Refrigerated interior surfaces of refrigerators located within habitable volumes are exempt 
from this standard. 
 
This standard incorporates SSP 30213 no. G-33.. 
 
 
The content of this 8080 standard is already covered in NASA STD 3000, paragraphs 
6.5.3 "Touch Temperature Design Requirements." 
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The following constraints shall be considered in the selection of the types of electrical 
connectors and their location for use in electronic boxes designed for on-orbit servicing by 
extravehicular activity (EVA): 
 
1. Space shall be sufficient to allow access by a gloved astronaut for mate and 
demate operations. 
2 The selected connector shall be of the scoop-proof type; i.e., shells extend far 
enough beyond the pins to prevent pin contact with the mating connector shell during the 
mating operation. 
3. Back shells shall be designed to provide a grip point for the suited astronaut to 
grasp to disengage the connector. 
 
 
 
These considerations will improve the capability of the gloved astronaut to effect the 
mating and demating of electrical connectors on boxes designed for changeout in orbit. 
This standard incorporates SSP 30213 no. G-34. 
 
 
There is no need to list individual Standards for EVA as all EVA requirements are now 
housed in one place.  Reference document JSC 28918, EVA Design Requirements and 
Considerations, as documentation for all EVA requirements.  
 
This standard only lists a portion of EVA requirements.  Therefore if Standard G-34 
remains as a standard, the possibility exists that hardware may be designed that is not 
fully EVA-compatible. 
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All enclosure panels requiring extravehicular activity (EVA) access shall be hinged 
assemblies. All fasteners on these panels shall be captive types. No lock-wire is to be 
used when an EVA interface is involved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The captive feature improves EVA and ground handling. Locking type inserts eliminate 
the lock-wiring requirement. 
This standard incorporates SSP 30213 no. G-35. 
 
 
 
We no longer require all enclosure panels to be hinged.  If Standard G-35 remains as it is 
currently written, the possibility exists that hardware may be designed that is not EVA 
compatible.  
 
Reference document JSC 28918, EVA Design Requirements and Considerations, as 
documentation for all EVA requirements. 
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Where extravehicular activity (EVA) access is required to a specific area for servicing or 
repair, thermal blankets shall be designed for removal and replacement by a gloved 
astronaut. Where nonconductive fasteners (i.e., Velcro) are used, grounding shall be 
accomplished through the use of conductive strips. 
 
 
 
The purpose of this requirement is to allow a gloved astronaut to gain access to the 
required worksite and thermally secure the area after servicing is complete. 
 
This standard incorporates SSP 30213 no. G-36. 
 
 
 
We no longer need to list individual Standards for EVA as all EVA requirements are now 
housed in one place.  Reference document JSC 28918, EVA Design Requirements and 
Considerations, as documentation for all EVA requirements. This standard only lists a 
portion of EVA requirements. If Standard G-36 remains as a standard, the possibility 
exists that hardware may be designed that is not fully EVA compatible.  
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Acoustic noise sound pressure levels specified by this standard establish the maximum 
acceptable flight crew environmental limits which would result from operation of the total 
spacecraft system and from the expected environment during all phases of a mission. 
The sound pressure levels specified cannot be directly applied as the acceptable levels 
which can be produced by a separate piece of equipment or subsystem because of the 
accumulative and interacting effects when sound sources are integrated as a complete 
spacecraft system. The sound pressure levels, in decibels, shall be referenced to 0.0002 
microbars (0.00002 N/m2) and shall be measured at, or translated to, the external 
auditory meatus of the operating personnel; these sound pressure levels shall not be 
achieved through the use of ear coverings unless all simultaneous requirements for 
communications and auditory monitoring of equipment functions can also be met. 
Figures 1 and 2 define the maximum allowable sound pressure levels during launch or 
short duration mission phases. Figure 3 defines the sound pressure levels, frequencies, 
exposure times, and required quiet periods after intermittent noise. Exposures shall not 
exceed the allowable levels, periods, or repetition rates. No single octave band or tone 
sound pressure level may exceed the allowable contour. 
The maximum allowable continuous sound pressure levels produced by normal operating 
equipment or systems within work and sleep areas shall be defined by figure 4 and 
described as follows: 
1.  Broadband octave band sound pressure levels shall not exceed the noise criteria 
(NC) 50 contour of figure 4 during work periods and the NC 40 contour during sleep 
periods. 
2.  The maximum sound pressure level of any narrow band component shall be at 
least 10dB less than the sound pressure level of the octave band which contains the 
component. 
 
See next page 
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A narrow band component is a simple or complex tone or line spectra having intense and 
steady-state frequency components (relative to wide band noise components) in a very 
narrow band, 1 percent of octave band or 5 Hz, whichever is less, and is heard as a 
musical sound, either harmonic or discordant. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 145. 
 
 
 
This standard is cancelled because revised acoustic requirements will be documented in 
Vol. 8 of NASA-STD-3000 for Crew Exploration Vehicle, Spiral 1, scheduled to be 
baselined in December, 2004.  Both ISS and Shuttle programs have existing acoustic 
requirements. 
 
In addition, acoustic requirements will also be considered for further revision as part of 
the longer-term Strategic Update to NASA-STD-3000. 
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Spacecraft and components that are planned for operation outside the magnetosphere, or 
more than 100,000 miles from earth, shall be designed so that components which are 
exposed to the external environment shall not be functionally impaired by a flux of 1019 
protons/m2 of 3 ± 2000 EV delivered each day, not to exceed 3 x 10l9 protons/m2 in 1 
week, or 2 x 1020 protons/m2 in 1 year. 
 
The flux levels specified are based on the occurrence of one magnetic storm in a day, 
three in a week, or twenty in a year. 
This standard establishes the JSC parameters for solar wind environment for future 
spacecraft design. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 55. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. General Geophysical Research, Vol. 71, nos. 5 and 13. (Based on data obtained 
from IMP satellite.) 
2. Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) technical report no. 32-514. (Based on data 
obtained from Mariner 2 satellite.) 
 
As this document does not include crew interface requirements, SF has no requirement 
for this standard.  SF has coordinated with ES on vehicle radiation requirements and has 
obtained concensus that this standard is not necessary for vehicle requirements either.  
E-22, Ionizing Radiation Effects, adequately covers effects of radiation on the vehicle at 
this level.  
 
Reference to MP-1 for materials degradation issues. 
 
Delete standard as it is adequately covered under standard E-22 for vehicle systems. 
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All controls, meters, or other monitoring devices (switches, circuit breakers, etc.) for a 
particular system or subsystem shall be centrally located on one panel or adjacent 
panels. However, redundancy criteria will apply. 
 
 
The crew must be able to easily determine the configuration and status of a particular 
system or subsystem. 
 
The intent here is to avoid, for instance, placing a set of switches associated with the 
module pressure control system on a panel at one end of the module and another set of 
switches (or circuit breakers, meters, etc.) associated with the same system on a panel at 
the other end of the module. 
 
This standard incorporates SSP 30213 no. G-43. 
 
 
The content of this 8080 standard is already covered in NASA STD 3000, paragraphs 
9.2.3.2.3 " Control/Display Grouping Design Requirements"  and 9.2.3.2.4 "Preferred 
Control/Display Location Design Requirements." 
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Design all spacecraft systems and ground support servicing equipment requiring storage 
of hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) to include devices for monitoring temperature and pressure 
to permit accurate determination of the rates of active-oxygen loss of the hydrogen 
peroxide contained in their respective systems. 
 
 
 
 
These monitoring devices will provide time for corrective action in the event that abnormal 
decomposition of H2O2 is initiated. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 808Q standard 44. 
 
 
This standard was written specifically to address issues related to hydrogen peroxide 
systems.  Standard F-6 was subsequently incorporated into the 8080 document and is 
written as a more general standard applicable to "potentially hazardous reactive fluids".  
Thus, the specific standard related to hydrogen peroxide has been cancelled and 
hydrogen peroxide has been specifically referenced in the updated version of the F-6 
standard. 
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STATEMENT OF STANDARD 
 
Design of circuitry for automatic shutdown of launch vehicle engine(s) shall include 
protection against possible engine shutdown coincidental with, or immediately after, 
launch vehicle release. 
 
REMARKS 
 
The term "immediately after" in the statement refers to the time from launch vehicle 
release to the time when ground support equipment umbilicals are released. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 48. 
 
RATIONALE FOR CANCELLATION 
 
As revised, Standard E-18 was extensively overhauled and contained information more 
appropriate to its designation as a General standard.  Refer to Standard G-54 for the 
revised text.  The reclassification of E-18 to Section G was based on review by DPSWG 
and its subsequent recommendation 
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Electrical connectors shall be designed such that misalignment during connect and 
disconnect operations will not cause pin damage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Past space programs have shown that significant time loss and costs have been 
sustained because of pin damage during manual assembly and disassembly. Connector 
designs exist which prevent this problem. 
 
 
This standard incorporates SSP 30213 no. E-21 
 
 
 
This standard does not provide any additional information over what is given in standard 
E-1.   E-1 provides the connector mating requirements.   
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The use of point-contract, grown junction, or alloy junction transistors shall be avoided in 
electronic circuits in both spacecraft and ground support equipment. 
 
 
 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 5. 
 
 
 
 
This standard is deleted because it references old technology and processes that are no 
longer used in industry.  These technologies were the first designs of transistors back in 
the 1950’s.  Even though there was production into the 1970’s, they no longer are 
produced. 
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Crew cabin module ventilation fans shall be protected by screens or other devices to 
prevent entrance of debris that could damage or jam the fan blades during zero-gravity 
conditions. Such screens or other devices shall be serviceable and/or replaceable. 
 
 
 
Crew cabin module ventilating fans are generally small, low-power devices designed with 
low clearances between blades and duct to maximize efficiency and minimize power 
consumption. Under zero-gravity conditions, debris in the cabin can float freely with air 
currents and enter the fan. Protection is required to prevent entry of floating debris of a 
size that could wedge itself into the low clearances and stall the fan. However, a 
protective screen should not be made so fine that it restricts the flow of air through the fan 
to a significant degree or becomes clogged with particles of debris too small to endanger 
the fan. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 73 and incorporates SSP 30213 no. F-
14. 
 
 
These requirements are now covered in 8080 standard G-4.  Additional remarks have 
been added to G-4 to provide lessons learned information and design guidelines about 
filters for longer duration missions. 
 
F-14 Crew Cabin Module Ventilating 
Fans - Protection From Debris  
Document No. 
 JPR 8080.5 
Standard No.  
 F-14 
Page  
1 of 1 
Previous 
Revision  
04/01/1991 
 
Cancelled as of date signed below: 
STATEMENT OF STANDARD 
REMARKS 
RATIONALE FOR CANCELLATION 
 JSC-STD-8080 
October 2011 
B-21 
 
Approval Signature: ______/s/ Frank Benz_________________  
 
Date:____08 March 2005__________ 
                           Director, Engineering 
  
 
 
 
 
STATEMENT OF STANDARD 
 
Test and analyze fluids used in the successful equipment qualification, as required, to 
establish baseline reference data on the physical and chemical properties of the fluid and 
allowable impurities that could affect the performance of the equipment and compatibility 
of materials. Evaluate the effect on system and component qualification, and define any 
additional qualification required before any of the following changes are allowed. 
 
1. Changes in fluid specification 
2. Changes in procurement source 
3. Changes in fluid processes, process conditions, or handling procedures 
4. Changes in raw materials, suppliers, or manufacturers 
5. Shifts in fluid properties noted in new lots or batches whenever these properties are not 
specifically allowed by the procurement specification. 
 
 
REMARKS 
 
Hardware changes normally include consideration of any additional qualification needed 
to ensure successful system function. The effect on equipment caused by changes in 
fluid properties must be given equal consideration whether they are introduced by 
changes in specification, source of fluid procurement, fluid manufacturing processes, raw 
materials, or by other means. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 147A and incorporates SSP 30213 no. 
F-23. 
 
RATIONALE FOR CANCELLATION 
 
This standard has been rewritten as a generic standard for reverification and is no longer 
limited to fluid systems.  The information captured in this standard has been moved to the 
more appropriate General standards section where the new standard, G-53, will serve as 
repository for the information. 
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Do not use gaseous nitrogen as a substitute medium for leak testing components for use 
with liquid low surface tension silicate ester coolants. 
 
 
 
 
Gaseous nitrogen has been used for component level leak testing and verifıcation on the 
interface unit (IU) thermal conditioning subsystem (TCS) components since their 
inception at George C Marshall Space Flight Center. With the use of a 60/40.1 mixture of 
methanol/water/sodium benzoate as a coolant, this technique was acceptable. However, 
after the low surface tension silicate ester coolant was incorporated in the IU TCS, visible 
leakage was evident even after acceptable component and system level leakage tests 
with gaseous nitrogen media. After evaluation of several leakage test techniques, the 
halogen method was the most reliable for this system. 
 
An investigation revealed that use of halogen gases with physical constants data similar 
to Freon 22TM and utilizing an electronic halogen leak detector with a detection range of 
1 x 10-g standard cc or greater is an acceptable method for even the smallest visible 
leaks found with silicate ester coolants. 
 
This standard incorporates SSP 30213 no F-31. 
 
The standard addressed a system that is outdated and no longer used. 
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This standard applies to electrical wiring within habitable compartments of spacecraft. 
Electrical wire insulation, wiring accessories, and materials in contact with electrical 
circuitry shall not be capable of sustaining combustion in the most severe oxidizing 
environment to be encountered during operations: 
1.  After removal of the source of ignition 
2. Following melting of the electrical conductor by high currents, such as those 
resulting from short circuits or equipment malfunction 
Materials in contact with a conductor subjected to these high currents shall not be 
capable of igniting the insulation, wiring accessories, or other materials on other 
conductors. 
This requirement does not apply to material isolated by a container capable of retaining 
within the container any combustion resulting from high currents. 
 
 
Materials are considered nonflammable or self-extinguishing if they meet the applicable 
flammability requirements of NHB 8060.1. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 22A and incorporates SSP 30213 no. 
M/P-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page. 
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Requirement is covered by revised JSC 49774 paragraphs 4.1.1 and 4.1.6, which require 
all materials to be nonflammable or self-extinguishing, including wiring materials.   
 
Paragraph 4.1.1 states: 
 
4.1.1  FLAMMABILITY CONTROL 
Flammability control shall be based on using materials that are nonflammable or self-
extinguishing when tested by NASA-STD-6001, Test 1; testing shall not be required for 
ceramics and metal oxides.  Test 2 (Heat and Visible Smoke Release Rates) of NASA-
STD-6001 is not required.  If flammable materials must be used, flammability control shall 
be based on adequate separation of flammable materials in configuration to preclude fire 
propagation paths.  Guidelines for hardware flammability assessment can be found in JSC 
29353, Flammability Configuration Analysis for Spacecraft Applications.   
 
Material flammability ratings and test data are given in the MAPTIS database.  The 
thickness specified for flammability includes the minimum thickness in which the material 
was tested.  Thinner materials may not have the same rating, and may need to be tested.  
Similarly, the oxygen concentration specified is that in which the material was tested.  
MAPTIS flammability test data at other oxygen concentrations may be used only if the test 
data were obtained at a higher oxygen concentration than the maximum use oxygen 
concentration.   
 
 
Paragraph 4.1.6 states: 
 
4.1.6  ELECTRICAL WIRE INSULATION MATERIALS 
Electrical wire insulation materials shall be evaluated for flammability in accordance with 
NASA-STD-6001 Test 4.   
 
Arc tracking shall be evaluated in accordance with NASA-STD-6001 Test 18 or a generally 
accepted voluntary consensus standard aerospace wiring arc tracking test.  Testing is not 
required for polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), PTFE laminate, ethylene tetrafluoroethlyene 
(ETFE), or silicone-insulated wires since the resistance of these materials to arc tracking 
has already been established. 
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No materials that, when exposed to a short circuit, will generate toxic fumes in a 
concentration sufficient to impair crew safety shall be used for wire insulation, ties, 
identification marks, and protective covering on wiring. 
 
 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 23 and incorporates SSP 30213 no. M/P-
3. 
 
 
 
This standard cannot be implemented.  It is impossible to quantify the amount of toxic 
fumes generated by a short-circuit condition and limitation of materials to those which are 
least prone to generate toxic combustion/pyrolysis products limits the materials to those 
which are most flammable.  From a flammability standpoint, Teflon-based materials are 
the best; from a toxic combustion/pyrolysis standpoint they are the worst.   
 
Agency policy is to select the least flammable materials, regardless of combustion 
product toxicity, as the best means of controlling the amount of toxic fumes generated by 
a short-circuit condition.  Revised M/P-1 calls out JSC 49774.  Paragraphs 4.1.1 and 
4.1.6 of the revised JSC 49774 require all materials to meet NASA-STD-6001 which 
contains Agency flammability requirements for all materials. 
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The risk of galvanic corrosion in manned spacecraft shall be minimized by consideration 
of relative electrical potential [i.e., electromotive force (EMF)] in the selection and 
application of metals. 
Metals that differ in potential by more than 0.25 V, as determined from table 1, shall not 
be used in direct contact when exposed to a common electrolyte, such as the 
atmosphere. 
Metal couples prohibited by or not included in table I shall not be used until they have 
been demonstrated to be satisfactory in the proposed application. 
No aluminum or aluminum alloys shall be used in liquid water conduits or in gas conduits 
where water condensation can routinely occur. Oxygenated/liquid water systems shall 
use 300 series stainless steel. In such cases, users of the system should be alerted to the 
fact that iron ions will leach into the liquid and form ferric oxide (rust). 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 63 and incorporates SSP 30213 no. M/P-
4. 
Requirement is covered by revised JSC 49774 paragraph 4.6.3, which states: 
 
4.6.3  CORROSION PREVENTION AND CONTROL  
All parts, assemblies, and equipment, including spares, shall be finished to provide 
protection from corrosion in accordance with the requirements of MSFC-SPEC-250, 
Protective Finishes for Space Vehicle Structures and Associated Flight Equipment, General 
Specification For.  Corrosion evaluation shall show the possible effects of fluid release 
resulting from the failure or permeation of barriers.  Corrosion control of galvanic couples 
shall be in accordance with MIL-STD-889, Dissimilar Metals.  Galvanic couples for alloy 
combinations not listed in MIL-STD-889 shall not exceed 0.25 volts.   Specific corrosion 
prevention and control techniques shall be defined in the Materials and Processes 
Selection, Control, and Implementation Plan. For hardware in the mild corrosive 
environment of standard habitable spacecraft volumes, the following changes may be 
made: 
 
Continued next page. 
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• The requirements of MIL-STD-889 may be relaxed with corrosion resistant 
aluminum alloys. 
• Exposed aluminum surfaces may have anodic coatings instead of organic coatings 
specified in MSFC-SPEC-250. 
• Conversion coatings may be used as the sole corrosion protection for 5000 and 
6000 series corrosion resistant aluminum alloys.  They are not acceptable as the sole 
corrosion protection for 2000 and 7000 series aluminum alloys. 
 
 
 
Continued next page. 
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Benzotriazole (BZT), a silver chelating agent, shall be added to solutions containing 
ethylene glycol which are used aboard spacecraft whose electrical or electronic circuits 
contain silver or silver-coated copper. The concentration of BZT shall be 4500 to 5000 
ppm (0.45 to 0.50 percent) by weight. 
 
 
Bare or defectively insulated silver or silver-coated copper components such as wire, 
pins, sockets, or connectors impressed with a direct current potential can spontaneously 
ignite and burn when exposed to ethylene glycol solutions that do not contain a silver 
chelating agent. The addition of BZT completely eliminates this flammability hazard. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 70 and incorporates SSP 30213 no. M/P-
5. 
 
 
A new paragraph has been added to JSC 49774 addressing the issue: 
 
4.3.9  ETHYLENE GLYCOL 
When solutions containing ethylene glycol are used aboard spacecraft which have 
electrical or electronic circuits containing silver or silver-coated copper, a silver chelating 
agent such as benzotriazole (BZT) shall be added to the solution to prevent spontaneous 
ignition from the reaction of silver with ethylene glycol. [End] 
 
Note also that Mir had ethylene glycol coolant (which leaked in large quantities) and  
electrical circuits containing silver-plated copper but no fires occurred.  Ethylene glycol 
coolant is effectively prohibited (unless in a containment that is failure tolerant against 
leakage) because of toxicological and Environmental Control and Life Support System 
issues with the coolant unrelated to silver and fires.  
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Nonmetallic materials used within crew compartments shall not provide a toxic 
atmosphere. Identification and test requirements are specified below. 
1. Identification Requirements. All nonmetallic materials proposed for use within the 
crew compartments of the spacecraft shall be identified as follows: 
a. Material trade name 
b. Application in spacecraft 
c. Part number 
d. Vendor 
e. Commercial designation (technical) 
f. Materials specification - primary 
g. Materials specification - secondary 
h. Weight of material in spacecraft cabin 
i. Surface area exposed in spacecraft cabin 
j. Material test status 
k. Alternative materials considered with reasons for rejection 
 
2. Test Requirements. The contractor shall justify use of the proposed material by 
documentary evidence supported by testing performed by other laboratories or by the 
contractor itself. Test data shall consist of the following: 
a. Testing agency 
b. Test procedures 
c. Test environment 
d. Weight loss during test 
e. Major offgassing products - identification and quantification 
f. Test report and data 
g. Source of all data 
 
Toxicity and/or offgassing testing of off-the-shelf equipment may be performed in lieu of 
the above requirements when materials documentation is not available. 
Odor tests do not provide detailed information pertaining to toxicity. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standards 33 and 89 and incorporates SSP 30213 
no. M/P-6. 
 
Continued next page. 
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Requirement is superseded by JSC 49774 paragraph 4.1.2, which states: 
 
4.1.2 TOXIC OFFGASSING 
All materials used in habitable flight compartments shall meet the offgassing requirements 
of NASA-STD-6001 using one of the following methodologies: 
 
(a)  Offgassing is tested as an assembled article 
 
Summation of Toxic Hazard Index (T) values (total concentration in milligrams per cubic 
meter/Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration) of all offgassed constituent products 
shall not exceed 0.5. 
 
(b) Hardware components evaluated on a materials basis  
 
Individual materials used to make up a component shall be evaluated based on the actual 
or estimated mass of the material used in the hardware component.  The total T value for 
all materials used to make up the component shall be less than 0.5. 
 
(c)  More than one hardware component or assembly 
 
If a single hardware component is tested or evaluated for toxicity, but more than one will be 
flown, the T value obtained for one unit times the number of flight units shall be less than 
0.5. 
 
(d)  Bulk materials and other materials not inside a container 
 
All materials shall be evaluated individually using the ratings in the MAPTIS database.  The 
maximum quantity and associated rating is specified for each material code. 
 
The analytical technique used to identify and quantify offgassed products in the NASA-
STD-6001 standard test shall be capable of detecting formaldehyde concentrations of 0.05 
parts per million.  Offgassing testing is not required for metallic materials or for ceramics 
and metal oxides.  SMAC values shall be obtained from JSC 20584, Spacecraft Maximum 
Allowable Concentrations for Airborne Contaminants.  For compounds for which no SMAC 
values are found in JSC 20584, the values in MAPTIS shall be used.  
 
The JSC 49774 approach has been the accepted methodology for offgassing control 
implementation by all NASA Centers and International Partners since it was introduced in 
1989. 
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Materials containing or coated with substances known to be detrimental to metals used in 
electrical connectors shall not be used adjacent to exposed electrical contact surfaces. 
The use of materials containing or coated with sulfides or free sulfur is prohibited. 
 
Difficulties of this type have been encountered where protective caps containing gaskets 
coated with sulfur have been used on electrical connectors. 
Contact surfaces of electrical connectors electroplated with gold have developed 
semiconducting or insulating films in the presence of sulfur-bearing atmosphere. 
Investigations have shown that the base metals of the contacts (such as copper, zinc, 
and silver) beneath the gold plating combine chemically with atmospheric sulfur to 
produce a sulfide which diffuses through the gold to form films on the contact surfaces. 
Presence of the film can cause breakdown of an electrical connection formed by the 
contact surfaces. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 101 and incorporates SSP 30213 no. 
M/P-7. 
 
 
This standard selects just one out of hundreds of materials compatibility issues that must 
be addressed by a comprehensive M&P program. 
 
Revised M/P-1 calls out JSC 49774.  JSC 49774 contains no specific requirement on this 
subject but contains generic requirements to ensure that all materials must be compatible 
with each other and have acceptable life. Such requirements are used to address many 
issues in the electrical world such as red plague, purple plague, tin whisker growth, and 
compatibility of sulfur with electrical connectors. 
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Any wetting agent to be used on the outside surface of pressurized spacecraft systems to 
detect leaks shall be verified to be compatible with the materials on which it is to be used 
or materials on which it might be spilled. After the leak tests are completed, the wetting 
agent shall be neutralized or removed by a washing and drying procedure compatible 
with the materials. 
 
Only wetting agents classified as nonionic shall be used. 
 
WARNING: If leak tests are accomplished in the crew bay, the solution must not be toxic 
or flammable and shall not be capable of leaving a residue which is toxic, flammable, or 
hygroscopic 
Detergents such as household liquid soap are sometimes used for bubble tests in lieu of 
standard leak detectors. The highly alkaline nature of most detergents, however, 
promotes corrosion and may dissolve amphoteric metals such as cadmium and zinc. 
Therefore, such detergents shall not be used. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 111 and incorporates SSP 30213 no. 
M/P-8. 
Requirement is covered by revised JSC 49774 paragraph 4.1.3, which states: 
 
4.1.3 FLUID COMPATIBILITY 
Materials exposed to hazardous fluids1 shall be evaluated or tested for compatibility.  …… 
 
1 For the purpose of this standard, the definition of hazardous fluids includes gaseous 
oxygen, liquid oxygen, fuels, oxidizers, and other fluids that could cause corrosion, 
chemically or physically degrade materials in the system, or cause an exothermic reaction.   
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In addition, revised JSC 49774 paragraph 3.0 states: 
 
 
3.0  GENERAL REQUIREMENTS  
 
Materials used in the fabrication and processing of flight hardware shall be selected by 
considering the worst-case operational requirements for the particular application and the 
design engineering properties of the candidate materials.  The operational requirements 
shall include, but not be limited to, operational temperature limits, loads, contamination, life 
expectancy, moisture or other fluid media exposure, and vehicle related induced and 
natural space environments.  Properties that shall be considered in material selection 
include, but are not limited to, mechanical properties, fracture toughness, flammability and 
offgassing characteristics, corrosion, stress corrosion, thermal and mechanical fatigue 
properties, vacuum outgassing, fluids compatibility, microbial resistance, moisture 
resistance, fretting, galling, and susceptibility to electrostatic discharge (ESD) and 
contamination.  Conditions that could contribute to deterioration of hardware in service shall 
receive special consideration.  Non-flight materials used in processing and testing of flight 
hardware shall not cause degradation of the flight hardware. 
 
The last sentence of this paragraph ensures that all aspects of compatibility between non-
flight materials used in processing/checkout of flight hardware and flight hardware are 
properly addressed – including, but not limited to, the compatibility of leak detection fluids 
with flight materials.  
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Documentation and controls shall be established for all liquid locking compounds. 
Single-component liquid locking compounds that cure (solidify) when confined between 
closely fitting metal and/or primed surfaces but remain liquid when in direct contact with 
oxygen shall be used only when the following restrictions and controls are implemented: 
 
1. Shelf-life limitations shall be observed. 
2. Excess liquid or cured material that extends beyond the planes of the joined 
metal surfaces shall be removed to avoid contamination and migration. 
3. Joining surfaces shall be prepared and primed in accordance with the 
manufacturer's recommendations. 
4. Locking compounds shall be cured according to the manufacturer's 
recommendations prior to operations or applied loads that will stress the 
material. 
5. In fluid systems, locking compounds shall not be used without prior NASA 
approval. The justification for requesting NASA approval shall include 
satisfactory compatibility of the liquid and/or solid with the fluid media and its 
environment and acceptable compliance with a failure modes and effects 
analysis. 
 
This type locking, categorized as "anaerobic," has presented contamination problems in 
the past when that portion of the compound not confined between surfaces remained 
liquid and migrated to other areas of equipment. Anaerobic locking compound curing is 
inhibited by the presence of any concentration of oxygen. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 152B and incorporates SSP 30213 no. 
MP-10. 
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This standard fails to identify the key requirements associated with the use of liquid 
locking compounds (that they not be used in structural applications) and limits itself to 
generalities on the subject of having controlled, documented processes.   
 
Section 4.6.4.1 of JSC 49774 contains specific requirements on the use of liquid locking 
compounds as follows: 
 
4.6.4.1 Fastener Locking Requirements -- Each bolt, screw, nut, pin, or other fastener used 
in a safety critical application shall incorporate two separate verifiable locking features. 
Preload may be used as one of the features combined with a conventional aerospace 
secondary locking feature that is positive locking and vibration rated. Joints that are subject 
to rotation in operation shall use at least one non-friction locking device.  Use of a liquid 
locking compound as a secondary locking feature on safety-critical fasteners shall require 
an approved MUA [2] .  Liquid locking compounds used as a secondary locking feature in 
non-safety-critical  applications shall require a qualified process specified on the 
engineering drawing.  Installation procedures shall require functional verification of locking 
features, such as measurement of running (self-locking) torque or visual inspection of lock 
wire integrity. Preload torques and running torques shall be specified on the drawings. 
 
[2]  For the purposes of this requirement, Safety Critical fasteners are defined as :  
a) All primary or secondary structural fasteners used in the exterior and interior of 
flight modules. 
b) All non-structural fasteners used exterior to flight modules, which may pose a FOD 
risk to vehicle operations and which have not been vibration tested during qualification or 
acceptance of the hardware.   
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1. All multilayer thermal blankets or thermal blanket materials shall be baked out prior 
to exposure to sensitive surfaces during vacuum or prior to flight. In general, the blankets 
should be baked out at 80C (176°F) in a vacuum for 48 hr or until a quartz crystal 
microbalance held at -20°C (-4°F) shows less than 10 counts per hr. Blankets not in use 
shall be stored in clean, sealed containers. 
 
2. It is recommended that the materials be baked out prior to blanket construction or 
that blankets be slightly oversized. 
 
The procedures in number 1, above, will prevent multilayer thermal blankets from 
contaminating sensitive surfaces. 
 
In regard to number 2, above, typical multilayer blanket materials (Mylar and Kapton) 
shrink slightly during bake out. 
 
This standard incorporates SSP 30213 no. M/P-12. 
 
If MLI blankets are fabricated using materials that meet JSC 49774 outgassing 
requirements, there is no need to vacuum-bake the blankets before use.  The one benefit 
of vacuum baking is that it takes care of shrinkage, but this is a minor problem and not 
mentioned in the standard.  Some contractors like to bake their blankets but most do not. 
 
Section 4.3.6 of the revised JSC 49774 contains specific requirements on vacuum 
outgassing of materials and for vacuum baking components that contain materials that fail 
the requirement or are unknown.  Requirements are based on the standard ASTM E595 
test and acceptance criteria used by every space agency in the world (even RSA).   
 
Note: specific programs may have special, more stringent requirements (HST and ISS). 
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Design of a system using a silicate ester coolant shall observe the following ground rules: 
 
1. Nitrile elastomer seals shall not be used without making allowance for 
shrinkage. 
2. Silicone-based elastomers that will be in contact with or exposed to silicate 
ester coolants shall not be used because they will deteriorate. 
3. Ethylene propylene elastomers may be used; however, this elastomer will swell 
upon exposure to silicate ester fluids. 
4. Dow Corning DC-55 or similar lubricants shall not be used in seals, etc., 
exposed to silicate ester coolants such as Oronite Flo-Cool 100. Test and 
failure analyses have shown this lubricant to become a brittle, hard, and flaky 
material that can be detrimental to a sealing cavity, especially under dynamic 
conditions. Seals may be received from the manufacturer prelubricated with 
this type of lubricant. 
The effects described above were realized as a result of switching to Oronite fluid in the 
instrument unit coolant system, which was originally designed for use of water-methanol 
fluid. 
 
This standard incorporates SSP 30213 no. M/P-14. 
 
 
This standard addresses specific materials compatibility issues associated with a single 
coolant that has never been used by NASA in manned spacecraft.  All materials 
compatibility issues must be addressed for any fluid used in manned spacecraft. Revised 
M/P-1 calls out JSC 49774.    Sections 3.0 and 4.1.3 of JSC 49774 require fluids 
compatibility to be addressed for any material in contact with any fluid. 
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The use of equipment containing mercury in liquid or vapor form (such as manometers, 
lights, thermometers, etc.) shall be avoided where the mercury could come in contact with 
the spacecraft or spaceflight equipment at any time during manufacturing, assembly, 
testing, checkout, or flight. Where the use of equipment containing mercury cannot be 
avoided, the following information shall be documented in a waiver for approval by the 
Program Manager: 
1. A list of equipment containing mercury to be used during manufacturing, assembly, 
testing, and checkout, along with justification for each use 
2. The amount of mercury contained in the equipment 
3. The protection provided to prevent the release of mercury 
4. A plan for decontamination in the event the mercury is released. The plan must 
note the following: 
a. An environment containing mercury vapor in concentration of 0.005 mg/m3 (or 
greater) is not acceptable for continuous occupancy. Equipment used to detect mercury 
in the crew compartment must be able to measure concentrations below this level. 
b. Mercury must not be removed from metal surfaces with any abrasive cleaning 
method. The removal of oxide films on the metal will cause immediate mercury 
penetration. 
 
Mercury is a particularly hazardous liquid because of its toxicity and tendency to 
penetrate joints and amalgamate structure materials. Corona discharge can occur at low 
potentials in the presence of mercury vapor. 
Metal contaminated while under high stress will receive greater penetration of mercury 
and degradation of ability to withstand stress than will metals under relatively low stress. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 116 and incorporates SSP 30213 no. 
M/P-15. 
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Requirement is covered by revised JSC 49774 paragraph 4.2.7, which states: 
 
4.2.7  MERCURY  
Equipment containing mercury shall not be used where the mercury could come in contact 
with the spacecraft or spaceflight equipment during manufacturing, assembly, test, 
checkout, and flight.  Flight hardware (including fluorescent lamps) containing mercury shall 
have three levels of containment to prevent mercury leakage.  The bulbs of non-flight 
lamps containing mercury, such as those used in hardware ground processing and 
fluorescent penetrant inspection of flight parts, shall be protected by a non-shatterable, 
leak-proof outer container.  
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Surfaces in the habitable compartments which are expected to be exposed to extensive 
or continuous abrasion and rubbing contact by the spacecraft crew shall not be painted or 
coated with materials which are subject to flaking. 
 
Arm rests and floors on spacecraft have been painted. This paint has been rubbed, 
chipped, and flaked off in flight, presenting a floating hazard under zero-gravity 
conditions. 
Removable protection plates used on door facings prior to flight must also comply with 
this standard. 
Where necessary, surfaces may be protected by compatible processes, such as 
anodizing. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 43 and incorporates SSP 30213 no. M/P-
16. 
 
The problems identified in the remarks have been observed in the past but are almost 
entirely due to improper manufacturing processes (poor surface preparation/excessive 
cure and contamination of the primer surface before topcoat application) which are not 
mentioned in the standard.  Anodize is durable and popular with M&P, but human factors 
requirements often drive coating even when anodize is feasible  
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Section 3.0 of JSC 49774 contains generic requirements to ensure materials are selected 
for adequate life in the use environment.  Where surfaces in habitable compartments are 
to be coated, the durability of the coating is a key factor in coating material  trade studies.  
With proper materials selection and proper processes for conducting the coating, long life 
(such as 30 years) with minimal wear is feasible.  JSC 49774 has been revised to 
strengthen requirements on process controls; paragraph 3.1.3 of the revised document 
reads: 
 
3.1.3  PROCESS CONTROLS 
The materials and processes selection, control, and implementation plan shall identify all 
process specifications used to implement specific requirements in this standard.  All 
materials processes used in manufacturing shall be documented in process specifications 
and all applicable process specifications shall be identified on the engineering drawing.  
Each processing step in the process specification shall be identified in a level of detail that 
ensures the process is repeatable.  Qualification testing shall be conducted to demonstrate 
the repeatability of all processes where the quality of the product cannot be verified by 
subsequent monitoring or measurement.    Process specifications shall be made available 
to support design review activities.  Deviations from process specifications identified in the 
Materials & Processes Selection, Control, and Implementation Plan shall require approved 
MUAs per section 3.3 of this standard. 
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Radiographic inspection shall be used on brazed and welded tubing joints per military 
standard MIL-STD-453 or equivalent to verify that the brazing or welding process is under 
proper control. 
Radiographic inspection is not required on silver soldered joints of less than (12.7 mm) 
0.5 in. diam. in payload systems where (1) no catastrophic hazard exists, (2) tubing 
installation makes radiographic inspection difficult, and/or (3) electronic devices in 
proximity of joint(s) could be degraded by radiographic inspection. 
The use of radiographic inspection does not preclude the need for other established 
inspection procedures, such as visual examination, proof tests, and leak tests. 
Acceptance criteria for brazed joints shall be in accordance with military specification MIL-
B-7883 and weld joints in accordance with George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
specification MSFC-SPEC-504 or MSFC-SPEC-560, unless otherwise specified in the 
procurement documents. 
 
 
The explosive and catastrophic hazards to manned spacecraft carrying high pressure gas 
and liquid propellants make it mandatory that brazed and welded tubing joints be of 
uniform high quality. Radiographic inspection has proven to be an effective technique for 
determining the acceptable condition of joints produced by any given brazing or welding 
procedure. 
Silver soldering is considered a brazing operation, but it is not identical to silver brazing. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 87A and incorporates SSP 30213 no. 
M/P-17. 
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Requirement is superseded by the revised JSC 49774 paragraphs 4.4.4, 4.4.5, and 4.4.6.   
 
Paragraph 4.4.4 states that "The processing and quality assurance requirements for 
manual, automatic, and semiautomatic fusion welding for space flight applications and 
special test equipment used for testing flight hardware within NASA shall meet the 
requirements of NASA-STD-5006, General Fusion Welding Requirements for Aerospace 
Materials Used in Flight Hardware."   
 
Paragraph 4.4.5 states that "Brazing shall be conducted in accordance with AWS C-3.3, 
Design, Manufacture, and Inspection of Critical Brazed Components, Recommended 
Practices for."   
 
Paragraph 4.4.6 states that "Soldering shall not be used for structural applications."    
 
The standards called out by 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 call out appropriate inspection requirements. 
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Electrical wire or cable insulated or coated with polytetrafluoroethylene (TFE) or 
fluorinated ethylene propylene (FEP) shall be etched prior to potting to ensure 
mechanical bond strength and environmental seal. Potting shall be accomplished within 1 
year of etching, provided the etched wires have been protected from ultraviolet light and 
contamination. 
 
When etching of wire insulation is required to provide satisfactory bonding to potting 
materials, the open end of the wire shall not be exposed to the etchant. The preferred 
process is to form the wire into a U shape, immersing only the bent portion in the etchant 
with the open ends above the etchant level. The unetched end of the wire shall not be cut 
off prior to neutralization of the etchant. 
 
 
The failure of unetched TFE or FEP wire to bond to electrical connector potting materials 
allows moisture to penetrate within the connector, resulting in dielectric breakdown 
between pins. 
Care should be taken to keep etched wires clean and packaged in sealed black bags and 
stored in cabinets so as to avoid ultraviolet light. The potential bond strength of TFE or 
FEP deteriorates if more than 3 weeks elapses between etching and potting without 
proper protection afforded to these surfaces. 
Exposure of open ends of insulated wire to etchant may result in wicking of etchant 
between the conductor and/or shield braid and insulation. Subsequent exposure to low 
pressures may result in outgassing of the etchant. Wicking of the etchant may also cause 
corrosion of conductor and solder joints. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standards 98 and 109B and incorporates SSP 
30213 no. M/P-18. 
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Requirement is covered by revised JSC 49774 paragraph 4.3.10, which states: 
 
4.3.10  ETCHING FLUOROCARBONS 
The etching of fluorocarbons shall meet the requirements of SAE-AMS 2491, Surface 
Treatment of Polytetrafluoroethylene, Preparation for Bonding.  Etched surfaces must be 
processed within 24 hours or packaged per SAE-AMS 2491.  Etched surfaces packaged 
per AMS 2491 shall be processed within 1 year.  Electrical wire or cable insulated or 
coated with fluorocarbons shall be etched prior to potting to ensure mechanical bond 
strength and environmental seal.  When etching of wire insulation is required to provide 
satisfactory bonding to potting materials, the open end of the wire shall not be exposed to 
the etchant. 
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Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) shall not be used on manned spacecraft except under either of 
the following conditions: 
 
1. PVC's surface temperatures will not exceed 48.8°C (120°F) and/or pressures will 
not be less than 2.1 x 104 Pa (3 psia) under normal or emergency conditions. 
2. Adequate data is presented on outgassing, toxicity, physical changes, etc., for 
approval by the cognizant program office. 
 
 
Outgassed products are hazardous and corrosive. Products include hydrogen chloride, 
phosgene, CO, CO2 chlorine monoxide, and acidic carbonaceous coke. Plasticiser loss 
causes embrittlement. PVC has a low ignition point and will not comply with the 
requirements of JSCM standard M/P-2, Flammability of Wiring Materials. 
 
Results of the Manned Spacecraft Center test program have indicated that the three PVC 
formulations tested should not be used in applications which may be exposed to greater 
than 48.8°C (120°F) or less than 2.1 x 104 Pa (3 psia). 
 
Products containing PVC are often called by trade names that do not indicate the 
presence of PVC. 
 
AII types of PVC tested to date are fungus nutrient. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 18. 
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Requirement is superseded by JSC 49774 paragraphs 4.1 and 4.3.2.   
 
JSC 49774 paragraph 4.3.2  states that "Use of polyvinylchloride on flight hardware shall 
be limited to applications in pressurized areas where temperatures do not exceed 120 
degrees Fahrenheit (49 degrees C).  Polyvinylchloride shall not be used in vacuum. "   
 
In addition, paragraph 4.1 imposes NASA-STD-6001 requirements for flammability and 
toxic offgassing on all nonmetallic materials.   
 
These requirements address all issues with use of PVC. 
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Titanium or its alloys shall not be used where exposed to liquid oxygen. 
 
Titanium or its alloys shall not be used where exposed to gaseous oxygen at any 
pressure or with air at oxygen partial pressures above 34.5 kPa (5 lb psia). 
 
 
1. Jackson, J.D.; Miller, P.D.; and Boyd, W. K.: Reactivity of Titanium With 
Gaseous N2O4 Under Conditions of Tensile Rupture. Defense Metals 
Information Center (DMIC) Memorandum 173, Battelle Memorial Institute, 
Columbus, Ohio, August 1, 1963. 
2. Riehl, W. A.; Key, C. F.; and Gayle, J. B.: Reactivity of Titanium With Oxygen. 
Technical Report NASA TR-180, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, 
Alabama. 
3. Molley, J. J.: Tank Explosion. Letter, Industrial Hygiene and Safety, 
Rocketdyne, North American Aviation, April 27, 1964. 
4. Gabel, H.; and Benz, F. J.: Combustion Phenomena of Commercially Pure 
Titanium and Ti-6AI-4V in Oxygen. In Flammability and Sensitivity of Materials 
in Oxygen-Enriched Atmospheres, Vol. S, American Society for Testing 
Materials STP 1111, 1991. 
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RATIONALE FOR CANCELLATION [Cont.] 
 
Requirement is superseded by JSC 49774 paragraph 4.2.3.5, which states: 
 
 4.2.3.5 Titanium Flammability -- Titanium alloys shall not be used with Liquid Oxygen 
(LOX) or Gaseous Oxygen (GOX) at any pressure or with air at oxygen partial pressures 
above 5 psia (34.5 kPa).   Titanium alloys shall not be machined inside spacecraft modules 
during ground processing or in flight, because machining operations can ignite titanium 
turnings and cause fire. 
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Unalloyed beryllium shall not be used within the crew compartment(s) of spacecraft 
unless suitably protected to prevent erosion, or formation of salts or oxides. 
Environmental tests, under expected conditions, shall be conducted to verify that the 
coating used provides satisfactory protection for the beryllium surface. 
 
Beryllium and alloys or oxides of beryllium shall not be ground, filed, drilled, sawed, or in 
any other way machined within the spacecraft crew compartment at any stage of 
manufacturing, assembly, testing, modification, or operation. 
Beryllium is an extremely toxic material whose threshold limit is 0.002 mg/m3. Mists, 
dusts, or fumes containing beryllium or its compounds can cause a delayed type of 
pneumonitis that may manifest itself after an extended period of time. 
 
Alloys containing 4 percent or less of beryllium are an exception to this standard. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 51. 
Requirement is covered by revised JSC 49774 paragraph 4.2.5, which states: 
 
4.2.5  BERYLLIUM  
Beryllium shall not be used for primary structural applications.  Beryllium is allowed as an 
alloying constituent up to a maximum of 4 percent by weight. Beryllium alloys containing 
more than 4 percent beryllium by weight shall not be used for any application within 
spacecraft crew compartments unless suitably protected to prevent erosion or formation of 
salts or oxides.  Beryllium alloys and beryllium oxide of beryllium shall not be machined 
inside spacecraft crew compartments at any stage of manufacturing, assembly, testing, 
modification, or operation. 
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Brazed joints in spacecraft fuel and oxidizer lines shall be permanently marked adjacent 
to the joint to identify the qualified brazer who makes the joint and the inspector who 
approves the joint. The mark to be used shall be applied by an approved method which 
has been shown to be incapable of degrading brazing or tubing material. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Improve manufacturing discipline, traceability, and inspection capability. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 82. 
 
The process of brazing fuel and oxidizer lines is no longer performed.  Tracking of welded 
joints is performed via inspection records 
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1. The compatibility of pressure vessel materials with processing, inspecting, testing, 
and flight fluids will be verified by data obtained under conditions simulating the intended 
fluid-use environment. When coupons are used to verify properties, test material will be 
representative of the production pressure vessel material and will have been subjected to 
processes that are representative of the processes for production pressure vessels. 
Fluids to be used in pressure testing of pressure vessels and flight fluids must be 
evaluated with the pressure vessel material considering the existence of flaws that can be 
accepted by inspecting processes The effect of material condition (parent versus weld 
metal or heat-affected one) must be considered in the compatibility determinations. The 
scope of the program shall be sufficient to show compatibility of the fluid and material for 
the anticipated temperature range, pressure range, pressure cycle history of the vessel, 
and fluid composition range. 
 
2. Qualification tests of pressure vessels will be conducted on representative 
pressure vessels that have been fabricated by proposed production processes and 
exposed to the same processing, inspecting, and test sequences (fluids, times, and 
pressures) as would be expected on flight hardware. 
 
3. The qualification program will include tests on pressure vessels containing the 
flight fluids at the maximum pressure allowed by the relief devices or maximum pressure 
expected for vessels without relief devices. In addition, the conditions of the tests will 
include exposure to the most deleterious operating temperature expected in use. 
 
4. The vessels, while containing the flight fluid, shall be subjected to the above 
pressure and temperature conditions for twice the expected pressurized life or for 1 year, 
whichever is less. The flight duration shall include the time from initial pressuri 
zation, with the flight fluid, and the anticipated launch pad hold times under pressure. 
 
5. For testing of pressure vessels with decaying pressure, flight duration can be taken 
as the time from initial pressurization with the flight fluid including the anticipated launch 
pad hold times under pressure to the time at which the internal pressure of the vessel 
reaches one-half the maximum pressure allowed by the relief device or one-half 
maximum operating pressure, whichever pressure is less. 
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For the purposes of this standard, a "pressure vessel" is defined as a container for the 
storage of compressed fluid that would release more than 19,320 J (14,250 ft-lb) of 
energy [0.004 kg (0.01 lb) equivalent of TNT] based on the adiabatic expansion of a 
perfect gas to ambient conditions. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 114A. 
 
 
Requirement is superseded by revised M/P-13, which calls out ANSI/AIAA S-080, “Space 
Systems-Metallic Pressure Vessels, Pressurized Structures, and Pressure Components”, 
and ANSI/AIAA S-081, “Space Systems-Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels 
(COPVs)". Each part of the standard listed above is addressed below: 
 
1. Compatibility of pressure vessel materials – is covered by M/P-13 
2. Qualification tests of pressure vessels  - is covered by M/P-13 
3. Qualification Program is obsolete and replaced by M/P-13 
4. Life testing regime is obsolete and replaced by M/P-13 
5. Not a requirement 
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Use of cadmium and cadmium plating should be avoided under the following conditions: 
 
1. Where cadmium in contact with breathing gas could reach temperatures that 
would generate toxic fumes 
2. In equipment containers where electrical and electronic equipment could be 
degraded to an unacceptable level by vaporization and deposition of cadmium 
on the equipment surfaces 
3. In applications where the combination of temperature and proximity of the 
cadmium or cadmium plating could adversely affect critical surfaces by 
cadmium deposition. Critical surfaces include but are not limited to optical 
surfaces. electromagnetic radiating surfaces and surfaces that have specified 
requirements for solar radiation absorptivity or total hemispheric emissitivity 
4. In applications where temperature of the cadmium or cadmium plating could 
exceed 232.2°C (450°F) 
 
Cadmium is prone to vaporize rapidly at combinations of temperature and pressure 
encountered in spaceflight applications. The fumes are toxic and may cause problems if 
redeposited on certain equipment surfaces. 
A sharp decrease in the tensile strength of cadmium-plated high-strength steel parts can 
occur when the parts are subjected to elevated temperatures while under stress. 
Embrittlement occurs as a result of diffusion of cadmium into the alloy, a process that 
progresses rapidly at temperatures above 232.2°C (450°F). Under such conditions, 
failures have occurred at loads corresponding to stresses well below the tensile strength 
of the steel. Cadmium-plated tools should not be used on titanium or high-strength steel 
parts that are to be operated under stress at temperatures above 232.2°C (450°F) since 
small deposits of cadmium may be left on the part. 
 
 
Continued next page. 
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Breathable atmospheres could become severely toxic with cadmium fumes if a cadmium 
or cadmium-plated part were overheated. Overheating could result from an electrical 
short circuit a fire or from dissipated electrical power in a component installed with a 
cadmium-plated fastener. The toxic effect is cumulative and continued breathing of a very 
low concentration of cadmium fumes may result in prolonged disability or possibly death. 
The presence of low concentrations of cadmium fumes may not be detected until toxic 
effects are felt. Venting the crew compartment to outside atmosphere or space would 
provide only a temporary reduction in cadmium concentration unless the supply of 
cadmium were depleted or the source of heat eliminated. The use of an organic-based 
paint as a barrier overcoating of cadmium surfaces is not a reliable method of control 
because of the porosity of the available overcoatings and the possibility of overcoating 
damage during normal operations. Complete elimination of cadmium from areas exposed 
directly to breathable atmospheres appears to be the most practical method of avoiding 
the toxicity hazards involved in cadmium use. 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 125. 
 
 
Requirement is superseded by JSC 49774 paragraph 4.2.6, which specifically addresses 
all "to be avoided" conditions in the old standard: 
 
4.2.6  CADMIUM  
Cadmium shall not be used in crew environments.  Cadmium shall not be used in vacuum 
environments where the temperature/pressure environment could cause contamination of 
optical surfaces or electrical devices 
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Develop nondestructive evaluation (NDE) plans during the design phase to delineate the 
methods and techniques used to evaluate the surface and subsurface conditions of the 
pressure vessel during the following phases: 
 
1. Manufacturing phase 
2. Buildup and assembly phases 
3. Phase subsequent to proof testing 
4. Operational life phase 
 
Describe NDE methods and techniques in the design control specification and on other 
applicable specifications, drawings, and procedures. 
 
Methods of inspecting welds are of particular importance. Before installation and 
subsequent to design proof testing, examine welds by the specified NDE methods. 
 
For the purposes of this standard, a "pressure vessel" is defined as a container for 
compressed fluid that would release more than 19,320 J(14,250 ft-lb)[0.004 kg (0.01 lb) 
equivalent of TNT] based on the adiabatic expansion of a perfect gas to ambient 
conditions. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 137. 
Requirement is superseded by revised M/P-13, which calls out:  
1. ANSI/AIAA S-080, “Space Systems-Metallic Pressure Vessels, Pressurized 
Structures, and Pressure Components”  
2. ANSI/AIAA S-081, “Space Systems-Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels 
(COPVs)" 
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Exposed sharp surfaces or protrusions which could injure crew members or damage 
equipment shall be eliminated or guarded so as to avoid accidental contact. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sharp surfaces or protrusions are those surfaces, edges, crevices, points, burrs, wire 
ends, screw heads, corners, brackets, rivets, braided cable, swaged cable, cable strands, 
clamps, pins, latches, lap joints, bolt ends, lock nuts, etc., that if contacted could injure 
crew members or damage equipment by entrapment, cutting, sawing, abrading, 
snagging, tearing, or puncturing. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 142 and incorporates SSP 30213 no. 
M/S-6. 
 
The content of this 8080 standard is already covered in NASA STD 3000, paragraph 
6.3.3 "Mechanical Hazards Design Requirements." 
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Doors in the structure of the spacecraft or heat shield that open and close during flight 
must be designed such that a single-point failure will not cause the loss of crew or 
vehicle. The following design requirements shall be met: 
 
l. Doors shall be used only if no other practicable method exists to perform the desired 
function. 
 
2. Doors shall be as small as practicable and shall be designed to cover only the devices 
they protect; specifically, they will not be enlarged for use as maintenance access doors. 
Designs requiring active vents will include relief features to prevent catastrophic failures 
should the door fail to operate.  Vehicle aerodynamics and structural integrity will not be 
catastrophically degraded by a failed door. 
 
3. Spacecraft systems requiring thermal protection doors shall be designed so that if a 
door fails, the spacecraft can make a safe ascent and reentry. 
 
4. For door operation that is not time critical with respect to survival of crew and/or 
vehicle, an alternate manual means shall be provided if items 2 and 3 are not practicable. 
 
This standard supersedes JSCM 8080 standard 150. 
 
 
Standard addresses technical content that is obsolete.  Standard was also unverifiable. 
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All slings are to be designed with a safety actor of 5 to 1 to the ultimate and initially tested 
and periodically retested to 200 percent of the maximum load capacity. 
 
All lifting and hoisting load-bearing sling components that can be disassembled, such as 
individual slings, cables, shackles, pins, bolts, and similar parts, shall be tethered, 
serialized, tagged, or marked for positive identification and traceability to ensure proper 
assembly of verified hardware after proof load testing.. 
 
Proof loading and periodic recertification of slings and load-bearing assemblies cannot be 
properly verified in real time if all components of the assemblies are not traceable back to 
the load-testing configuration. 
 
This standard incorporates SSP 30213 no. M/S-13 
 
Current standard is not comprehensive and could lead to oversights.  Standard is not 
comprehensive and is superseded by a higher level document. 
 
Standard is completely covered by NASA STD-8719.9, "Standard for Lifting Devices & 
Equipment". 
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Wiring splicing is prohibited on both flight firing circuits and ground test firing circuits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A failure due to a broken wire can cause catastrophic damage including loss of vehicle 
and crew 
 
For ground test, a broken or intermittent wire can cause loss of data or cause an 
inadvertent firing. 
 
 
 
 
The specifications for splicing, whether for pyrotechnic or other circuits, are captured 
within the content of NASA-STD-8739.4.  
 
To avoid conflicting splicing requirements, the JPR 8080 P-3 standard is cancelled. 
 
Standard content is contained in NASA-STD-8739.4. 
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Packaging of pyrotechnic devices shall be in accordance with the packaging and handling 
requirements of NSTS 08060 (Rev. J, March 2003), Space Shuttle System Pyrotechnic 
Specification.   
 
Raw explosive mixes that are not loaded into an electro-explosive component shall be 
contained in conductive packaging and be in compliance with MIL-STD-2073. 
 
 
 
The following paragraphs from NSTS 08060 Space Shuttle System Pyrotechnic 
Specification apply specifically to this standard:   
 
• 3.2.2.1, JSC Safety  
• 3.8.3, Transportation Environments   
• 6.0, Preservation, Packaging and Delivery 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
Pyrotechnic packaging requirements are covered in Federal Regulations. 
 
Packaging and shipping requirements are now covered by Federal regulations. 
 
Pyrotechnic device packaging and shipping requirements are covered by Department of 
Transportation Requirements listed in the Code of Federal Regulations Title 49 Parts 100 
through 199. 
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Pyrotechnic devices shall be color coded as follows: 
 1. Expended (fired) units – red paint.   
2. Loaded or Charged units- Natural color of the body material (i.e., stainless steel or 
aluminum). 
3. Charged units (or off nominal loaded units) not intended for flight - blue paint.  
Exceptions to painting units blue that are not intended for flight include those units in 
storage at JSC/ Energy Systems Test Area (ESTA) / Building 352 for testing such as 
Age Life Verification or Destructive Lot Acceptance Test (DLAT) setup verification 
firings where paint may be detrimental to environmental conditioning such as 
thermal cycling. 
4. Color coding shall be conspicuous and not obliterate identification markings such as 
part, lot, or serial numbers.  
 
Inert pyrotechnic devices are identified as a "pyro device" according to NSTS 08060, 
Space Shuttle Pyrotechnic Specification, paragraph 11.0 Definitions.  
 
Off nominal loaded devices are defined as those units whose charge load is different from 
the charge load of flight operational units.  
 
Inert (unloaded by design) flown pyrotechnic devices which accept loaded devices for 
functioning such as frangible nuts or thrusters that are flown are painted as required by 
flight environments which dictate the thermal protection and/or anti-reflectivity posture.   
 
Because of the various sizes and configurations of explosive devices, the location and 
extent of color coding cannot be defined in this standard.  
 
Color coding requirements are now defined in Program level requirements documents. 
Color coding requirements are now defined in headquarters level requirements 
documents.  
Color coding requirements are defined in JSC 62809 Revision C. 
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